論工業社會及其未來

INTRODUCTION
介紹

The Industrial Revolution and itsconsequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatlyincreased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in "advanced"countries, but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling,have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespreadpsychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) andhave inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development oftechnology will worsen the situation. It will certainly subject human beings togreater indignities and inflict greater damage on the natural world, it willprobably lead to greater social disruption and psychological suffering, and itmay lead to increased physical suffering even in "advanced"countries.

1
工業革命及其後果為人類帶來了極大的災難。這兩者極大地增加了我們這些生活在“發達”國家的人口的預期壽命，但也破壞了社會的穩定性，令生活空虛無謂，剝奪了人類的尊嚴，導致了心理疾病的擴散（以及第三世界裡的生理疾病擴散），還嚴重地破壞了自然界。技術的繼續發展將令上述情況進一步惡化。人類尊嚴必將遭到進一步剝奪，自然界也必將遭到進一步破壞。社會也很可能遭到進一步擾亂，心理困擾將會加劇，而生理疾病甚至將會在“發達”國家蔓延開來。

The industrial-technological system maysurvive or it may break down. If it survives, it MAY eventually achieve a lowlevel of physical and psychological suffering, but only after passing through along and very painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanentlyreducing human beings and many other living organisms to engineered productsand mere cogs in the social machine. Furthermore, if the system survives, theconsequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming or modifying thesystem so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.

2
工業-技術體系可能倖存也可能崩潰。假如該體系倖存下來，可能最終將會降低生理與心理的痛苦水平，但在此之前必須經歷一段漫長而痛苦的調整期，而且人類與眾多其他生命體也將付出慘重代價，永遠淪為社會機器上的齒輪。更有甚者，假如這個體系倖存下來，將會導致不可避免的後果：沒有任何方法能夠改革或改進這一體系，使之不至於剝奪人的尊嚴與自主。

If the system breaks down theconsequences will still be very painful. But the bigger the system grows themore disastrous the results of its breakdown will be, so if it is to break downit had best break down sooner rather than later.

3
假如這一體系崩潰，結果依舊會十分痛苦。但是體系規模越大，崩潰造成的結果就越可怕。因此假如真要崩潰的話最好趕早不趕遲。

We therefore advocate a revolutionagainst the industrial system. This revolution may or may not make use ofviolence: it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process spanning afew decades. We can't predict any of that. But we do outline in a very generalway the measures that those who hate the industrial system should take in orderto prepare the way for a revolution against that form of society. This is notto be a POLITICAL revolution. Its object will be to overthrow not governmentsbut the economic and technological basis of the present society.,

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所以我們主張發動針對工業體系的革命。這場革命可能使用或不使用暴力，可能突然完成也可能在幾十年時間裡相對循序漸進地進行。我們無法預測這一點。但是我們的確為那些憎恨工業體系的人們勾勒了一套十分寬泛的方法，從而為反對這一特定社會形式的革命鋪平道路。這不是一場政治革命。革命目標並非推翻政府，而是顛覆現存社會的經濟與技術基礎。

In this article we give attention toonly some of the negative developments that have grown out of theindustrial-technological system. Other such developments we mention onlybriefly or ignore altogether. This does not mean that we regard these otherdevelopments as unimportant. For practical reasons we have to confine our discussionto areas that have received insufficient public attention or in which we havesomething new to say. For example, since there are well-developed environmentaland wilderness movements, we have written very little about environmentaldegradation or the destruction of wild nature, even though we consider these tobe highly important.

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本文中我們僅僅關注了工業-技術體系所產生的所有負面發展中的一部分。其他此類發展我們則僅僅稍微提了一提或者乾脆完全忽略了。這並不意味著我們認為此類負面發展不重要。出於實際考量我們必須將討論範圍侷限於未曾獲得足夠公眾注意或者我們有話要說的領域。例如，鑑於目前已經有了進展得力的環保與自然運動，我們對於環境惡化或自然破壞的話題並未多費筆墨，儘管我們認為這些問題極為重要。

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN LEFTISM
現代左派主義的心理

Almost everyone will agree that we livein a deeply troubled society. One of the most widespread manifestations of thecraziness of our world is leftism, so a discussion of the psychology of leftismcan serve as an introduction to the discussion of the problems of modernsociety in general.

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幾乎所有人都會同意我們生活在一個深度動盪的社會。我們這個社會的瘋狂有許多廣為傳播的表現，左派主義就是其中之一。因此討論左派主義心理有助於進一步開展針對現代社會一般性問題的討論。

But what is leftism? During the firsthalf of the 20th century leftism could have been practically identified withsocialism. Today the movement is fragmented and it is not clear who canproperly be called a leftist. When we speak of leftists in this article we havein mind mainly socialists, collectivists, "politically correct"types, feminists, gay and disability activists, animal rights activists and thelike. But not everyone who is associated with one of these movements is aleftist. What we are trying to get at in discussing leftism is not so much amovement or an ideology as a psychological type, or rather a collection ofrelated types. Thus, what we mean by "leftism" will emerge moreclearly in the course of our discussion of leftist psychology (Also, seeparagraphs 227-230.)

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但是左派主義是什麼呢？在二十世紀前半段左派主義就等同於社會主義。今天這一運動已經分崩離析了，也很難說怎樣的人才算是左派主義者。本文中所謂的左派主義者包括社會主義者、集體主義者、“政治正確”人士、女權主義者、同性戀與殘疾人活動者，動物權益保護者以及其他類似群體。但並非所有與此類活動有所牽扯的人都一定是左派主義者。我們這裡打算討論的並非左派主義運動或者意識形態，而是左派運動的心理類型或者相關心理類型的集合。我們筆下“左派主義”的含義將會隨著我們對於左派主義心理的討論而越發清晰。（見227-230段）

Even so, our conception of leftism willremain a good deal less clear than we would wish, but there doesn't seem to beany remedy for this. All we are trying to do is indicate in a rough andapproximate way the two psychological tendencies that we believe are the maindriving force of modern leftism. We by no means claim to be telling the WHOLEtruth about leftist psychology. Also, our discussion is meant to apply tomodern leftism only. We leave open the question of the extent to which ourdiscussion could be applied to the leftists of the 19th and early 20th century.

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儘管如此，我們對於左派主義的概念依然趕不上我們的希望那樣清晰，但是看來在這方面完全無計可施。我們在這裡只想以粗略的方式指出我們眼中驅動現代左派主義的兩大心理趨勢。我們不敢聲稱已經窮盡了左派心理的所有事實。我們的討論也僅侷限於現代左派主義。至於我們的討論究竟在多大程度上可以應用於十九世紀以及二十世紀初期的左派主義者，在此姑且存而不論。

The two psychological tendencies thatunderlie modern leftism we call "feelings of inferiority" and"oversocialization." Feelings of inferiority are characteristic ofmodern leftism as a whole, while oversocialization is characteristic only of acertain segment of modern leftism; but this segment is highly influential.

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我們將奠定現代左派主義基礎的兩股心理趨勢稱為“自卑感”與“過度社會化。自卑感是現代左派主義的整體特徵，而過度社會化則僅僅是現代左派主義某些派別的特徵，但是這一派別極有影響力。

FEELINGS OF INFERIORITY
自卑感

By "feelings of inferiority" we mean not only inferiority feelings in the strictest sense but a whole spectrum of related traits: low self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness, depressive tendencies, defeatism, guilt, self-hatred, etc. We argue that modern leftists tend to have such feelings (possibly more or less repressed) and that these feelings are decisive in determining the direction of modern leftism.

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我們口中的“自卑感”不僅意味著最嚴格意義上的自卑感，還包括一系列十分廣泛的相關特徵：自尊低下、無力感、抑鬱、失敗主義、負罪感以及自我憎恨等等。我們認為現代左派主義者傾向於有上述感受（可能受到了一定程度的壓抑），這些感受對於決定現代左派主義的方向起著決定性的作用。

When someone interprets as derogatory almost anything that is said about him (or about groups with whom he identifies) we conclude that he has inferiority feelings or low self-esteem. This tendency is pronounced among minority rights advocates, whether or not they belong to the minority groups whose rights they defend. They are hypersensitive about the words used to designate minorities. The terms "negro," "oriental," "handicapped" or "chick" for an African, an Asian, a disabled person or a woman originally had no derogatory connotation. "Broad" and "chick" were merely the feminine equivalents of "guy," "dude" or "fellow." The negative connotations have been attached to these terms by the activists themselves. Some animal rights advocates have gone so far as to reject the word "pet" and insist on its replacement by "animal companion." Leftist anthropologists go to great lengths to avoid saying anything about primitive peoples that could conceivably be interpreted as negative. They want to replace the word "primitive" by "nonliterate." They seem almost paranoid about anything that might suggest that any primitive culture is inferior to our own. (We do not mean to imply that primitive cultures ARE inferior to ours. We merely point out the hypersensitivity of leftish anthropologists.)

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當某人將幾乎一切針對他（或者他所認同的群體）所說的話均理解為貶損時，我們就認為此人有自卑感或低自尊。少數群體權益擁護者就體現了這一趨向，無論他們自身是否從屬於該群體。他們對於指代少數群體的名詞極為敏感。指代黑人、亞洲人、殘疾人與女性的“黑鬼（negro）”、“東方人（oriental）”、“殘廢（handicapped）”與“妞（chick）”就原意來說並不包含貶低意味。“娘們（broad）”與“妞”只是“爺們（guy）”“哥們（dude，fellow）”的女性對應稱謂。正是活動家們自己為這些名詞附加了負面含義。有些動物權益活動家們甚至拒絕使用“寵物”一詞，而以“動物伴侶”取而代之。左派人類學家們十分費力地避免使用任何可能被理解為負面含義的言辭來形容原始民族，他們還想把“原始（primitive）”替換成“不文（nonliterate）”任何可能暗示原始文化比他們的文化更為低劣的言辭都令他們幾乎要疑神疑鬼。（我們在此不打算暗示原始文化比我們的文化更為低劣。我們僅僅想要指出左派人類學家極為敏感的表現。）

Those who are most sensitive about "politically incorrect" terminology are not the average black ghetto-dweller, Asian immigrant, abused woman or disabled person, but a minority of activists, many of whom do not even belong to any "oppressed" group but come from privileged strata of society. Political correctness has its stronghold among university professors, who have secure employment with comfortable salaries, and the majority of whom are heterosexual, white males from middle-class families.

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對於“政治正確”術語最為敏感的人並非一般的貧民區黑人居民、亞洲移民，遭受虐待的女性或者殘疾人，而是一小部分活動家，他們當中有許多人甚至都不屬於任何“受壓迫”群體，而是出身於地位更高的社會階層。政治正確的據點是大學教授，他們有穩定的工作與豐厚的薪金，以中產階級出身異性戀白人男性為主。

Many leftists have an intense identification with the problems of groups that have an image of being weak (women), defeated (American Indians), repellent (homosexuals), or otherwise inferior. The leftists themselves feel that these groups are inferior. They would never admit it to themselves that they have such feelings, but it is precisely because they do see these groups as inferior that they identify with their problems. (We do not suggest that women, Indians, etc., ARE inferior; we are only making a point about leftist psychology).

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許多左派主義者對於那些在形象上軟弱（女性）、失敗（印第安原住民）、令人反感（同性戀）等等的群體所遭遇的問題有著十分強烈的認同感。他們絕不會自認擁有此類感情，但正是因為他們認為這些群體低人一等才會認同他們遭遇的問題。（我們並未暗示女性與印第安人等群體低人一等，我們僅僅在解釋左派主義者的心理。）

Feminists are desperately anxious to prove that women are as strong as capable as men. Clearly they are nagged by a fear that women may NOT be as strong and as capable as men.

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女權主義者極為急切地想要證明女性與男性一樣強壯有力。很明顯女性可能不像男性一樣強壯有力的恐懼令她們十分不安。

Leftists tend to hate anything that has an image of being strong, good and successful. They hate America, they hate Western civilization, they hate white males, they hate rationality. The reasons that leftists give for hating the West, etc. clearly do not correspond with their real motives. They SAY they hate the West because it is warlike, imperialistic, sexist, ethnocentric and so forth, but where these same faults appear in socialist countries or in primitive cultures, the leftist finds excuses for them, or at best he GRUDGINGLY admits that they exist; whereas he ENTHUSIASTICALLY points out (and often greatly exaggerates) these faults where they appear in Western civilization. Thus it is clear that these faults are not the leftist's real motive for hating America and the West. He hates America and the West because they are strong and successful.

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左派主義者傾向於憎恨一切給人留下強大、優秀與成功印象的事物。他們憎恨美國，他們憎恨西方文明，他們憎恨白人男性，他們憎恨理性。左派主義者們之所以憎恨西方等事物的原因顯然與他們的真正動機不符。他們說他們之所以憎恨西方是因為西方喜好戰爭、推行帝國主義、性別歧視以及種族中心論等等，但當這些問題出現在社會主義國家或者原始文化當中時，左派主義者們總會為其尋找藉口，至多也僅僅是勉強承認其存在，同時則十分積極地（並經常誇大其詞地）指出西方文明中出現的同樣問題。因此很顯然這些問題並非左派主義者憎恨美國與西方的真正原因。他們憎恨美國與西方是因為它們強大而成功。

Words like "self-confidence," "self-reliance," "initiative", "enterprise," "optimism," etc. play little role in the liberal and leftist vocabulary. The leftist is anti-individualistic, pro-collectivist. He wants society to solve everyone's needs for them, take care of them. He is not the sort of person who has an inner sense of confidence in his own ability to solve his own problems and satisfy his own needs. The leftist is antagonistic to the concept of competition because, deep inside, he feels like a loser.

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“自信”、“自立”、“自主”、“進取”以及“樂觀”之類的詞彙在自由派與左派主義者的用語當中起不到多少作用。左派主義者反對個人主義，支持集體主義。他們希望社會解決每個人的需求並照料他們。他內心深處對於依靠自己的能力解決自己的問題並滿足自己的需求毫無信心。左派主義者是競爭這一概念的天敵，因為他在內心深處感覺像是個失敗者。

Art forms that appeal to modern leftist intellectuals tend to focus on sordidness, defeat and despair, or else they take an orgiastic tone, throwing off rational control as if there were no hope of accomplishing anything through rational calculation and all that was left was to immerse oneself in the sensations of the moment.

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吸引現代左派主義知識分子的藝術形式傾向於關注污穢、失敗與絕望，或者採取狂歡基調，放棄理性控制，似乎已經無望通過理性計算實現任何目的，只得將自己徹底沉浸於當下的感官刺激當中。

Modern leftist philosophers tend to dismiss reason, science, objective reality and to insist that everything is culturally relative. It is true that one can ask serious questions about the foundations of scientific knowledge and about how, if at all, the concept of objective reality can be defined. But it is obvious that modern leftist philosophers are not simply cool-headed logicians systematically analyzing the foundations of knowledge. They are deeply involved emotionally in their attack on truth and reality. They attack these concepts because of their own psychological needs. For one thing, their attack is an outlet for hostility, and, to the extent that it is successful, it satisfies the drive for power. More importantly, the leftist hates science and rationality because they classify certain beliefs as true (i.e., successful, superior) and other beliefs as false (i.e. failed, inferior). The leftist's feelings of inferiority run so deep that he cannot tolerate any classification of some things as successful or superior and other things as failed or inferior. This also underlies the rejection by many leftists of the concept of mental illness and of the utility of IQ tests. Leftists are antagonistic to genetic explanations of human abilities or behavior because such explanations tend to make some persons appear superior or inferior to others. Leftists prefer to give society the credit or blame for an individual's ability or lack of it. Thus if a person is "inferior" it is not his fault, but society's, because he has not been brought up properly.

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現代左派主義哲學家傾向於蔑視理性、科學與客觀現實，並堅持一切都在文化上都是相對的。誠然，人們可以就科學知識的基礎以及如何（假如可以的話）在概念上定義客觀事實提出嚴肅的問題。但是顯然現代左派主義哲學家們並不僅僅是頭腦冷靜的邏輯學家，他們的所作所為也不是對於知識基礎進行系統性分析。他們在攻擊真理與事實時投入了大量的感情。他們攻擊這些概念是因為自己的心理需求。他們的攻擊行為是對自身敵意的發洩，假如這種攻擊取得成功，還能滿足他們的權欲。更重要的是，左派主義者們憎恨科學與理性是因為它們將特定信仰歸類為真（成功、高等）而將其他信仰歸類為假（失敗、低等）。左派主義者的自卑感如此深厚以至於他無法容忍對於事物進行任何成功/高等與失敗/低等的分類。還有許多左派主義者以此為基礎反對精神疾病的概念與智商測試的實用性。左派主義者尤為反對從基因角度解釋人類能力或表現，因為此類解釋會使一部分人顯得比另一部分人更為高等或低等。左派主義者更喜歡將個人能力或能力缺乏歸功或歸罪於社會。因此假如某人較為“低等”，這並非本人的錯誤，而是社會的錯誤，因為他沒有得到適當的培養。

The leftist is not typically the kind of person whose feelings of inferiority make him a braggart, an egotist, a bully, a self-promoter, a ruthless competitor. This kind of person has not wholly lost faith in himself. He has a deficit in his sense of power and self-worth, but he can still conceive of himself as having the capacity to be strong, and his efforts to make himself strong produce his unpleasant behavior. [1] But the leftist is too far gone for that. His feelings of inferiority are so ingrained that he cannot conceive of himself as individually strong and valuable. Hence the collectivism of the leftist. He can feel strong only as a member of a large organization or a mass movement with which he identifies himself.

19
左派主義者並非那種會因為自卑感而誇誇其談、自高自大、欺凌他人、自我吹捧以致無情競爭的典型人物。此類人物並未完全喪失對自己的信心。他在權力與自我價值的認知方面有缺陷，他他依然可以想像自己強大有力的樣子，正是他令自己強大的努力才導致了這種種令人不快的行為。[1] 然而左派主義者已經遠遠超過了這一階段。他的自卑感如此根深蒂固，以至於她無法想像自己可以成為一名強大且有價值的個人。因此左派主義者信奉集體主義。他僅僅在身為大型組織或大規模運動的一員時才能感到強大。

[1]. (Paragraph 19) We are asserting that ALL, or even most, bullies and ruthless competitors suffer from feelings of inferiority.
[1]（第19段）我們斷言，所有或者至少大多數欺辱他人或者無情競爭的人都有自卑感。

Notice the masochistic tendency of leftist tactics. Leftists protest by lying down in front of vehicles, they intentionally provoke police or racists to abuse them, etc. These tactics may often be effective, but many leftists use them not as a means to an end but because they PREFER masochistic tactics. Self-hatred is a leftist trait.

20
注意左派主義者們行動策略中的自虐傾向。左派主義者經常躺在車輪前進行抗議，有意識挑逗警察或種族主義者對自身施暴。這些策略往往有效。但是許多左派主義者使用此類策略並非單純當做手段，而是因為他們更偏好自虐性的策略。自我憎恨是左派主義者的特徵。

Leftists may claim that their activism is motivated by compassion or by moral principle, and moral principle does play a role for the leftist of the oversocialized type. But compassion and moral principle cannot be the main motives for leftist activism. Hostility is too prominent a component of leftist behavior; so is the drive for power. Moreover, much leftist behavior is not rationally calculated to be of benefit to the people whom the leftists claim to be trying to help. For example, if one believes that affirmative action is good for black people, does it make sense to demand affirmative action in hostile or dogmatic terms? Obviously it would be more productive to take a diplomatic and conciliatory approach that would make at least verbal and symbolic concessions to white people who think that affirmative action discriminates against them. But leftist activists do not take such an approach because it would not satisfy their emotional needs. Helping black people is not their real goal. Instead, race problems serve as an excuse for them to express their own hostility and frustrated need for power. In doing so they actually harm black people, because the activists' hostile attitude toward the white majority tends to intensify race hatred.

21
左派主義者可能聲稱他們的活動動機是同情或者道德原則，道德原則對於過度社會化的左派主義者也的確有作用。但是同情或者道德原則不會是左派主義活動的主要動機。左派主義者的活動當中有著太過突出的敵意，因此其最要動機是權欲。更有甚者，許多左派主義者在進行活動時並沒有為了維護他們聲稱想要幫助的群體的權益而進行理性計算。例如，如果一個人認為黑人平權行動對黑人有益，那麼採取敵對化或教條化的平權行動有意義嗎？很明顯，與那些認為平權行動對他們造成歧視的白人們打交道時，採取靈活懷柔的手段並至少作出一些口頭和象徵性的讓步將更富有成效。但左派主義活動家們不採取這種做法，因為它無法滿足他們的情感需要。幫助黑人不是他們真正的目標。相反，他們將種族問題作為藉口藉以表達自己的敵意與追求權力而不可得的沮喪。他們的作法實際上傷害了黑人，因為這些活動家對待白人多數的敵對態度傾向於加強種族仇恨。

If our society had no social problems at all, the leftists would have to INVENT problems in order to provide themselves with an excuse for making a fuss.

22
如果我們的社會並沒有上述所有的問題，左派將不得不發明新的問題，從而為自己提供無病呻吟的藉口。

We emphasize that the foregoing does not pretend to be an accurate description of everyone who might be considered a leftist. It is only a rough indication of a general tendency of leftism.

23
我們強調，上述論述未必對於每一個可能被視為左派主義者的人都十分準確，這只是對於左派主義總趨勢的粗略概括。

OVERSOCIALIZATION
過度社會化

Psychologists use the term "socialization" to designate the process by which children are trained to think and act as society demands. A person is said to be well socialized if he believes in and obeys the moral code of his society and fits in well as a functioning part of that society. It may seem senseless to say that many leftists are over-socialized, since the leftist is perceived as a rebel. Nevertheless, the position can be defended. Many leftists are not such rebels as they seem.

24
心理學家使用“社會化”這個術語表示訓練兒童使之按照社會的要求去思考和行動的過程。一個得到良好社會化的人相信並服從他所屬社會的道德準則，並且很適應作為社會正常運作一部分的身份。說許多左派主義者過度社會化可能看起來毫無意義，因為左派主義者一般被視為反叛者。然而這一主張可以得到辯護。許多左派都不像看上去那樣反叛。

The moral code of our society is so demanding that no one can think, feel and act in a completely moral way. For example, we are not supposed to hate anyone, yet almost everyone hates somebody at some time or other, whether he admits it to himself or not. Some people are so highly socialized that the attempt to think, feel and act morally imposes a severe burden on them. In order to avoid feelings of guilt, they continually have to deceive themselves about their own motives and find moral explanations for feelings and actions that in reality have a non-moral origin. We use the term "oversocialized" to describe such people. [2]

25
我們社會的道德準則如此嚴苛，以至於沒有人能以完全道德的方式進行思考、感受與行動。例如，我們不應該去恨任何人，但幾乎每個人都曾經一度痛恨過其他什麼人，不論他是否向自己承認。有些人的社會化程度如此之高，以至於完全道德地思考、感受與行動的企圖為他們帶來了嚴重的負擔。為了避免罪惡感，他們不斷地就自己的動機欺騙自己，為那些在現實當中有著非道德起源的感受和行動尋找道德解釋。我們使用“過度社會化”這一術語來形容這樣的人。[2]

[2]. (Paragraph 25) During the Victorian period many oversocialized people suffered from serious psychological problems as a result of repressing or trying to repress their sexual feelings. Freud apparently based his theories on people of this type. Today the focus of socialization has shifted from sex to aggression.
[2]（第25段）在維多利亞時期許多過度社會化的人們都因為試圖壓抑性慾而遭受了嚴重的心理問題。顯然弗洛伊德以這些人為基礎構建了自己的理論。今天社會化的重點已經從性慾轉向了攻擊性。

Oversocialization can lead to low self-esteem, a sense of powerlessness, defeatism, guilt, etc. One of the most important means by which our society socializes children is by making them feel ashamed of behavior or speech that is contrary to society's expectations. If this is overdone, or if a particular child is especially susceptible to such feelings, he ends by feeling ashamed of HIMSELF. Moreover the thought and the behavior of the oversocialized person are more restricted by society's expectations than are those of the lightly socialized person. The majority of people engage in a significant amount of naughty behavior. They lie, they commit petty thefts, they break traffic laws, they goof off at work, they hate someone, they say spiteful things or they use some underhanded trick to get ahead of the other guy. The oversocialized person cannot do these things, or if he does do them he generates in himself a sense of shame and self-hatred. The oversocialized person cannot even experience, without guilt, thoughts or feelings that are contrary to the accepted morality; he cannot think "unclean" thoughts. And socialization is not just a matter of morality; we are socialized to confirm to many norms of behavior that do not fall under the heading of morality. Thus the oversocialized person is kept on a psychological leash and spends his life running on rails that society has laid down for him. In many oversocialized people this results in a sense of constraint and powerlessness that can be a severe hardship. We suggest that oversocialization is among the more serious cruelties that human beings inflict on one another.

26
過度社會化可導致低自尊、無力感、失敗主義以及內疚等，我們對兒童進行社會化的最重要手段之一是使他們對於與社會期望相反行為或言語感到羞愧。如果做過了頭，或者如果某個孩子特別容易受到這種感情的影響，他就會為自己感到羞愧。此外過度社會化的人與輕度社會化的人相比更容易在思想與行為上受到社會期待的限制。大多數人都會做出不道德的行為。他們撒謊，他們小偷小摸，他們違反交通法規，他們在工作中偷懶，他們討厭別人，他們說別人的壞話或者使用卑劣的花招來出人頭地。過度社會化的人不能做這些事情，如果他做了就會為自己感到羞恥，還會自我仇恨。他不能想“不乾淨”的念頭。而且社會化不只是一個道德問題，我們遭到社會化之後遵守的許多規範或表現都不屬於道德的認定範圍。因此，過度社會化的人在心理上被狗鏈拴著，一輩子都在社會鋪設的軌道上運行。對於許多過度社會化的人來說這都會導致約束感和無力感，令其十分難熬。我們認為過度社會化是人類對彼此造成最嚴重的暴行。

We argue that a very important and influential segment of the modern left is oversocialized and that their oversocialization is of great importance in determining the direction of modern leftism. Leftists of the oversocialized type tend to be intellectuals or members of the upper-middle class. Notice that university intellectuals [3] constitute the most highly socialized segment of our society and also the most left-wing segment.

27
我們認為，當代左派當中一個非常重要且有影響力的派系就是過度社會化份子，他們的過度社會化對於確定現代左派主義的前進方向十分重要。過度社會化類型的左派主義者往往是知識分子和上層中產階層的成員。請注意，大學知識分子 [3] 構成了我們的社會中社會化程度最高的部分，也是最左派的部分。

[3]. (Paragraph 27) Not necessarily including specialists in engineering "hard" sciences.
[3]（第27段）未必一定包括研究“硬”科學的專家。

The leftist of the oversocialized type tries to get off his psychological leash and assert his autonomy by rebelling. But usually he is not strong enough to rebel against the most basic values of society. Generally speaking, the goals of today's leftists are NOT in conflict with the accepted morality. On the contrary, the left takes an accepted moral principle, adopts it as its own, and then accuses mainstream society of violating that principle. Examples: racial equality, equality of the sexes, helping poor people, peace as opposed to war, nonviolence generally, freedom of expression, kindness to animals. More fundamentally, the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. All these have been deeply rooted values of our society (or at least of its middle and upper classes (4) for a long time. These values are explicitly or implicitly expressed or presupposed in most of the material presented to us by the mainstream communications media and the educational system. Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, usually do not rebel against these principles but justify their hostility to society by claiming (with some degree of truth) that society is not living up to these principles.

28
過度社會化類型的左派主義者試圖掙脫自己的心理狗鏈，通過反叛來維護他的自主權。但通常他不夠強大，無法反抗社會最基本的價值。一般而言，今天的左派主義者的目標與公認的道德並不衝突。恰恰相反，左派主義者接受公認的道德原則，當做自己的原則，然後指責主流社會違反該原則。例如：種族平等，男女平等，幫助窮人，和平或反戰，一般的非暴力行為，言論自由，善待動物，等等。從根本上說就是個人服務社會的責任與社會照顧個人的責任。所有這些很長一段時間以來都已經深深植根於我們的社會價值當中，或至少是社會的中產階級和上層階級 [4] 主流傳播媒體與教育體系呈現給我們的大多數都材料或明或暗地明示或暗示了這些價值。左派主義者，尤其是那些過度社會化類型的左派主義者，通常不會反叛這些原則，而是通過聲稱社會辜負了這些原則（在一定程度上的確如此）來為自己對社會的敵意進行辯護。

[4]. (Paragraph 28) There are many individuals of the middle and upper classes who resist some of these values, but usually their resistance is more or less covert. Such resistance appears in the mass media only to a very limited extent. The main thrust of propaganda in our society is in favor of the stated values.
[4]（第28段）很多中產階級和上層階級個人反對這些價值當中的一部分，但通常他們的反對或多或少都是隱蔽的。這種反對僅僅在出現在大眾媒體當中一個非常有限的範圍內。我們社會的宣傳主旨是支持上述指明的價值。

The main reasons why these values have become, so to speak, the official values of our society is that they are useful to the industrial system. Violence is discouraged because it disrupts the functioning of the system. Racism is discouraged because ethnic conflicts also disrupt the system, and discrimination wastes the talent of minority-group members who could be useful to the system. Poverty must be "cured" because the underclass causes problems for the system and contact with the underclass lowers the moral of the other classes. Women are encouraged to have careers because their talents are useful to the system and, more importantly because by having regular jobs women become better integrated into the system and tied directly to it rather than to their families. This helps to weaken family solidarity. (The leaders of the system say they want to strengthen the family, but they really mean is that they want the family to serve as an effective tool for socializing children in accord with the needs of the system. We argue in paragraphs 51,52 that the system cannot afford to let the family or other small-scale social groups be strong or autonomous.)
可以這麼說，這些價值觀成為官方價值觀的原因是因為它們對於工業體系有用。暴力遭到阻礙，因為它會破壞體系的功能。種族主義遭到阻礙，因為種族衝突會擾亂體系運行，歧視可能對體系有用的少數群體成員則會造成人才浪費。貧困必須被“治癒”，因為下層階級會給體系造成問題，其他階級在接觸下層階級時士氣也會下降。鼓勵婦女創立自己的事業是因為她們的才能對體系有利，更重要的是因為經常性工作的女性更容易整合到體系當中，並直接與體系而不是家庭相聯繫，這有助於削弱家庭凝聚力。（體系的領導人說，他們希望加強家庭，但他們真正的意思是他們希望家庭根據體系的需求成為兒童社會化的有效工具。我們在第51、52段認為體系不敢讓家庭或其他小規模社會群體真正強大自主起來）。

Here is an illustration of the way in which the oversocialized leftist shows his real attachment to the conventional attitudes of our society while pretending to be in rebellion against it. Many leftists push for affirmative action, for moving black people into high-prestige jobs, for improved education in black schools and more money for such schools; the way of life of the black "underclass" they regard as a social disgrace. They want to integrate the black man into the system, make him a business executive, a lawyer, a scientist just like upper-middle-class white people. The leftists will reply that the last thing they want is to make the black man into a copy of the white man; instead, they want to preserve African American culture. But in what does this preservation of African American culture consist? It can hardly consist in anything more than eating black-style food, listening to black-style music, wearing black-style clothing and going to a black-style church or mosque. In other words, it can express itself only in superficial matters. In all ESSENTIAL respects more leftists of the oversocialized type want to make the black man conform to white, middle-class ideals. They want to make him study technical subjects, become an executive or a scientist, spend his life climbing the status ladder to prove that black people are as good as white. They want to make black fathers "responsible." they want black gangs to become nonviolent, etc. But these are exactly the values of the industrial-technological system. The system couldn't care less what kind of music a man listens to, what kind of clothes he wears or what religion he believes in as long as he studies in school, holds a respectable job, climbs the status ladder, is a "responsible" parent, is nonviolent and so forth. In effect, however much he may deny it, the oversocialized leftist wants to integrate the black man into the system and make him adopt its values.

29
下面來表現一下過度社會化左派主義者如何顯示他對於社會傳統觀念的真實依賴，同時還假裝反抗。許多左派主義者都支持平權運動，支持黑人獲得地位更高的工作，提高黑人學校教學質量並向此類學校追加投資，他們認為黑人“下層階級”的存在是社會的恥辱。他們希望將黑人整合到體系中，使他成為企業主管，律師，科學家，就像上層中產階級的白人一樣。左派主義者會回答說他們最不想做的就是使黑人男子成為白人的翻版，相反，他們要保留美國黑人文化。但是保存美國黑人文化是什麼意思呢？幾乎無非就是吃黑人風格的食物，聽著黑人風格的音樂，穿著黑人風格的服裝，修建黑人風格的教堂或清真寺。換句話說，黑人只可以在表面問題上表達自己。而在所有根本方面，過度社會化的左派主義者都希望黑人符合白人中產階層的理想。他們希望讓他學習技術學科，成為行政人員或科學家，耗費人生向上爬從而證明自己並不比白人更差。他們希望黑人父親 “負責”。他們希望黑人幫派放棄暴力。但這些正是工業技術體系的價值觀。該體系不在乎一個人聽什麼樣的音樂，穿什麼樣的衣服，信什麼宗教，只要他在學校上學，擁有體面的工作，攀登等級階梯，是一個“負責任”的父親，不使用暴力等等。實際上，無論過度社會化的左派主義者如何否認這一點，他實際上是要將黑人整合到體系中並讓他接受體系的價值觀。

We certainly do not claim that leftists, even of the oversocialized type, NEVER rebel against the fundamental values of our society. Clearly they sometimes do. Some oversocialized leftists have gone so far as to rebel against one of modern society's most important principles by engaging in physical violence. By their own account, violence is for them a form of "liberation." In other words, by committing violence they break through the psychological restraints that have been trained into them. Because they are oversocialized these restraints have been more confining for them than for others; hence their need to break free of them. But they usually justify their rebellion in terms of mainstream values. If they engage in violence they claim to be fighting against racism or the like.

30
我們當然並不聲稱左派主義者，甚至是過度社會化的左派主義者，從不反抗我們社會的基本價值觀。顯然他們有時會這麼做。一些過度社會化的左派主義者甚至還反抗現代社會最重要的原則之一，採用了肢體暴力。他們認為暴力對他們來說是一種“解放”。換句話說，他們通過暴力衝破了習得的心理制約。因為他們過度社會化，這些制約對他們的限制效果更強；因此他們需要打破這些制約。但是，他們通常用主流價值觀為自己的反叛辯護。如果他們從事暴力活動，他們就聲稱自己是在打擊種族主義。

We realize that many objections could be raised to the foregoing thumb-nail sketch of leftist psychology. The real situation is complex, and anything like a complete description of it would take several volumes even if the necessary data were available. We claim only to have indicated very roughly the two most important tendencies in the psychology of modern leftism.

31
我們認識到，對於上述左派主義者的心理素描可以提出許多反對意見。真實的情況是複雜的，即使提供必要的數據，進行完整描述也需要好幾卷的篇幅。我們只打算非常粗略地概述兩個最重要的現代左派主義者心理傾向。

The problems of the leftist are indicative of the problems of our society as a whole. Low self-esteem, depressive tendencies and defeatism are not restricted to the left. Though they are especially noticeable in the left, they are widespread in our society. And today's society tries to socialize us to a greater extent than any previous society. We are even told by experts how to eat, how to exercise, how to make love, how to raise our kids and so forth.

32
左派主義者的問題表明了我們的社會作為整體的問題。低自尊，抑鬱傾向和失敗不僅限於左派，這些問題廣泛存在於我們的社會，雖然在左派尤其明顯。今天的社會與以往任何社會相比都試圖在更大程度上將我們社會化。甚至還有專家告訴我們怎麼吃，如何運動，如何做愛，如何教育子女等等。

THE POWER PROCESS
權力過程

Human beings have a need (probably based in biology) for something that we will call the "power process." This is closely related to the need for power (which is widely recognized) but is not quite the same thing. The power process has four elements. The three most clear-cut of these we call goal, effort and attainment of goal. (Everyone needs to have goals whose attainment requires effort, and needs to succeed in attaining at least some of his goals.) The fourth element is more difficult to define and may not be necessary for everyone. We call it autonomy and will discuss it later (paragraphs 42-44).

33
人類有一種需求（可能有生物學基礎），我們稱之為“權力過程”。這與對權力的需要緊密相關（這一點得到了廣泛承認）但並不完全一樣。“權力過程”有四大要素。其中最明確的三個我們稱之為目標、努力與目標實現。（每個人都需要目標，目標的實現需要努力，他至少需要成功實現一部分目標）第四個元素很難定義，未必對所有人都有必要。我們叫它自主並將在下文中加以討論（第42-44段）。

Consider the hypothetical case of a man who can have anything he wants just by wishing for it. Such a man has power, but he will develop serious psychological problems. At first he will have a lot of fun, but by and by he will become acutely bored and demoralized. Eventually he may become clinically depressed. History shows that leisured aristocracies tend to become decadent. This is not true of fighting aristocracies that have to struggle to maintain their power. But leisured, secure aristocracies that have no need to exert themselves usually become bored, hedonistic and demoralized, even though they have power. This shows that power is not enough. One must have goals toward which to exercise one's power.

34
考慮一個假設的個人，他只要心念一動就能獲得自己想要的一切。這個人有權力，但他將會遭受嚴重的心理問題。起初他將有很多的樂趣，但漸漸地他將極度無聊並且情緒低落。最終他有可能患上抑鬱症。歷史表明悠閒的貴族們往往會變得頹廢。為了保持權力而征戰不休的貴族並不會如此。但悠閒而安全、沒有必要發揮自己能力的貴族通常會變得無聊，沉湎於享樂主義並意氣消沉，即使他們掌握著權力。這表明權力本身是遠遠不夠的。一個人必須有行使權力的目標。

Everyone has goals; if nothing else, to obtain the physical necessities of life: food, water and whatever clothing and shelter are made necessary by the climate. But the leisured aristocrat obtains these things without effort. Hence his boredom and demoralization.

35
每個人都有目標，首先是獲得生活必需品：食物，水和與生活在特定氣候區域所必須的衣服和住所。但有閒的貴族毫不費力就能獲得這些東西。因此，他會感到無聊和意氣消沉。

Nonattainment of important goals results in death if the goals are physical necessities, and in frustration if nonattainment of the goals is compatible with survival. Consistent failure to attain goals throughout life results in defeatism, low self-esteem or depression.

36
如果目標是生存必需品，未能獲得重要目標就會導致死亡；如果目標對生存有益，未能獲得目標就會使人感到受挫。在整個生活當中一直沒能獲得目標將會導致失敗主義，自卑或抑鬱症。

Thus, in order to avoid serious psychological problems, a human being needs goals whose attainment requires effort, and he must have a reasonable rate of success in attaining his goals.

37
因此，為了避免嚴重的心理問題，一個人需要一個耗費一定努力才能實現的目標，還必須有合理的目標實現成功率。

SURROGATE ACTIVITIES
替代性活動

But not every leisured aristocrat becomes bored and demoralized. For example, the emperor Hirohito, instead of sinking into decadent hedonism, devoted himself to marine biology, a field in which he became distinguished. When people do not have to exert themselves to satisfy their physical needs they often set up artificial goals for themselves. In many cases they then pursue these goals with the same energy and emotional involvement that they otherwise would have put into the search for physical necessities. Thus the aristocrats of the Roman Empire had their literary pretensions; many European aristocrats a few centuries ago invested tremendous time and energy in hunting, though they certainly didn't need the meat; other aristocracies have competed for status through elaborate displays of wealth; and a few aristocrats, like Hirohito, have turned to science.

38
但是並非所有有閒貴族都會變得厭倦而意氣消沉。例如裕仁天皇就沒有沉湎於頹廢的享樂主義，而是投身於海洋生物學並取得了相當的成就。當人們不必為了滿足物質需求而發揮能力時，他們經常為自己設定人為目標。在很多情況下他們為了追求這些目標而投入的精力與感情就像其他人為了獲取物質必需品所進行的投入一樣。因此羅馬貴族會用文學修飾自己；幾個世紀以前的許多歐洲貴族投入大量的時間與精力來打獵，儘管他們肯定不缺肉食；其他貴族則通過展示財富來進行社會地位的比拚；還有少數貴族轉向了科學領域，例如裕仁天皇。

We use the term "surrogate activity" to designate an activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that people set up for themselves merely in order to have some goal to work toward, or let us say, merely for the sake of the "fulfillment" that they get from pursuing the goal. Here is a rule of thumb for the identification of surrogate activities. Given a person who devotes much time and energy to the pursuit of goal X, ask yourself this: If he had to devote most of his time and energy to satisfying his biological needs, and if that effort required him to use his physical and mental facilities in a varied and interesting way, would he feel seriously deprived because he did not attain goal X? If the answer is no, then the person's pursuit of a goal X is a surrogate activity. Hirohito's studies in marine biology clearly constituted a surrogate activity, since it is pretty certain that if Hirohito had had to spend his time working at interesting non-scientific tasks in order to obtain the necessities of life, he would not have felt deprived because he didn't know all about the anatomy and life-cycles of marine animals. On the other hand the pursuit of sex and love (for example) is not a surrogate activity, because most people, even if their existence were otherwise satisfactory, would feel deprived if they passed their lives without ever having a relationship with a member of the opposite sex. (But pursuit of an excessive amount of sex, more than one really needs, can be a surrogate activity.)

39
我們使用 “替代活動”這個名詞來表示追求自行設立的人為目標的行為，人們之所以樹立這些目標只是為了能夠為之努力，或者說僅僅是為了追逐目標過程中的“滿足感”。這是識別替代活動的關鍵。假設某人投入了大量時間和精力去追求目標x，你不妨問自己：如果他要投入大部分時間和精力來滿足自己的生理需求，而且他需要以多種不同且有趣的方式發揮自己的體力與腦力，他是否會因為沒能達到目標x而感到非常失落呢？如果答案是否定的，則此人對於目標X的追求就是替代活動。裕仁的海洋生物研究顯然是替代活動，因為很肯定，如果裕仁要將他的時間花在有趣的非科學性任務上從而獲取生活必需品，他不會因為自己不知道海洋動物的解剖結構和生命週期而感到失落。另一方面，性與愛的追求（打個比方）不是替代活動，因為大多數人即使在其他方面享受著令人滿意的生活，如果終其一生沒有與一名異性建立關係，依舊會感到失落。（但追求超出需要的過度性生活就是替代活動了）

In modern industrial society only minimal effort is necessary to satisfy one's physical needs. It is enough to go through a training program to acquire some petty technical skill, then come to work on time and exert very modest effort needed to hold a job. The only requirements are a moderate amount of intelligence, and most of all, simple OBEDIENCE. If one has those, society takes care of one from cradle to grave. (Yes, there is an underclass that cannot take physical necessities for granted, but we are speaking here of mainstream society.) Thus it is not surprising that modern society is full of surrogate activities. These include scientific work, athletic achievement, humanitarian work, artistic and literary creation, climbing the corporate ladder, acquisition of money and material goods far beyond the point at which they cease to give any additional physical satisfaction, and social activism when it addresses issues that are not important for the activist personally, as in the case of white activists who work for the rights of nonwhite minorities. These are not always pure surrogate activities, since for many people they may be motivated in part by needs other than the need to have some goal to pursue. Scientific work may be motivated in part by a drive for prestige, artistic creation by a need to express feelings, militant social activism by hostility. But for most people who pursue them, these activities are in large part surrogate activities. For example, the majority of scientists will probably agree that the "fulfillment" they get from their work is more important than the money and prestige they earn.

40
在現代工業社會中，只需付出很少的努力就足以滿足自己的生理需求。只需要參加技能培訓計畫並學一點手藝，按時上下班，為了完成工作而投入最少的努力，這就足夠了。唯一的要求是一般水平的智力以及單純的服從，後者才是最重要的。如果你有這些特質，社會就會從搖籃到墳墓一直照顧你（的確，對於下層社會來說生存必需品的獲得並不這麼理所當然，但我們這裡說的是主流社會）因此毫不奇怪的是，現代社會充滿了替代活動。這些活動包括科研工作，運動成績，人道主義工作，藝術和文學創作，企業升職，獲取遠遠超出需要的金錢和物質財富直到它們無法帶來任何額外的生理滿足，還有參與社會活動，儘管活動所要解決的問題對於活動家個人來說並不重要，例如為了非白人少數族裔的權利而工作的白人活動家。這些行為並不總是單純的替代活動，因為對很多人來說，他們的動機並不只是需要用來追求的目標。科學工作的動機可能是追求聲望，藝術創作是為了表達感情，激進社會活動主義則受到了敵意的驅使。但對於大多數追求這些目標的人來說，這些活動在很大程度上是替代活動。例如，大多數的科學家們可能會同意他們從工作獲得的“滿足感”比他們所賺取的金錢和聲望更重要。

For many if not most people, surrogate activities are less satisfying than the pursuit of real goals ( that is, goals that people would want to attain even if their need for the power process were already fulfilled). One indication of this is the fact that, in many or most cases, people who are deeply involved in surrogate activities are never satisfied, never at rest. Thus the money-maker constantly strives for more and more wealth. The scientist no sooner solves one problem than he moves on to the next. The long-distance runner drives himself to run always farther and faster. Many people who pursue surrogate activities will say that they get far more fulfillment from these activities than they do from the "mundane" business of satisfying their biological needs, but that it is because in our society the effort needed to satisfy the biological needs has been reduced to triviality. More importantly, in our society people do not satisfy their biological needs AUTONOMOUSLY but by functioning as parts of an immense social machine. In contrast, people generally have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate activities. have a great deal of autonomy in pursuing their surrogate activities.

41
對於許多人（如果不是大多數人）來說，替代活動都不如追求真正的目標（也就是即使權力過程的需求已經滿足之後依然希望獲得的目標）那樣令人滿意。這一點的表現之一是，在許多或者大多數情況下，深入參與替代活動的人永遠不會滿足，從來沒法休息。因此，商人不斷致力於獲取越來越多的財富。科學家剛解決了一個問題就又著手解決下一個。長跑運動員總是驅使自己跑得更遠更快。很多追求替代活動的人會說他們從這些活動中得到的滿足感遠遠多從“平凡”的工作或生理需求的滿足，但是這是因為在我們的社會滿足生理需求所需要的努力已經降低到了不值一提的程度。更重要的是，在我們的社會中，人們滿足生理需求的方式並非自主，而是充當巨大社會機器零件。相反，在追求自己的替代活動時人們普遍有很大的自主性。

AUTONOMY
自主性

Autonomy as a part of the power process may not be necessary for every individual. But most people need a greater or lesser degree of autonomy in working toward their goals. Their efforts must be undertaken on their own initiative and must be under their own direction and control. Yet most people do not have to exert this initiative, direction and control as single individuals. It is usually enough to act as a member of a SMALL group. Thus if half a dozen people discuss a goal among themselves and make a successful joint effort to attain that goal, their need for the power process will be served. But if they work under rigid orders handed down from above that leave them no room for autonomous decision and initiative, then their need for the power process will not be served. The same is true when decisions are made on a collective bases if the group making the collective decision is so large that the role of each individual is insignificant [5].

42
自主性作為權力過程的一部分，可能並非對所有人都有必要。但是大多數人朝著自己的目標努力時都需要或多或少的自主。他們的努力必須由自己主動進行，並且必須遵從自己的方向，受自己的控制。然而，大多數人都不必非得作為單一個體發揮主動性、遵從方向並進行控制。通常只要作為一個小團體的一員就夠了。因此，如果有五六個人彼此討論共同的目標並且成功地聯合努力來實現這一目標，他們對於權力過程的需求就會得到滿足。但是如果他們在上級下發的死板命令下工作，毫無自主主動的空間，他們對於權力過程的需求就得不到滿足。同樣，當進行集體決策時，假如集體人數過多，每個個人的作用都微不足道 [5]，那麼也會出現這種情況。

[5]，(Paragraph 42) It may be argued that the majority of people don't want to make their own decisions but want leaders to do their thinking for them. There is an element of truth in this. People like to make their own decisions in small matters, but making decisions on difficult, fundamental questions require facing up to psychological conflict, and most people hate psychological conflict. Hence they tend to lean on others in making difficult decisions. The majority of people are natural followers, not leaders, but they like to have direct personal access to their leaders and participate to some extent in making difficult decisions. At least to that degree they need autonomy
[5]（第42段）有人認為多數人都不想自己進行決策，而是更希望有領導者替他們思考。這話也有一定的道理。人們喜歡在小事上自行決策但是在困難而根本性的問題上進行決策必須面對激烈的心理衝突，而大多數人都討厭心理衝突。因此他們更希望他人替他們進行困難決策。大多數人都是天然的跟隨者而不是領導者，但是他們喜歡與自己的領導者保持直接聯繫並且部分參與困難決策的制定。至少在這種程度上他們還是需要自主性的。

It is true that some individuals seem to have little need for autonomy. Either their drive for power is weak or they satisfy it by identifying themselves with some powerful organization to which they belong. And then there are unthinking, animal types who seem to be satisfied with a purely physical sense of power(the good combat soldier, who gets his sense of power by developing fighting skills that he is quite content to use in blind obedience to his superiors).

43
的確，有些人似乎並不需要自主。可能他們的權欲並不強，或者他們通過從屬於強大的組織來獲得了滿足感。還有一類不假思索的、動物般的人，似乎單純的肉體權力感就能使其感到滿足（優秀的士兵通過戰鬥技能來獲得權利感，他對於盲從上級感到相當滿意）。

But for most people it is through the power process-having a goal, making an AUTONOMOUS effort and attaining t the goal-that self-esteem, self-confidence and a sense of power are acquired. When one does not have adequate opportunity to go throughout the power process the consequences are (depending on the individual and on the way the power process is disrupted) boredom, demoralization, low self-esteem, inferiority feelings, defeatism, depression, anxiety, guilt, frustration, hostility, spouse or child abuse, insatiable hedonism, abnormal sexual behavior, sleep disorders, eating disorders, etc. [6]

44
但大多數人還是要通過權力過程——確立目標，自主努力，實現目標——來獲得自尊，自信和權力感。當一個人沒有足夠的機會來經歷整個權力過程的時候，將會導致（取決於個人條件和權力過程遭到中斷的方式）無聊，士氣低落，低自尊，自卑感，失敗主義，抑鬱，焦慮，內疚，沮喪，敵意，虐待配偶或子女，永不滿足的享樂主義，不正常的性行為，睡眠障礙，進食障礙等 [6]。

[6]，(Paragraph 44) Some of the symptoms listed are similar to those shown by caged animals.
[6]（第44段）這裡列出的一些症狀類似於長期囚禁在籠中的動物所顯示的症狀。

To explain how these symptoms arise from deprivation with respect to the power process:
這裡解釋一下權力過程的剝奪如何導致這些症狀的出現：

Common-sense understanding of human nature tells one that lack of goals whose attainment requires effort leads to boredom and that boredom, long continued, often leads eventually to depression. Failure to obtain goals leads to frustration and lowering of self-esteem. Frustration leads to anger, anger to aggression, often in the form of spouse or child abuse. It has been shown that long-continued frustration commonly leads to depression and that depression tends to cause guilt, sleep disorders, eating disorders and bad feelings about oneself. Those who are tending toward depression seek pleasure as an antidote; hence insatiable hedonism and excessive sex, with perversions as a means of getting new kicks. Boredom too tends to cause excessive pleasure-seeking since, lacking other goals, people often use pleasure as a goal. See accompanying diagram. The foregoing is a simplification. Reality is more complex, and of course deprivation with respect to the power process is not the ONLY cause of the symptoms described. By the way, when we mention depression we do not necessarily mean depression that is severe enough to be treated by a psychiatrist. Often only mild forms of depression are involved. And when we speak of goals we do not necessarily mean long-term, thought out goals. For many or most people through much of human history, the goals of a hand-to-mouth existence (merely providing oneself and one's family with food from day to day) have been quite sufficient.

根據對於人性的常識理解，缺乏需要努力才能實現的目標會導致無聊，而長期無聊最終往往會導致抑鬱症。未能達成目標會導致挫折並降低自尊。挫折導致憤怒，憤怒導致攻擊性，往往以虐待配偶或子女的形式表現出來。人們已經證明了長期持續的挫折通常會導致抑鬱症，抑鬱症往往會造成內疚，睡眠障礙，進食障礙和不良情緒。傾向患抑鬱症的人尋求快感作為解藥，因此導致了無法滿足的享樂主義和過度性生活，變態行為也成為了獲取新刺激的手段。無聊之所以容易造成過度享樂，還因為在沒有其他目標的情況下人們經常將快感當做目標（請參閱附圖）。前述是簡化表述，現實更為複雜。當然權力過程的缺失並不是這裡描述症狀的唯一原因。順便說一下，當我們提到抑鬱症時，並不一定意味著嚴重到必須由精神科醫生進行治療的抑鬱症。通常情況下只會出現輕微的抑鬱症。我們所謂的目標也不必然意味著深思熟慮之後的長期目標。因為人類歷史上的許多或大多數人都僅僅將餬口作為目標（為自己和自己的家庭獲取日常的食物）。

SOURCES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS
社會問題的根源

Any of the foregoing symptoms can occur in any society, but in modern industrial society they are present on a massive scale. We aren't the first to mention that the world today seems to be going crazy. This sort of thing is not normal for human societies. There is good reason to believe that primitive man suffered from less stress and frustration and was better satisfied with his way of life than modern man is. It is true that not all was sweetness and light in primitive societies. Abuse of women and common among the Australian aborigines, transexuality was fairly common among some of the American Indian tribes. But is does appear that GENERALLY SPEAKING the kinds of problems that we have listed in the preceding paragraph were far less common among primitive peoples than they are in modern society.

45
上述任何症狀都可能發生在任何一個社會，但在現代工業社會中它們的存在規模尤其大。我們並非首先提出當今世界似乎正在發瘋的人。這樣的事情對於人類社會來說是不正常的。有充分的理由相信，與現代人相比，原始人所遭受的壓力和挫折更少並更滿足於自己的生活方式。的確，原始社會的生活也並非充滿輕鬆與甜蜜。澳洲原住民經常虐待婦女，性變裝在美國的一些印第安部落當中也相當常見。但總體來說，我們在上文各段當中列舉的各種問題對於原始民族來說遠不如在現代社會中那樣常見。

We attribute the social and psychological problems of modern society to the fact that that society requires people to live under conditions radically different from those under which the human race evolved and to behave in ways that conflict with the patterns of behavior that the human race developed while living under the earlier conditions. It is clear from what we have already written that we consider lack of opportunity to properly experience the power process as the most important of the abnormal conditions to which modern society subjects people. But it is not the only one. Before dealing with disruption of the power process as a source of social problems we will discuss some of the other sources.

46
我們將現代社會的社會與心理問題歸咎於以下事實：現代社會要求人們在一套截然不同的條件下生活，在這套條件下，人類種族的的生活和行為方式與早先條件下所養成的行為模式發生了衝突。我們在上文中明確認為缺乏恰當體驗權力過程的機會是現代社會加諸於人們頭上的最主要非正常條件。但這不是唯一的問題。在討論作為社會問題來源之一的權力過程打斷之前，我們將討論其他幾個來源。

Among the abnormal conditions present in modern industrial society are excessive density of population, isolation of man from nature, excessive rapidity of social change and the break-down of natural small-scale communities such as the extended family, the village or the tribe.

47
現代工業社會所造成的異常情況是人口密度過大，人與自然相隔離，社會變革過快的和突破以及自然小規模社區——如大家庭、村莊或部落——的瓦解。

It is well known that crowding increases stress and aggression. The degree of crowding that exists today and the isolation of man from nature are consequences of technological progress. All pre-industrial societies were predominantly rural. The industrial Revolution vastly increased the size of cities and the proportion of the population that lives in them, and modern agricultural technology has made it possible for the Earth to support a far denser population than it ever did before. (Also, technology exacerbates the effects of crowding because it puts increased disruptive powers in people's hands. For example, a variety of noise-making devices: power mowers, radios, motorcycles, etc. If the use of these devices is unrestricted, people who want peace and quiet are frustrated by the noise. If their use is restricted, people who use the devices are frustrated by the regulations... But if these machines had never been invented there would have been no conflict and no frustration generated by them.)

48
眾所周知，人群聚集會增加壓力與攻擊性。目前的擁擠程度以及人與自然的隔離是技術進步的必然結果。所有前工業社會都以農村為主。工業革命極大增加了城市規模和城市人口比例，現代農業技術使人們有可能供養遠比之前任何時代更為密集的人口。（此外，技術也加劇了人群聚集的影響，因為它將更強大的破壞力交給了人群。例如，現在存在著各種發出噪聲的設備：電動剪草機，收音機，摩托車等。假如這些設備的使用不受限制，希望享受和平與安寧的人們就會因為噪音而感到沮喪。如果其應用受到限制，使用這些設備的人就會感到沮喪，但如果這些機器從來不曾問世，就不會造成衝突與沮喪。）

For primitive societies the natural world (which usually changes only slowly) provided a stable framework and therefore a sense of security. In the modern world it is human society that dominates nature rather than the other way around, and modern society changes very rapidly owing to technological change. Thus there is no stable framework.

49
對於原始社會來說，自然世界（通常只會進行緩慢的改變）提供了一個穩定的框架，因此他們有安全感。現代世界當中人類社會主導了自然而不是相反，而且由於技術變革現代社會的變化十分迅速。因此不存在穩定的框架。

The conservatives are fools: They whine about the decay of traditional values, yet they enthusiastically support technological progress and economic growth. Apparently it never occurs to them that you can't make rapid, drastic changes in the technology and the economy of a society with out causing rapid changes in all other aspects of the society as well, and that such rapid changes inevitably break down traditional values.

50
保守派是傻瓜：他們抱怨傳統價值觀的衰敗，但同時又積極支持技術進步和經濟增長。顯然他們從來沒有想到技術與經濟快速而劇烈的變化必然導致所有其他社會方面的快速變化，這種快速變化又將不可避免地打破傳統價值觀。

The breakdown of traditional values to some extent implies the breakdown of the bonds that hold together traditional small-scale social groups. The disintegration of small-scale social groups is also promoted by the fact that modern conditions often require or tempt individuals to move to new locations, separating themselves from their communities. Beyond that, a technological society HAS TO weaken family ties and local communities if it is to function efficiently. In modern society an individual's loyalty must be first to the system and only secondarily to a small-scale community, because if the internal loyalties of small-scale small-scale communities were stronger than loyalty to the system, such communities would pursue their own advantage at the expense of the system.

51
傳統觀念的崩潰在一定程度上意味著維繫傳統小規模社會群體的紐帶的崩潰。現代社會環境往往要求或誘使個人脫離自己的社區移動到新的地點，這一事實對於小規模社會群體的解體也有促進作用。除此之外，科技社會如果要有效地發揮作用，就必須削弱家庭關係和地方社區。在現代社會中個人首先必須忠於體系，其次才能忠於小規模社區，因為如果小規模社區的內部忠誠強於對體系的忠誠，這樣的社區會犧牲體系來為自己追求好處。

Suppose that a public official or a corporation executive appoints his cousin, his friend or his co-religionist to a position rather than appointing the person best qualified for the job. He has permitted personal loyalty to supersede his loyalty to the system, and that is "nepotism" or "discrimination," both of which are terrible sins in modern society. Would-be industrial societies that have done a poor job of subordinating personal or local loyalties to loyalty to the system are usually very inefficient. (Look at Latin America.) Thus an advanced industrial society can tolerate only those small-scale communities that are emasculated, tamed and made into tools of the system. [7]

52
假設公職人員或公司的執行總裁任命他的表兄弟、他的朋友或者教友擔任某職位而不是任命最能勝任這項工作的人。他將個人忠誠放在了體系忠誠之前，這就是“裙帶關係”或“歧視”，這兩項在現代社會中都是可怕的罪行。未能成功地將個人或地區忠誠置於體系忠誠之下的准工業社會通常是非常低效的（例如拉丁美洲）。因此，一個先進的工業社會只能容忍那些遭到閹割與馴服並被體系當做工具的小規模社區。 [7]

[7]. (Paragraph 52) A partial exception may be made for a few passive, inward looking groups, such as the Amish, which have little effect on the wider society. Apart from these, some genuine small-scale communities do exist in America today. For instance, youth gangs and "cults". Everyone regards them as dangerous, and so they are, because the members of these groups are loyal primarily to one another rather than to the system, hence the system cannot control them. Or take the gypsies. The gypsies commonly get away with theft and fraud because their loyalties are such that they can always get other gypsies to give testimony that "proves" their innocence. Obviously the system would be in serious trouble if too many people belonged to such groups. Some of the early-20th century Chinese thinkers who were concerned with modernizing China recognized the necessity of breaking down small-scale social groups such as the family: "(According to Sun Yat-sen) The Chinese people needed a new surge of patriotism, which would lead to a transfer of loyalty from the family to the state. . .(According to Li Huang) traditional attachments, particularly to the family had to be abandoned if nationalism were to develop to China." (Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century," page 125, page 297.)
[7]（第52段）少數被動內向的群體，例如阿米什人，可能會部分例外於這一原則，這些群體對於更廣泛的社會影響不大。除此之外，在美國確實存在一些真正的小規模社區，例如青少年團夥和“邪教”。所有人都認為他們很危險，他們也的確如此，因為這些群體的成員主要忠於彼此而不是體系，因此體系無法控制他們。拿吉普賽人舉例。吉普賽人往往不會因為盜竊和欺詐行為遭受懲處，因為他們忠於彼此，其他吉普賽人總是可以 “證明”自己的清白。顯然，如果這類群體成員太多，該體系將面臨很大的麻煩。二十世紀初期一些關心中國現代化的中國思想家認識到有必要打破小規模社會群體，如家庭：“（孫中山認為）中國人民需要接受新一輪的愛國主義影響，這將使得忠誠從家庭向國家轉移……（李璜認為）如果中國的國家主義想要得到發展，就不得不放棄傳統的牽絆，特別是家庭的牽絆。”（Chester C. Tan, Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century，第125頁，第297頁。）

Crowding, rapid change and the breakdown of communities have been widely recognized as sources of social problems. but we do not believe they are enough to account for the extent of the problems that are seen today.

53
人們廣泛認為人群聚集與社區的快速變化瓦解是社會問題的根源。但是我們不認為僅憑這些就足以造成今天我們所見的如此嚴重的問題。

A few pre-industrial cities were very large and crowded, yet their inhabitants do not seem to have suffered from psychological problems to the same extent as modern man. In America today there still are uncrowded rural areas, and we find there the same problems as in urban areas, though the problems tend to be less acute in the rural areas. Thus crowding does not seem to be the decisive factor.

54
有幾座工業社會之前的城市也十分龐大而擁擠，但是其中的居民似乎並沒有遭受像現代社會成員那樣嚴重的心理問題。今天的美國依然存在著人口稀少的農村地區，在那裡也出現了與城市地區類似的問題，儘管程度上沒有這麼劇烈。因此人群聚集似乎並不是關鍵因素。

On the growing edge of the American frontier during the 19th century, the mobility of the population probably broke down extended families and small-scale social groups to at least the same extent as these are broken down today. In fact, many nuclear families lived by choice in such isolation, having no neighbors within several miles, that they belonged to no community at all, yet they do not seem to have developed problems as a result.

55
在十九世紀不斷推進的美國邊疆，人口流動性對於大家庭與小社區的破壞作用至少與今天一樣強。實際上許多核心家庭都是自願選擇隔離生活的，幾里以內沒有鄰居，不屬於任何社區，但他們似乎也沒有出問題。

Furthermore, change in American frontier society was very rapid and deep. A man might be born and raised in a log cabin, outside the reach of law and order and fed largely on wild meat; and by the time he arrived at old age he might be working at a regular job and living in an ordered community with effective law enforcement. This was a deeper change that that which typically occurs in the life of a modern individual, yet it does not seem to have led to psychological problems. In fact, 19th century American society had an optimistic and self-confident tone, quite unlike that of today's society. [8]

56
進一步來說，美國邊疆社會的發展也十分快速而深刻。某人可能生長於木屋中，不受法律秩序的制約，以野物為主食。而到老時他可能已經有了穩定的工作，生活在法律約束的社區當中。與典型現代人在一生中遭遇的變化相比，這種變化更為深刻，但是看起來似乎也沒有導致心理問題。實際上，十九世紀的美國社會基調樂觀而自信，與今天大不相同。[8]

[8]. (Paragraph 56) Yes, we know that 19th century America had its problems, and serious ones, but for the sake of breviety we have to express ourselves in simplified terms.
[8] 的確，我們清楚十九世紀的美國也存在著自己的問題，而且還十分嚴重。但是為了方便討論起見我們在這裡姑且簡化一下實際情況。

The difference, we argue, is that modern man has the sense (largely justified) that change is IMPOSED on him, whereas the 19th century frontiersman had the sense (also largely justified) that he created change himself, by his own choice. Thus a pioneer settled on a piece of land of his own choosing and made it into a farm through his own effort. In those days an entire county might have only a couple of hundred inhabitants and was a far more isolated and autonomous entity than a modern county is. Hence the pioneer farmer participated as a member of a relatively small group in the creation of a new, ordered community. One may well question whether the creation of this community was an improvement, but at any rate it satisfied the pioneer's need for the power process.

57
我們認為這其中的區別在於現代人（基本有理地）感到變化是強加在他身上的，而十九世紀的邊疆開拓者則（也同樣基本有理地）感到他自己造成了變化。開拓者定居在自己選擇的地點，並用自己的努力將其改造成農田。當時一個郡縣裡往往只有幾百戶居民，這個郡縣的孤立性與自主性也遠遠超過今天的郡縣。因此，開拓邊疆的農夫參與了一個相對較小的團體並創建了一個新的有秩序社區。這種社區的創立算不算進步儘管可以討論，但無論如何開拓者的權力過程得到了滿足。

It would be possible to give other examples of societies in which there has been rapid change and/or lack of close community ties without the kind of massive behavioral aberration that is seen in today's industrial society. We contend that the most important cause of social and psychological problems in modern society is the fact that people have insufficient opportunity to go through the power process in a normal way. We don't mean to say that modern society is the only one in which the power process has been disrupted. Probably most if not all civilized societies have interfered with the power ' process to a greater or lesser extent. But in modern industrial society the problem has become particularly acute. Leftism, at least in its recent (mid-to-late -20th century) form, is in part a symptom of deprivation with respect to the power process.

58
變化迅速且/或缺乏密切社區紐帶但卻沒有像今日工業化社會那樣發生大規模行為異常的社會可能還有其他例證。我們意圖說明現代社會當中社會與心理問題的最主要原因就是人們沒有足夠的機會來正常地完成權力過程。我們並不認為現代社會是唯一一個打斷權力過程的社會。很可能絕大多數文明社會都會在不同程度上干涉權力過程。但是在現代社會這個問題尤為尖銳。左派主義，或者起碼說最近形式（二十世紀中後期）的左派主義，正是權力過程剝奪所導致的症狀的一部分。

DISRUPTION OF THE POWER PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETY
現代社會對於權力過程的打斷

We divide human drives into three groups: (1) those drives that can be satisfied with minimal effort; (2) those that can be satisfied but only at the cost of serious effort; (3) those that cannot be adequately satisfied no matter how much effort one makes. The power process is the process of satisfying the drives of the second group. The more drives there are in the third group, the more there is frustration, anger, eventually defeatism, depression, etc.

59
我們將人類的慾望分為三類，（1）可以通過最少努力得到滿足的慾望；（2）需要付出大量努力才能滿足的慾望；（3）無論如何努力也無法充分滿足的慾望。權力過程滿足的是第二種慾望。第三類慾望越多，人們就越發沮喪憤怒，最後則會發展成失敗主義與抑鬱症。

In modern industrial society natural human drives tend to be pushed into the first and third groups, and the second group tends to consist increasingly of artificially created drives.

60
現代工業社會傾向於將人類的自然慾望推向第一類與第三類，第二類慾望則越發人為化。

In primitive societies, physical necessities generally fall into group 2: They can be obtained, but only at the cost of serious effort. But modern society tends to guaranty the physical necessities to everyone [9] in exchange for only minimal effort, hence physical needs are pushed into group 1. (There may be disagreement about whether the effort needed to hold a job is "minimal"; but usually, in lower- to middle-level jobs, whatever effort is required is merely that of obedience. You sit or stand where you are told to sit or stand and do what you are told to do in the way you are told to do it. Seldom do you have to exert yourself seriously, and in any case you have hardly any autonomy in work, so that the need for the power process is not well served.)

61
在原始社會，物質需求一般屬於第二類，必須付出大量努力才能獲取。現代社會在傾向於保證令所有人 [9] 都能用最小努力換取物質必需品，因此物質需求就被推到了第一類。（有人可能並不認為保住工作只需要“最小化”的努力；但是一般來說，中低層工作所要求的只是服從而已。只需要在規定地點站著或坐下，根據指定的方式完成指定的任務。在工作中基本上沒有自主，因此對於權力過程的需求也就沒有得到滿足。）

[9]. (Paragraph 61) We leave aside the underclass. We are speaking of the mainstream.
[9]（第61段）我們這裡忽略了下層階級，只討論社會主流。

Social needs, such as sex, love and status, often remain in group 2 in modern society, depending on the situation of the individual. [10] But, except for people who have a particularly strong drive for status, the effort required to fulfill the social drives is insufficient to satisfy adequately the need for the power process.

62
社會需求，例如性、愛與社會地位，在現代社會中往往屬於第二類，當然這還要取決於每個個人的具體情況。[10] 但是，除非某人對於社會地位有著特別強大的慾望，滿足社會慾望所需的努力依然不足以充分滿足權力過程的需要。

[10]. (Paragraph 62) Some social scientists, educators, "mental health" professionals and the like are doing their best to push the social drives into group 1 by trying to see to it that everyone has a satisfactory social life.
[10]（第62段）有些社會科學家、教育者、“精神健康”專業人士以及其他類似人物正在竭力將社會慾望推入第一類，從而使所有人都能擁有滿意的社會生活。

So certain artificial needs have been created that fall into group 2, hence serve the need for the power process. Advertising and marketing techniques have been developed that make many people feel they need things that their grandparents never desired or even dreamed of. It requires serious effort to earn enough money to satisfy these artificial needs, hence they fall into group 2. (But see paragraphs 80-82.) Modern man must satisfy his need for the power process largely through pursuit of the artificial needs created by the advertising and marketing industry [11], and through surrogate activities.

63
因此屬於第二類的特定人為需求就被創造了出來，藉以滿足權力過程的需要。廣告與營銷的發展使人們覺得他們需要他們的祖父母們做夢也沒有想過的東西。他們需要花大力氣掙錢來滿足這些人為需求，因此這些需求就歸於了第二類。（見80-82段）現代人想要滿足權力過程的需要就必須主要依靠追求由廣告與營銷工業創造出來的人為需求 [11] 以及替代行為。

[11]. (Paragraphs 63) Is the drive for endless material acquisition really an artificial creation of the advertising and marketing industry? Certainly there is no innate human drive for material acquisition. There have been many cultures in which people have desired little material wealth beyond what was necessary to satisfy their basic physical needs (Australian aborigines, traditional Mexican peasant culture, some African cultures). On the other hand there have also been many pre-industrial cultures in which material acquisition has played an important role. So we can't claim that today's acquisition-oriented culture is exclusively a creation of the advertising and marketing industry. But it is clear that the advertising and marketing industry has had an important part in creating that culture. The big corporations that spend millions on advertising wouldn't be spending that kind of money without solid proof that they were getting it back in increased sales. One member of FC met a sales manager a couple of years ago who was frank enough to tell him, "Our job is to make people buy things they don't want and don't need." He then described how an untrained novice could present people with the facts about a product, and make no sales at all, while a trained and experienced professional salesman would make lots of sales to the same people. This shows that people are manipulated into buying things they don't really want.
[11]（第63段）對於獲取物質的無盡慾望是否真是廣告和營銷行業的人為創造呢？當然，人並沒有與生俱來的獲取物質慾望。在許多文化中，人們對於物質必需品之外的物質財富並沒有多大興趣，以滿足他們的基本生理需求（澳大利亞原住民，傳統墨西哥農民文化，一些非洲文化）。另一方面，在工業革命前，獲取物質行為作用重大的文化也有許多。因此，我們不能說當今以獲取物質為導向的文化完全就是廣告和營銷行業的創造。但很顯然，廣告和營銷行業對於這種文化的創造有著重大的作用。如果沒有確鑿證據表明如此大手筆的開支一定能增加銷量，大公司是不會花費數百萬美元做廣告的。一名FC成員幾年前遇到了一個銷售經理，此人坦率地告訴他，“我們的工作是讓人購買他們不想要且不需要的東西。”然後他描述了一個未經訓練的新手如何向人們介紹關於產品的事實卻賣不出去，而一個訓練有素，經驗豐富的專業銷售員卻可以面向同一批人打開銷路。這表明人們在操縱之下購買了他們並不真正想要的東西。

It seems that for many people, maybe the majority, these artificial forms of the power process are insufficient. A theme that appears repeatedly in the writings of the social critics of the second half of the 20th century is the sense of purposelessness that afflicts many people in modern society. (This purposelessness is often called by other names such as "anomic" or "middle-class vacuity.") We suggest that the so-called "identity crisis" is actually a search for a sense of purpose, often for commitment to a suitable surrogate activity. It may be that existentialism is in large part a response to the purposelessness of modern life. [12] Very widespread in modern society is the search for "fulfillment." But we think that for the majority of people an activity whose main goal is fulfillment (that is, a surrogate activity) does not bring completely satisfactory fulfillment. In other words, it does not fully satisfy the need for the power process. (See paragraph 41.) That need can be fully satisfied only through activities that have some external goal, such as physical necessities, sex, love, status, revenge, etc.

64
看來對於很多人甚或大多數人來說，人為形式的權力過程是不夠的。二十世紀後半期社會批評家的著作中反覆出現的一個主題是困擾很多現代社會成員的無目的性。（這種無目的性通常有其他名稱，如“失范”或“中產階級空虛”）。我們認為，所謂的“身份危機”其實是對於目的性的尋找，往往是為了投入一項合適的替代活動。存在主義可能在很大程度上是是現代生活對於無目的性的回應。[12] 對於“滿足感”的搜尋在現代社會中非常普遍。但我們認為，大多數以獲得滿足感為主要目標的活動（即替代活動）並不能帶來完全令人滿意的滿足感。換句話說，它並不能完全滿足對於權力過程的需要。（見第41段），這一需要只有通過擁有外部目標的活動才可以得到完全滿足，如物質必需品，性，愛情，地位，復仇等

[12]. (Paragraph 64) The problem of purposelessness seems to have become less serious during the last 15 years or so, because people now feel less secure physically and economically than they did earlier, and the need for security provides them with a goal. But purposelessness has been replaced by frustration over the difficulty of attaining security. We emphasize the problem of purposelessness because the liberals and leftists would wish to solve our social problems by having society guarantee everyone's security; but if that could be done it would only bring back the problem of purposelessness. The real issue is not whether society provides well or poorly for people's security; the trouble is that people are dependent on the system for their security rather than having it in their own hands. This, by the way, is part of the reason why some people get worked up about the right to bear arms; possession of a gun puts that aspect of their security in their own hands.
[12]（第64段）在過去的15年裡，無目的性的問題似乎已經變得不那麼嚴重了，因為人們現在感覺自己在身體與經濟方面都沒那麼安全了，對於安全的需要為他們提供了目標。但無目的性已經被實現安全的難度所帶來的挫敗感所取代了。我們強調無目的性的問題，因為自由派和左派主義者希望通過使社會保障所有人的安全來解決我們的社會問題，但如果真能做到這一點只能令無目的性捲土重來。真正的問題不在於社會為其成員提供的安全是否足夠，而是在於人們依賴體係為他們提供安全而不是將安全掌握在自己手中。順便說一句，之所以有些人對於攜帶武器的權利如此熱衷，這也是部分原因；手裡有槍意味著他們把某一方面的安全掌握在了自己手中。

Moreover, where goals are pursued through earning money, climbing the status ladder or functioning as part of the system in some other way, most people are not in a position to pursue their goals AUTONOMOUSLY. Most workers are someone else's employee as, as we pointed out in paragraph 61, must spend their days doing what they are told to do in the way they are told to do it. Even most people who are in business for themselves have only limited autonomy. It is a chronic complaint of small-business persons and entrepreneurs that their hands are tied by excessive government regulation. Some of these regulations are doubtless unnecessary, but for the most part government regulations are essential and inevitable parts of our extremely complex society. A large portion of small business today operates on the franchise system. It was reported in the Wall Street Journal a few years ago that many of the franchise-granting companies require applicants for franchises to take a personality test that is designed to EXCLUDE those who have creativity and initiative, because such persons are not sufficiently docile to go along obediently with the franchise system. This excludes from small business many of the people who most need autonomy.

65
此外，如果通過賺錢、攀爬等級階梯、充當體系一部分或其他方式來追求目標，大多數人都不會自主追求自己的目標。大多數工人是別人的僱員，正如我們在第61段中指出的那樣，他們每天都必須按照指定的方式做指定的事情。甚至獨立經營的人也只有有限的自主。小企業經營者和創業者一直都在抱怨政府過度監管束縛住了他們的雙手。有些規定無疑是不必要的，但在大多數情況下政府規定對於我們這個極其複雜的社會來說是必要且不可避免的。今天很大一部分小企業以特許經營制度為基礎。幾年前據《華爾街日報》報導，許多大公司在授予專營權時都需要申請者接受性格測試，目的是為了排除那些有創造性和主動性的人，因為這樣的人不夠順從，無法乖乖地沿襲特許經營體系。這就將許多最需要自主的人排除在了小企業之外。

Today people live more by virtue of what the system does FOR them or TO them than by virtue of what they do for themselves. And what they do for themselves is done more and more along channels laid down by the system. Opportunities tend to be those that the system provides, the opportunities must be exploited in accord with the rules and regulations [13], and techniques prescribed by experts must be followed if there is to be a chance of success.

66
今天的人們更多依靠體係為他們或對他們所作的事情生活，而不是依靠自己為自己所作的事情生活。而他們為自己所作的事情也越來越依靠體系安排的渠道。機會大都是體系提供的，對於機會的利用也要符合規則與規定[13] 且如果想要有機會成功就必須遵從專家指定的方法。

[13]. (Paragraph 66) Conservatives' efforts to decrease the amount of government regulation are of little benefit to the average man. For one thing, only a fraction of the regulations can be eliminated because most regulations are necessary. For another thing, most of the deregulation affects business rather than the average individual, so that its main effect is to take power from the government and give it to private corporations. What this means for the average man is that government interference in his life is replaced by interference from big corporations, which may be permitted, for example, to dump more chemicals that get into his water supply and give him cancer. The conservatives are just taking the average man for a sucker, exploiting his resentment of Big Government to promote the power of Big Business.
[13]（第66段）保守派減少政府監管的努力對於普通人沒有多少好處。首先，真正能夠消除的監管措施只有一小部分，絕大多數監管措施都是必需的。其次，絕大多數去監管措施都是對行業而不是普通人起作用。因此這些舉措的主要作用是將權力從政府手中轉移到私人企業手中。對於普通人來說這意味著之前干涉他生活的是大政府，現在則是大企業，而這些企業可能會允許對他不利的行為，例如向水源傾倒化學物質使他患上癌症。保守派將普通人當成了冤大頭，利用他對大政府的怨氣來加強大企業的權力。

Thus the power process is disrupted in our society through a deficiency of real goals and a deficiency of autonomy in pursuit of goals. But it is also disrupted because of those human drives that fall into group 3: the drives that one cannot adequately satisfy no matter how much effort one makes. One of these drives is the need for security. Our lives depend on decisions made by other people; we have no control over these decisions and usually we do not even know the people who make them. ("We live in a world in which relatively few people - maybe 500 or 1,00 - make the important decisions" - Philip B. Heymann of Harvard Law School, quoted by Anthony Lewis, New York Times, April 21, 1995.) Our lives depend on whether safety standards at a nuclear power plant are properly maintained; on how much pesticide is allowed to get into our food or how much pollution into our air; on how skillful (or incompetent) our doctor is; whether we lose or get a job may depend on decisions made by government economists or corporation executives; and so forth. Most individuals are not in a position to secure themselves against these threats to more [than] a very limited extent. The individual's search for security is therefore frustrated, which leads to a sense of powerlessness.

67
因此在我們的社會裡權力過程經常因為缺乏真正目標與缺乏追求目標的自主權而遭到打斷。不過打斷權力過程的因素還有第三類慾望：無論付出多麼大的努力都不能充分滿足的慾望。其中一項慾望就是對安全的需要。我們的生活依賴於其他人的決定，我們無法控制這些決定，通常我們甚至不知道作出這些決定的是什麼人。（“我們生活在一個由相對不多的人——也許500或100人——做出重要決定的世界裡。” 菲利普.B.海曼，哈佛大學法學院，《紐約時報》，1995年4月21日，安東尼.劉易斯）我們的生命取決於核電廠是否得到了恰當維護，食品中許可的農藥殘留量或者空氣中許可的污染物含量有多高，我們的醫生有多麼高明（或不稱職），我們是否有工作取決於政府經濟學家或企業管理者的決策，大多數人都只能在一個非常有限的範圍內確保自己免受威脅，個人對於安全的追尋因此而受挫，這也導致了無力感。

It may be objected that primitive man is physically less secure than modern man, as is shown by his shorter life expectancy; hence modern man suffers from less, not more than the amount of insecurity that is normal for human beings. but psychological security does not closely correspond with physical security. What makes us FEEL secure is not so much objective security as a sense of confidence in our ability to take care of ourselves. Primitive man, threatened by a fierce animal or by hunger, can fight in self-defense or travel in search of food. He has no certainty of success in these efforts, but he is by no means helpless against the things that threaten him. The modern individual on the other hand is threatened by many things against which he is helpless; nuclear accidents, carcinogens in food, environmental pollution, war, increasing taxes, invasion of his privacy by large organizations, nation-wide social or economic phenomena that may disrupt his way of life.

68
可能有人提出反對，認為原始人與現代人相比更欠缺身體安全，因為原始人的壽命更短，因此現代人承受的不安全感與人類能夠承受的正常值相比要更少而不是更多。但心理安全與身體安全的關係並不密切。我們之所以感到安全與其說是因為客觀安全的現實，倒不如說是對我們有能力保障自身安全的信心。原始人在面對猛獸襲擊或飢餓威脅時可以奮力自衛或長途跋涉尋找食物。他的這些努力未必總能成功，但他面對那些威脅他的事物絕非束手無策。另一方面現代個人對於自己所受到的威脅往往十分無奈：核事故，食品裡的致癌物質，環境污染，戰爭，稅收上調，大型企業對於隱私的侵犯以及全國性的社會或經濟問題都會打亂他的生活方式。

It is true that primitive man is powerless against some of the things that threaten him; disease for example. But he can accept the risk of disease stoically. It is part of the nature of things, it is no one's fault, unless is the fault of some imaginary, impersonal demon. But threats to the modern individual tend to be MAN-MADE. They are not the results of chance but are IMPOSED on him by other persons whose decisions he, as an individual, is unable to influence. Consequently he feels frustrated, humiliated and angry.

69
的確，原始人面對某些威脅時同樣無能為力，例如疾病。但是他堅忍地接受了疾病帶來的風險。疾病是自然的一部分，不是任何人的錯，除非是某個想像出來的、毫無感情的魔鬼。但是現代人面對的威脅都是人為的，並不是運氣不好的結果，而是他人的決策強加於他的結果，而他又無力影響這些決策。因此他自然會感到沮喪，羞辱與憤怒。

Thus primitive man for the most part has his security in his own hands (either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group) whereas the security of modern man is in the hands of persons or organizations that are too remote or too large for him to be able personally to influence them. So modern man's drive for security tends to fall into groups 1 and 3; in some areas (food, shelter, etc.) his security is assured at the cost of only trivial effort, whereas in other areas he CANNOT attain security. (The foregoing greatly simplifies the real situation, but it does indicate in a rough, general way how the condition of modern man differs from that of primitive man.)

70
因此原始人的安全大體而言是掌握在自己手裡的（無論作為個體還是小群體的成員）。而現代人的安全則掌握在那些距離他太遠或規模太大，以致他無法施加個人影響的機構組織手裡。因此現代人追求安全的慾望大致可歸於第一類與第三類；在某些領域（例如食物與住所）他的安全只需要一丁點努力就能得到保證，而在其他方面他則完全無法自行獲得安全。（這段論述極大地簡化了實際情況，但是的確十分粗略地概括了現代人與原始人的區別）

People have many transitory drives or impulses that are necessary frustrated in modern life, hence fall into group 3. One may become angry, but modern society cannot permit fighting. In many situations it does not even permit verbal aggression. When going somewhere one may be in a hurry, or one may be in a mood to travel slowly, but one generally has no choice but to move with the flow of traffic and obey the traffic signals. One may want to do one's work in a different way, but usually one can work only according to the rules laid down by one's employer. In many other ways as well, modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations (explicit or implicit) that frustrate many of his impulses and thus interfere with the power process. Most of these regulations cannot be disposed with, because the are necessary for the functioning of industrial society.

71
現代生活中人們有很多暫時性的慾望或衝動也會遭到抑制，因此也會落入第三類。一個人可能會生氣，但現代社會不允許鬥毆，很多情況下甚至不允許言語攻擊。某人前往某地是可能急著趕路，也可能希望慢慢走，但一般來說都只能跟隨車流行動並遵守交通信號。在許多其他方面，現代人都被一張規則之網所籠罩（或明或暗），使他的衝動無法釋放並因此打斷他的權力過程。大部分此類規則都不能廢除，因為這些規則對於工業社會的運作是必需的。

Modern society is in certain respects extremely permissive. In matters that are irrelevant to the functioning of the system we can generally do what we please. We can believe in any religion we like (as long as it does not encourage behavior that is dangerous to the system). We can go to bed with anyone we like (as long as we practice "safe sex"). We can do anything we like as long as it is UNIMPORTANT. But in all IMPORTANT matters the system tends increasingly to regulate our behavior.

72
現代社會在某些方面是極為放縱的。在不影響體系運作的方面我們基本上想做什麼都可以。我們可以任意信仰任何宗教（只要該宗教不鼓勵威脅體系的行為）。我們可以和任何人上床（只要注意“安全性交”）。我們想做什麼都可以，只要所作的事情無關緊要。但是在所有重要方面體系都傾向於越發規範我們的行為。

Behavior is regulated not only through explicit rules and not only by the government. Control is often exercised through indirect coercion or through psychological pressure or manipulation, and by organizations other than the government, or by the system as a whole. Most large organizations use some form of propaganda [14] to manipulate public attitudes or behavior. Propaganda is not limited to "commercials" and advertisements, and sometimes it is not even consciously intended as propaganda by the people who make it. For instance, the content of entertainment programming is a powerful form of propaganda. An example of indirect coercion: There is no law that says we have to go to work every day and follow our employer's orders. Legally there is nothing to prevent us from going to live in the wild like primitive people or from going into business for ourselves. But in practice there is very little wild country left, and there is room in the economy for only a limited number of small business owners. Hence most of us can survive only as someone else's employee.

73
管束人們行為的因素不止限於明確的規則以及政府。控制往往是政府以外的其他機構或者作為整體的體系通過間接脅迫、心理壓力或操縱來進行的。大多數大型組織都會使用某種形式的宣傳 [14] 操縱公眾的態度和行為。宣傳不限於“廣告”，有時製作人甚至沒有自覺意識到自己正在進行宣傳。例如，娛樂節目的內容就是一種功能強大的宣傳形式。舉一個間接脅迫一個例子：沒有法律規定我們必須去工作，每天必須遵守僱主的命令。在法律上沒有什麼條文能阻止我們像原始人那樣生活在野外或自行創業。但在現實當中野外環境已經極為有限，經濟生活當中所能容納的小企業主數量也是有限的。因此，我們大多數人只有成為別人的僱員才可以生存。

[14]. (Paragraph 73) When someone approves of the purpose for which propaganda is being used in a given case, he generally calls it "education" or applies to it some similar euphemism. But propaganda is propaganda regardless of the purpose for which it is used.
[14]（第73段）如果某人同意某個特例當中使用宣傳的目的，他一般稱之為“教育”或使用其他委婉用語。但是宣傳就是宣傳，無論出於什麼目的。

We suggest that modern man's obsession with longevity, and with maintaining physical vigor and sexual attractiveness to an advanced age, is a symptom of unfulfillment resulting from deprivation with respect to the power process. The "mid-life crisis" also is such a symptom. So is the lack of interest in having children that is fairly common in modern society but almost unheard-of in primitive societies.

74
我們認為現代人對於長壽的痴迷以及在老年階段維持身體活力與性吸引力的執著是一種不滿足的症狀，原因則在於權力過程遭到了剝奪。所謂“中年危機”也是此類症狀之一。缺乏養育子女的興趣對於現代社會來說也十分常見，但是在原始社會這種事可謂聞所未聞。

In primitive societies life is a succession of stages. The needs and purposes of one stage having been fulfilled, there is no particular reluctance about passing on to the next stage. A young man goes through the power process by becoming a hunter, hunting not for sport or for fulfillment but to get meat that is necessary for food. (In young women the process is more complex, with greater emphasis on social power; we won't discuss that here.) This phase having been successfully passed through, the young man has no reluctance about settling down to the responsibilities of raising a family. (In contrast, some modern people indefinitely postpone having children because they are too busy seeking some kind of "fulfillment." We suggest that the fulfillment they need is adequate experience of the power process -- with real goals instead of the artificial goals of surrogate activities.) Again, having successfully raised his children, going through the power process by providing them with the physical necessities, the primitive man feels that his work is done and he is prepared to accept old age (if he survives that long) and death. Many modern people, on the other hand, are disturbed by the prospect of death, as is shown by the amount of effort they expend trying to maintain their physical condition, appearance and health. We argue that this is due to unfulfillment resulting from the fact that they have never put their physical powers to any use, have never gone through the power process using their bodies in a serious way. It is not the primitive man, who has used his body daily for practical purposes, who fears the deterioration of age, but the modern man, who has never had a practical use for his body beyond walking from his car to his house. It is the man whose need for the power process has been satisfied during his life who is best prepared to accept the end of that life.

75
在原始社會，生活是一連串的階段。一個階段的需要和目的已經達成之後，原始人就會自然進入下一階段而並不感到特別勉強。一名年輕男子通過成為一個獵人來完成權力過程，他的狩獵活動不是為了取樂或滿足感，而是為了得到必要的肉食。（年輕女性的權力過程更加複雜，更加注重社會權力，我們在此姑且不加討論）。順利通過這一階段後，年輕人就會毫不勉強地承擔起養家的責任。（相比之下，一些現代人無限期推遲生育子女，因為他們太忙於尋求某種“圓滿”。我們認為，他們所需要的是權力過程的充分經驗——這裡的權力過程要有真正的目標，而不是替代活動的人為目標。）同樣，在成功地養育了他的孩子，通過為他們提供物質必需品而完成權力過程之後，原始人會認為他的工作已經完成並坦然接受老年（如果他能活這麼久）與死亡。另一方面，許多現代人對於死亡的前景感到不安，他們付出了大量努力試圖維持自己的身體狀況、外觀和健康。我們認為這是由於他們從來沒有以任何方式使用自己的身體，從來沒有通過認真地使用自己的身體來完成權力過程，因此感到不滿足。原始人每天為了實際目的而使用自己的身體，而現代人對於身體的實際應用無非是每天下車走回家，真正擔心年歲增長卻是後者。在人生當中滿足了權力過程需要的人最能接受人生的結束。

In response to the arguments of this section someone will say, "Society must find a way to give people the opportunity to go through the power process." For such people the value of the opportunity is destroyed by the very fact that society gives it to them. What they need is to find or make their own opportunities. As long as the system GIVES them their opportunities it still has them on a leash. To attain autonomy they must get off that leash.

76
有些人對本段論述的反應是“社會必須設法為人們提供經歷權力過程的機會。”但是對於這些人來說，由社會向他們提供機會這一事實就已經摧毀了這些機會的價值。他們必須自己尋找或創造自己的機會。只要這些機會是體系提供的，體系就依然制約著他們。為了獲得自主他們必須擺脫這種制約。

HOW SOME PEOPLE ADJUST
一部分人的調整方式

Not everyone in industrial-technological society suffers from psychological problems. Some people even profess to be quite satisfied with society as it is. We now discuss some of the reasons why people differ so greatly in their response to modern society.

77
並非所有生活在工業技術社會的人們都會遭受心理問題。有些人甚至對於社會現狀十分滿意。我們現在就來討論一下為什麼人們對於現代社會的反應如此不同。

First, there doubtless are differences in the strength of the drive for power. Individuals with a weak drive for power may have relatively little need to go through the power process, or at least relatively little need for autonomy in the power process. These are docile types who would have been happy as plantation darkies in the Old South. (We don't mean to sneer at "plantation darkies" of the Old South. To their credit, most of the slaves were NOT content with their servitude. We do sneer at people who ARE content with servitude.)

78
首先，無疑人與人之間的權力慾望強弱有所不同。權力慾望較弱的個人相對而言或許沒有多少體驗權力過程的需要，或者至少說相對而言對於權力過程中的自主性沒有多少需要。這些人屬於溫順的類型，例如當年美國南方各州種植園裡的黑奴。（我們無意嘲笑當年美國南方各州種植園裡的黑奴。平心而論，大多數黑奴都不甘忍受奴役。但我們的確嘲笑那些滿足於奴役的人。）

Some people may have some exceptional drive, in pursuing which they satisfy their need for the power process. For example, those who have an unusually strong drive for social status may spend their whole lives climbing the status ladder without ever getting bored with that game.

79
有些人在滿足權力過程需求的追尋中或許有超過常人的慾望。例如有人對於社會地位的慾望特別強烈，他可能會耗費終生向上爬而絲毫不感到厭倦。

People vary in their susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques. Some people are so susceptible that, even if they make a great deal of money, they cannot satisfy their constant craving for the shiny new toys that the marketing industry dangles before their eyes. So they always feel hard-pressed financially even if their income is large, and their cravings are frustrated.

80
不同的人對於廣告營銷手段的易感度有所不同。有些人極易受到影響，以至於儘管他們賺了很多錢，依舊無法抗拒營銷工業在他們眼前招搖的閃亮新玩具。因此儘管他們收入優渥卻總感到財政吃緊，他們的欲求總得不到伸張。

Some people have low susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques. These are the people who aren't interested in money. Material acquisition does not serve their need for the power process.

81
有些人對於廣告與營銷策略的易感度很低。這些人對金錢沒有興趣。獲取物質無法滿足他們對於權力過程的需要.

People who have medium susceptibility to advertising and marketing techniques are able to earn enough money to satisfy their craving for goods and services, but only at the cost of serious effort (putting in overtime, taking a second job, earning promotions, etc.) Thus material acquisition serves their need for the power process. But it does not necessarily follow that their need is fully satisfied. They may have insufficient autonomy in the power process (their work may consist of following orders) and some of their drives may be frustrated (e.g., security, aggression). (We are guilty of oversimplification in paragraphs 80-82 because we have assumed that the desire for material acquisition is entirely a creation of the advertising and marketing industry. Of course it's not that simple.

82
對於廣告與營銷策略有著中等易感度的人可以賺到足夠的錢來滿足自己對於商品與服務的慾望，但是必須為此付出相當的努力（加班，兼職，爭取升職等）。因此獲取物質可以滿足他們對於權力過程的需要。但他們的需要未必一定就能得到完全的滿足。他們在權力過程中未必擁有完全自主（他們的工作就是執行命令）而他們的一部分預防也可能遭到壓制（安全或攻擊性）。（我們在80-82段的論述過於簡略，因為我們假設獲取物質的慾望完全是廣告與營銷行業創造出來的。當然實際情況要複雜得多。）

Some people partly satisfy their need for power by identifying themselves with a powerful organization or mass movement. An individual lacking goals or power joins a movement or an organization, adopts its goals as his own, then works toward these goals. When some of the goals are attained, the individual, even though his personal efforts have played only an insignificant part in the attainment of the goals, feels (through his identification with the movement or organization) as if he had gone through the power process. This phenomenon was exploited by the fascists, nazis and communists. Our society uses it, too, though less crudely. Example: Manuel Noriega was an irritant to the U.S. (goal: punish Noriega). The U.S. invaded Panama (effort) and punished Noriega (attainment of goal). The U.S. went through the power process and many Americans, because of their identification with the U.S., experienced the power process vicariously. Hence the widespread public approval of the Panama invasion; it gave people a sense of power. [15] We see the same phenomenon in armies, corporations, political parties, humanitarian organizations, religious or ideological movements. In particular, leftist movements tend to attract people who are seeking to satisfy their need for power. But for most people identification with a large organization or a mass movement does not fully satisfy the need for power.

83
有些人通過認同某個強大組織或群體運動來部分滿足自己的權力需求。缺乏目標或權力的個人會加入一個組織或運動，接受其目標作為自己的目標，然後努力實現這些目標。當這些目標中的一部分達成之後，即使個人的努力在目標實現的過程中只起到了不太重要的作用，個人依然會（通過對於運動或組織的認同）感到自己已經完成了權力過程。法西斯，納粹和共產主義者都利用過這種現象。我們的社會也會利用這種現象，儘管不那麼粗暴。例如：諾列加刺激了美國（目標：懲罰諾列加）。美國入侵巴拿馬（努力）並懲罰了諾列加（達到目標）。美國完成了權力過程，許多認同美國的美國人也共鳴班底感到了權力過程的完成。因此公眾廣泛支持入侵巴拿馬，因為這一事件給人們帶來了權力感。 [15]在軍隊，企業，政黨，人道主義組織，宗教或意識形態運動當中也能看到同樣的現象。左派主義運動尤其會吸引試圖滿足權力過程需要的人。但對於大多數人來說認同一個龐大的組織或群眾運動並不能完全滿足對權力的需求。

[15]. (Paragraph 83) We are not expressing approval or disapproval of the Panama invasion. We only use it to illustrate a point.
[15] 我們並不打算對入侵巴拿馬事件表示贊同或反對。我們只想說明自己的論點。

Another way in which people satisfy their need for the power process is through surrogate activities. As we explained in paragraphs 38-40, a surrogate activity that is directed toward an artificial goal that the individual pursues for the sake of the "fulfillment" that he gets from pursuing the goal, not because he needs to attain the goal itself. For instance, there is no practical motive for building enormous muscles, hitting a little ball into a hole or acquiring a complete series of postage stamps. Yet many people in our society devote themselves with passion to bodybuilding, golf or stamp collecting. Some people are more "other-directed" than others, and therefore will more readily attack importance to a surrogate activity simply because the people around them treat it as important or because society tells them it is important. That is why some people get very serious about essentially trivial activities such as sports, or bridge, or chess, or arcane scholarly pursuits, whereas others who are more clear-sighted never see these things as anything but the surrogate activities that they are, and consequently never attach enough importance to them to satisfy their need for the power process in that way. It only remains to point out that in many cases a person's way of earning a living is also a surrogate activity. Not a PURE surrogate activity, since part of the motive for the activity is to gain the physical necessities and (for some people) social status and the luxuries that advertising makes them want. But many people put into their work far more effort than is necessary to earn whatever money and status they require, and this extra effort constitutes a surrogate activity. This extra effort, together with the emotional investment that accompanies it, is one of the most potent forces acting toward the continual development and perfecting of the system, with negative consequences for individual freedom (see paragraph 131). Especially, for the most creative scientists and engineers, work tends to be largely a surrogate activity. This point is so important that is deserves a separate discussion, which we shall give in a moment (paragraphs 87-92).

84
人們滿足權力過程的另一種方法是替代活動。正如我們在第38-40段所解釋的那樣，替代活動指向人為的目標，個人追求此類目標是為了獲得“滿足感”而不是達到目標本身。舉例來說，鍛鍊出巨大的肌肉，將小球打入一個洞裡或獲得一套完整的系列郵票等行為並沒有什麼實用動機。然而在我們的社會裡有很多人都在充滿激情地進行著健身、高爾夫或集郵活動。有些人與其他人相比要更加 “以他人為導向”，因此更容易僅僅因為他們周圍的人認為這些替代活動十分重要或者因為社會告訴他們這些活動很重要就重視這些替代活動。這就是為什麼有些人會非常嚴肅地對待基本上無關緊要的活動，如運動、橋牌、象棋或晦澀的學術研究，而其他看得更清楚的人從來只將這些活動視為替代活動，因此在滿足權力過程的需要時從來沒有重視過這些活動。接下來只需要指出在許多情況下一個人的謀生方式也是替代活動。不是單純的替代活動，因為活動的動機是為了獲得物理必需品以及（對於某些人來說）社會地位和因為廣告宣傳而想要擁有的奢侈品。但很多人投入工作的努力遠遠超過了賺取任何金錢或地位所必需的額度，而這種額外的努力就構成了替代活動。這種額外努力加上隨之而來的感情投資是促進體系不斷發展和完善的最強大力量，並會為個人自由帶來消極的後果（見第131段）。特別是對於最有創意的科學家和工程師來說，工作往往主要是替代活動。這一點非常重要，因此值得拿出來單獨討論（第87-92段）。

In this section we have explained how many people in modern society do satisfy their need for the power process to a greater or lesser extent. But we think that for the majority of people the need for the power process is not fully satisfied. In the first place, those who have an insatiable drive for status, or who get firmly "hooked" or a surrogate activity, or who identify strongly enough with a movement or organization to satisfy their need for power in that way, are exceptional personalities. Others are not fully satisfied with surrogate activities or by identification with an organization (see paragraphs 41, 64). In the second place, too much control is imposed by the system through explicit regulation or through socialization, which results in a deficiency of autonomy, and in frustration due to the impossibility of attaining certain goals and the necessity of restraining too many impulses.

85
在本節當中我們討論了許多現代人是如何或多或少地滿足了自己對於權力過程的需要。但是我們認為對於大多數人來說對於權力過程的需要並未得到完全滿足。首先，那些對於社會地位的慾望極強，或者極其投入替代行為，或者十分認同某個組織或運動，從而滿足了自己對於權力過程的需求的人都是特例。其他人是無法通過這些方法來得到滿足的（見41、64段）。其次，體系通過明文規定與社會化施加了太多限制，導致了自主性不足，無法達成某些目標以及對於過量衝動進行限制的必要性也會使人感到挫敗。

But even if most people in industrial-technological society were well satisfied, we (FC) would still be opposed to that form of society, because (among other reasons) we consider it demeaning to fulfill one's need for the power process through surrogate activities or through identification with an organization, rather than through pursuit of real goals.

86
但是即使大多數人在工業技術社會都得到了完全滿足，我們（FC）依舊要反對這種社會形式，因為（原因之一是）我們認為通過投入替代行為或者認同某個組織而不是追尋真正的目標來滿足對於權力過程的需求是對人的貶低。

THE MOTIVES OF SCIENTISTS
科學家的動機

Science and technology provide the most important examples of surrogate activities. Some scientists claim that they are motivated by "curiosity," that notion is simply absurd. Most scientists work on highly specialized problem that are not the object of any normal curiosity. For example, is an astronomer, a mathematician or an entomologist curious about the properties of isopropyltrimethylmethane? Of course not. Only a chemist is curious about such a thing, and he is curious about it only because chemistry is his surrogate activity. Is the chemist curious about the appropriate classification of a new species of beetle? No. That question is of interest only to the entomologist, and he is interested in it only because entomology is his surrogate activity. If the chemist and the entomologist had to exert themselves seriously to obtain the physical necessities, and if that effort exercised their abilities in an interesting way but in some nonscientific pursuit, then they couldn't giver a damn about isopropyltrimethylmethane or the classification of beetles. Suppose that lack of funds for postgraduate education had led the chemist to become an insurance broker instead of a chemist. In that case he would have been very interested in insurance matters but would have cared nothing about isopropyltrimethylmethane. In any case it is not normal to put into the satisfaction of mere curiosity the amount of time and effort that scientists put into their work.

87
科學和技術為替代活動提供了最重要的例子。一些科學家宣稱，他們的動機是“出於好奇”，這個概念十分荒謬。大多數科學家研究的都是高度專業化的問題，並非任何正常好奇心的對象。例如，一個天文學家、數學家或一個昆蟲學家會對三甲基丁烷的特性感到好奇嗎？當然不會。只有化學家才會對此感到好奇，因為化學是他的替代活動。化學家會對一種新發現甲蟲的適當分類感到好奇嗎？這個問題只有昆蟲學家有興趣，他對此有興趣也僅僅是因為昆蟲學是他的替代活動。如果化學家和昆蟲學家不得不認真努力從而獲得物質必需品，而且如果這種努力需要他們以非科學研究的有趣方式發揮自己的能力，那麼他們根本不會關心三甲基丁烷或甲蟲分類。假設研究生教育的資金缺乏導致原本可能成為化學家的人成為了保險經紀人。在這種情況下，他會對保險事宜很感興趣，但不會再關心什麼三甲基丁烷了。科學家們單純以好奇心為理由將如此大量的時間和精力投入自己的工作是難以服人的。

The "benefit of humanity" explanation doesn't work any better. Some scientific work has no conceivable relation to the welfare of the human race - most of archaeology or comparative linguistics for example. Some other areas of science present obviously dangerous possibilities. Yet scientists in these areas are just as enthusiastic about their work as those who develop vaccines or study air pollution. Consider the case of Dr. Edward Teller, who had an obvious emotional involvement in promoting nuclear power plants. Did this involvement stem from a desire to benefit humanity? If so, then why didn't Dr. Teller get emotional about other "humanitarian" causes? If he was such a humanitarian then why did he help to develop the H-bomb? As with many other scientific achievements, it is very much open to question whether nuclear power plants actually do benefit humanity. Does the cheap electricity outweigh the accumulating waste and risk of accidents? Dr. Teller saw only one side of the question. Clearly his emotional involvement with nuclear power arose not from a desire to "benefit humanity" but from a personal fulfillment he got from his work and from seeing it put to practical use.

88
“造福人類”,這個解釋也同樣靠不住。一其他科學領域則顯然有著造成危險的可能性。然而，在這些領域的科學家們對他們的工作就像開發疫苗或研究空氣污染的同行們一樣熱情。考慮愛德華.泰勒博士（Edward Teller）的例子，他對於參與促進核電廠建設十分熱情。這種感情投入是否源於造福人類的願望呢？如果是這樣的話，那麼為什麼泰勒博士沒有對其他 “人道主義”事業進行同樣的感情投入呢？如果他是人道主義者，那麼他為什麼要幫助發展氫彈呢？與許多其他的科學成就一樣，核電廠是否真正能夠造福人類是非常值得商榷的。廉價電力的好處能夠超過核廢料累積和危險事故帶來的危害嗎？泰勒博士看到的只是問題的一個側面。顯然他對於核電的情感投入並非源於“造福人類”的願望，而是源於他的工作以及將核電投入實用所帶來的個人價值的實現。

The same is true of scientists generally. With possible rare exceptions, their motive is neither curiosity nor a desire to benefit humanity but the need to go through the power process: to have a goal (a scientific problem to solve), to make an effort (research) and to attain the goal (solution of the problem.) Science is a surrogate activity because scientists work mainly for the fulfillment they get out of the work itself.

89
一般來說科學家都是這樣。可能其中也有少數例外，但總體而言他們的動機既不是好奇也不是造福人類，而是完成權力過程的需要。

Of course, it's not that simple. Other motives do play a role for many scientists. Money and status for example. Some scientists may be persons of the type who have an insatiable drive for status (see paragraph 79) and this may provide much of the motivation for their work. No doubt the majority of scientists, like the majority of the general population, are more or less susceptible to advertising and marketing techniques and need money to satisfy their craving for goods and services. Thus science is not a PURE surrogate activity. But it is in large part a surrogate activity.

90
當然實際情況並沒有如此簡單。其他動機對於許多科學家來說也有作用，例如金錢與地位。有些科學家或許對地位有著無法滿足的欲求（見79段），這一點為他們的工作提供了最主要的動機。無疑，大多數科學家也像大多數公眾一樣多少易於受到廣告與營銷手段的影響，也需要金錢來滿足他們對於商品和服務的需要。因此科學研究並不完全是替代行為，但在相當程度上是這樣。

Also, science and technology constitute a mass power movement, and many scientists gratify their need for power through identification with this mass movement (see paragraph 83).

91
此外，科學技術也構成了群體權力運動，許多科學家都通過認同這一運動來滿足自己的權力需求（見83段）

Thus science marches on blindly, without regard to the real welfare of the human race or to any other standard, obedient only to the psychological needs of the scientists and of the government officials and corporation executives who provide the funds for research.

92
因此科學盲目地前進，不考慮人類種族的真正福祉或任何其他標準，僅僅服從科學家以及提供研究資金的政府官員與企業高管的心理需求。

THE NATURE OF FREEDOM
自由的本質

We are going to argue that industrial-technological society cannot be reformed in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing the sphere of human freedom. But because "freedom" is a word that can be interpreted in many ways, we must first make clear what kind of freedom we are concerned with.

93
我們認為工業技術社會無法加以改革，使之不至於蠶食人類自由的空間。但是由於“自由”這個詞可以從許多不同方面加以解釋，我們必須首先闡明我們這裡所謂的自由究竟是什麼。

By "freedom" we mean the opportunity to go through the power process, with real goals not the artificial goals of surrogate activities, and without interference, manipulation or supervision from anyone, especially from any large organization. Freedom means being in control (either as an individual or as a member of a SMALL group) of the life-and-death issues of one's existence; food, clothing, shelter and defense against whatever threats there may be in one's environment. Freedom means having power; not the power to control other people but the power to control the circumstances of one's own life. One does not have freedom if anyone else (especially a large organization) has power over one, no matter how benevolently, tolerantly and permissively that power may be exercised. It is important not to confuse freedom with mere permissiveness (see paragraph 72).

94
我們這裡的“自由”指的是經歷權力過程的機會，該權力過程要有真正的目標，而不是替代行為的人為目標，不受任何人尤其是大型組織的干涉、操縱或監督。自由意味著（以個人或小群體成員的身份）控制關乎本人生死的問題：食物，衣物，住所以及抵禦環境當中任何可能的威脅。自由意味著擁有權力，不是控制他人的權力，而是控制自身周邊環境的權力。如果任何其他人（尤其是大型組織）對某人有權力，那麼這個人就不自由，無論這種權力的實施有多麼寬容放縱。絕不能將自由與放縱混為一談。

It is said that we live in a free society because we have a certain number of constitutionally guaranteed rights. But these are not as important as they seem. The degree of personal freedom that exists in a society is determined more by the economic and technological structure of the society than by its laws or its form of government. [16] Most of the Indian nations of New England were monarchies, and many of the cities of the Italian Renaissance were controlled by dictators. But in reading about these societies one gets the impression that they allowed far more personal freedom than out society does. In part this was because they lacked efficient mechanisms for enforcing the ruler's will: There were no modern, well-organized police forces, no rapid long-distance communications, no surveillance cameras, no dossiers of information about the lives of average citizens. Hence it was relatively easy to evade control.

95
人們說我們生活在一個自由社會，因為我們擁有若干憲法保護的權利。但是這些權利並沒有看上去那麼重要。一個社會當中個人自由的限度並不是由法律或者政府形式決定的，而是由這個社會的經濟與技術結構決定的 [16] 新英格蘭的大多數印度國家都是君主制國家，文藝復興時期的意大利城邦也多由獨裁者掌控。但是研究一下這些社會，人們會感到這些社會遠比我們的社會更加允許個人自由的存在。部分原因在於這些社會缺乏執行統治者意志的有效機制。這些社會裡沒有組織良好的現代警察，沒有遠距離快速通信，沒有監視攝像頭，沒有針對普通人日常生活的信息卷宗。因此在此類社會裡逃避控制相對較容易。

[16]. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there were fewer and less effective legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution went into effect, yet there was more personal freedom in pre-industrial America, both before and after the War of Independence, than there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. We quote from "Violence in America: Historical and Comparative perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12 by Roger Lane, pages 476-478: "The progressive heightening of standards of property, and with it the increasing reliance on official law enforcement (in 19th century America). . .were common to the whole society. . .The change in social behavior is so long term and so widespread as to suggest a connection with the most fundamental of contemporary social processes; that of industrial urbanization itself. . ."Massachusetts in 1835 had a population of some 660,940, 81 percent rural, overwhelmingly preindustrial and native born. It's citizens were used to considerable personal freedom. Whether teamsters, farmers or artisans, they were all accustomed to setting their own schedules, and the nature of their work made them physically dependent on each other. . .Individual problems, sins or even crimes, were not generally cause for wider social concern. . ."But the impact of the twin movements to the city and to the factory, both just gathering force in 1835, had a progressive effect on personal behavior throughout the 19th century and into the 20th. The factory demanded regularity of behavior, a life governed by obedience to the rhythms of clock and calendar, the demands of foreman and supervisor. In the city or town, the needs of living in closely packed neighborhoods inhibited many actions previously unobjectionable.
[16]（第95段）當北美殖民地依舊處於英國統治之下時，對於自由的法律保障與美國憲法生效之後相比要更少且效力更弱。但是與工業革命在美國紮根之後相比，在獨立戰爭前後的前工業化美國有著更多的個人自由。我們引用Violence in America: Historical and Comparative perspectives一書，Hugh Davis Graham與Ted Robert Gurr編輯，第12章，作者Roger Lane，第476-478頁，“（十九世紀美國）財產標準的漸進式升高與人們對於官方執法力量的越發依賴……對於整個社會而言十分常見……這對於社會行為的改變歷時如此之長，範圍如此之廣，以至關乎當代最基本的社會進程：工業化與城市化……1835年的馬薩諸塞人口約為660940人，81%是農村人口，前工業化社會與本地出生人口占絕對主流。無論是牛馬車伕、農夫還是手藝匠人都習慣於自行設定日程，他們工作的性質也使得他們在物質層面上相互依賴……個人問題，罪過甚至犯罪一般都不會導致大範圍的關注……”但是1835年時剛剛起步的工業化與城市化這對雙生子運動在整個十九世紀與二十世紀期間對於人的行為一直有著漸進性的影響。工廠要求行為規律化，要求人們順從鐘錶與日曆的節律以及工頭與監管人員的命令。而在城鎮當中，緊密居住的需要禁止了許多之前無人反對的行為。

Both blue- and white-collar employees in larger establishments were mutually dependent on their fellows. as one man's work fit into another's, so one man's business was no longer his own. "The results of the new organization of life and work were apparent by 1900, when some 76 percent of the 2,805,346 inhabitants of Massachusetts were classified as urbanites. Much violent or irregular behavior which had been tolerable in a casual, independent society was no longer acceptable in the more formalized, cooperative atmosphere of the later period. . .The move to the cities had, in short, produced a more tractable, more socialized, more 'civilized' generation than its predecessors."

大型機構裡的藍領與白領工人全都相互依賴，他們的工作相互契合，因此他們再也沒有私事了。“新式生活與工作組織形式的結果到了1900年已經很明顯了，馬薩諸塞州2805346名居民中有76%成為了城市人口。在一個隨意獨立的社會當中往往能得到容忍的大量暴力或不端行為在後來更加正規化合作化的氛圍當中都成了不可接受的表現……簡而言之，遷入城市的運動造成了比之前世代更加馴良，更加社會化，更加‘文明’的一代人。”

(If copyright problems make it impossible for this long quotation to be printed, then please change Note 16 to read as follows:)
（假如出於版權原因無法出版上文中的長篇引言，請將第16號註釋替換為下文：）

([16]. (Paragraph 95) When the American colonies were under British rule there were fewer and less effective legal guarantees of freedom than there were after the American Constitution went into effect, yet there was more personal freedom in pre-industrial America, both before and after the War of Independence, than there was after the Industrial Revolution took hold in this country. In "Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives," edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 12 by Roger Lane, it is explained how in pre-industrial America the average person had greater independence and autonomy than he does today, and how the process of industrialization necessarily led to the restriction of personal freedom.)
（[16]（第95段）當北美殖民地處於英國統治之下時，與美國憲法生效之後相比，自由的法律保障較少且效力較弱。但是與工業革命在美國紮根之後相比，在獨立戰爭前後的前工業化美國有著更多的個人自由。Hugh Davis Graham與Ted Robert Gurr編輯的《美國的暴力：歷史與比較視角》（Violence in America: Historical and Comparative perspectives）一書中由Roger Lane撰寫的第12章專門解釋了前工業化時期美國的普通人如何擁有超過今天的獨立自主以及工業化進程如何必然導致了對個人自由的限制。）

As for our constitutional rights, consider for example that of freedom of the press. We certainly don't mean to knock that right: it is very important tool for limiting concentration of political power and for keeping those who do have political power in line by publicly exposing any misbehavior on their part. But freedom of the press is of very little use to the average citizen as an individual. The mass media are mostly under the control of large organizations that are integrated into the system. Anyone who has a little money can have something printed, or can distribute it on the Internet or in some such way, but what he has to say will be swamped by the vast volume of material put out by the media, hence it will have no practical effect. To make an impression on society with words is therefore almost impossible for most individuals and small groups. Take us (FC) for example. If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they had been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because it's more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we've had to kill people.

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至於憲法權利，不妨以出版自由舉例。我們絕對無意抨擊這一權利：這是一件十分重要的工具，可以用來限制政治權力集中化以及通過暴露掌權者的不軌之舉來約束他們的行為。但是出版自由對於作為個體的普通人用處很小。大眾媒體主要受與體系同化的大型機構的控制。任何人只要有一點錢就可以出版印刷品，或在互聯網上傳播，或借助其他此類手段；但他想說的話將會被媒體的巨量材料所淹沒，無法起到任何實際作用。因此對於大多數個人或小團體來說幾乎無法用語言為社會留下印象。以我們（FC）為例。如果我們此前從未進行任何暴力活動，那麼將這份文稿交給出版社之後很可能不會得到接受。如果其得到接受與出版，恐怕也不會吸引太多讀者。即使能夠吸引到大量讀者，這些人中的大部分也會因為暴露在媒體提供的巨量材料當中而很快將其遺忘。為了將我們的信息傳遞到公眾面前並有機會產生持久影響，我們不得不殺人。

Constitutional rights are useful up to a point, but they do not serve to guarantee much more than what could be called the bourgeois conception of freedom. According to the bourgeois conception, a "free" man is essentially an element of a social machine and has only a certain set of prescribed and delimited freedoms; freedoms that are designed to serve the needs of the social machine more than those of the individual. Thus the bourgeois's "free" man has economic freedom because that promotes growth and progress; he has freedom of the press because public criticism restrains misbehavior by political leaders; he has a rights to a fair trial because imprisonment at the whim of the powerful would be bad for the system. This was clearly the attitude of Simon Bolivar. To him, people deserved liberty only if they used it to promote progress (progress as conceived by the bourgeois). Other bourgeois thinkers have taken a similar view of freedom as a mere means to collective ends. Chester C. Tan, "Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century," page 202, explains the philosophy of the Kuomintang leader Hu Han-min: "An individual is granted rights because he is a member of society and his community life requires such rights. By community Hu meant the whole society of the nation." And on page 259 Tan states that according to Carsum Chang (Chang Chun-mai, head of the State Socialist Party in China) freedom had to be used in the interest of the state and of the people as a whole. But what kind of freedom does one have if one can use it only as someone else prescribes? FC's conception of freedom is not that of Bolivar, Hu, Chang or other bourgeois theorists. The trouble with such theorists is that they have made the development and application of social theories their surrogate activity. Consequently the theories are designed to serve the needs of the theorists more than the needs of any people who may be unlucky enough to live in a society on which the theories are imposed.

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憲法權利在一定程度上是有用的，但只能保證所謂資產階級的自由觀。根據資產階級的概念，一個“自由”的人本質上是社會機器的一個組件，只享有一套特定的自由，這套自由與其說是服務於個人，倒不如說是服務於社會機器的需要。因此資產階級的“自由人”有經濟自由，因為這能促進經濟成長和進步；他有新聞自由，因為公開批評能抑制政治領袖的不當行為，他有獲得公正審判的權利，因為出於當權者心血來潮的監禁將會破壞體系。這顯然是西蒙.玻利瓦爾的態度。在他看來只有利用自由來推動進步（小資產階級心目中的進步）的人們才有資格得到自由。其他資產階級思想家也採取了類似的觀點，認為自由僅僅是達到集體目的的手段。Chester C. Tan在Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century，第202頁解釋了國民黨領袖胡漢民的理念：“一個人被授予權利，因為他是社會的一員，他的社會生活需要這樣的權利。胡在這裡指的是整個國家的社會。”Tan還在第259頁指出，根據張君勱（中國國家社會黨領袖）的觀點，認為自由必須為了國家與人民的整體利益而得到使用。但是假如某人的自由只能按照別人規定的方式使用，那還算是什麼自由呢？FC的自由觀不同於玻利瓦爾，胡，張或其他資產階級理論家。這些理論家的問題在於他們將社會理論的研發和應用當成了替代活動。因此這些理論的設計是為理論家而服務的，而不是那些不幸生在被人強加了這些理論的社會當中的人們。

One more point to be made in this section: It should not be assumed that a person has enough freedom just because he SAYS he has enough. Freedom is restricted in part by psychological control of which people are unconscious, and moreover many people's ideas of what constitutes freedom are governed more by social convention than by their real needs. For example, it's likely that many leftists of the oversocialized type would say that most people, including themselves are socialized too little rather than too much, yet the oversocialized leftist pays a heavy psychological price for his high level of socialization.

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本節還要再說明一點：人們不應因為某人聲稱自己足夠自由就認為他足夠自由。自由部分受到了心理控制的約束，而人們無法感知這種心理活動。此外人們對於自由的感念也不是由他們的真正需要決定的，而是取決於社會常規。例如，許多過度社會化左派主義者都聲稱包括他們自己在內的大多數人的社會化程度不是太深，而是太淺。但是過度社會化左派主義者為了自己的高度社會化付出了慘重的心理代價。

SOME PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY
幾條歷史原則

Think of history as being the sum of two components: an erratic component that consists of unpredictable events that follow no discernible pattern, and a regular component that consists of long-term historical trends. Here we are concerned with the long-term trends.

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在此請將歷史想像為兩個組成部分的總和：一個是不規則組成部分，由無法預知也不遵循任何明顯模式的事件組成；另一個是規則組成部分，由長期歷史趨勢組成。我們在這裡考慮的是長期趨勢。

FIRST PRINCIPLE. If a SMALL change is made that affects a long-term historical trend, then the effect of that change will almost always be transitory - the trend will soon revert to its original state. (Example: A reform movement designed to clean up political corruption in a society rarely has more than a short-term effect; sooner or later the reformers relax and corruption creeps back in. The level of political corruption in a given society tends to remain constant, or to change only slowly with the evolution of the society. Normally, a political cleanup will be permanent only if accompanied by widespread social changes; a SMALL change in the society won't be enough.) If a small change in a long-term historical trend appears to be permanent, it is only because the change acts in the direction in which the trend is already moving, so that the trend is not altered but only pushed a step ahead.

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第一條原則。假如一個小改變影響了長期歷史趨勢，這種影響只能是暫時性的，趨勢很快就能逆轉回到原來的狀態。（舉例：政治反腐改革幾乎總是只能取得短期效果，改革者終將懈怠，腐敗也總會捲土重來。任何一個給定社會的腐敗程度都是恆定的，或者只會隨著社會的演變發生緩慢的變化。正常情況下，反腐改革只有在伴隨著廣泛社會變革的情況下才能取得長期效果，小規模改變是沒有用的。）如果某個小改變看似在長期歷史趨勢當中取得了長期影響，這只是因為這個改變的方向與大趨勢相一致，因此趨勢沒有得到改變，只是向前推進了一步。

The first principle is almost a tautology. If a trend were not stable with respect to small changes, it would wander at random rather than following a definite direction; in other words it would not be a long-term trend at all.

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第一原則基本上就是同義反覆。假如某個趨勢相對小改變而言不夠穩定，這一趨勢就會隨機發展而非追尋特定方向，換句話說就是根本無法成為長期趨勢。

SECOND PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is sufficiently large to alter permanently a long-term historical trend, than it will alter the society as a whole. In other words, a society is a system in which all parts are interrelated, and you can't permanently change any important part without change all the other parts as well.

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第二條原則。假如一項改變足夠大，可以永久改變長期歷史趨勢，那這項改變必然影響整個社會。換言之，社會體系中的各個部分都是相關的，不可能永久性改變任何重要部分而不改變所有其他部分。

THIRD PRINCIPLE. If a change is made that is large enough to alter permanently a long-term trend, then the consequences for the society as a whole cannot be predicted in advance. (Unless various other societies have passed through the same change and have all experienced the same consequences, in which case one can predict on empirical grounds that another society that passes through the same change will be like to experience similar consequences.)

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第三條原則。假如一項改變足夠大，可以永久改變長期歷史趨勢，那麼任何人都無法預測社會整體將如何改變。（除非許多其他社會也經歷了相同的變化與同樣的結果，這樣才可以在經驗基礎上預測下一個經歷了此類改變的社會可能會遭受類似的結果。）

FOURTH PRINCIPLE. A new kind of society cannot be designed on paper. That is, you cannot plan out a new form of society in advance, then set it up and expect it to function as it was designed to.

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第四條原則。新型社會無法從紙面上創造出來。換句話說，你無法提前設計新型社會，並期待該社會在得到建立之後會按照設計來運行。

The third and fourth principles result from the complexity of human societies. A change in human behavior will affect the economy of a society and its physical environment; the economy will affect the environment and vice versa, and the changes in the economy and the environment will affect human behavior in complex, unpredictable ways; and so forth. The network of causes and effects is far too complex to be untangled and understood.

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第三條與第四條原則是人類社會複雜性的結果。人類行為的改變將會影響社會經濟與物質環境，經濟與環境互為影響，而社會與經濟的改變又將以無法預測的方式作用於人類行為。因果律的網絡過於複雜，任何人都無法理清並理解。

FIFTH PRINCIPLE. People do not consciously and rationally choose the form of their society. Societies develop through processes of social evolution that are not under rational human control.

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第五條原則。人們並不有意識地並理性地選擇他們所屬社會的形態。是通過社會演化而形成，不受人的理性控制。

The fifth principle is a consequence of the other four.

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第五條原則是前四條的結果。

To illustrate: By the first principle, generally speaking an attempt at social reform either acts in the direction in which the society is developing anyway (so that it merely accelerates a change that would have occurred in any case) or else it only has a transitory effect, so that the society soon slips back into its old groove. To make a lasting change in the direction of development of any important aspect of a society, reform is insufficient and revolution is required. (A revolution does not necessarily involve an armed uprising or the overthrow of a government.) By the second principle, a revolution never changes only one aspect of a society; and by the third principle changes occur that were never expected or desired by the revolutionaries. By the fourth principle, when revolutionaries or utopians set up a new kind of society, it never works out as planned.

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在此說明一下：根據第一條原則，一般說來進行社會改革的嘗試要麼遵從社會發展的方向（因此僅僅加速了無論如何都要發生的改變）要麼就只有暫時性的效果，而社會很快就會恢復原狀。如果要在任何重要的社會方面遵循發展方向進行持續性的改變，改革是不夠的，必須訴諸於革命。（革命並不必然意味著武裝暴動或推翻政府）根據第二條原則，革命絕不會僅僅改變某一個單獨社會方面；根據第三條原則將會發生革命者們未曾期望或不想看到的改變。根據第四條原則，革命者或烏托邦主義者們建立的新型社會永遠無法按照計畫運作起來。

The American Revolution does not provide a counterexample. The American "Revolution" was not a revolution in our sense of the word, but a war of independence followed by a rather far-reaching political reform. The Founding Fathers did not change the direction of development of American society, nor did they aspire to do so. They only freed the development of American society from the retarding effect of British rule. Their political reform did not change any basic trend, but only pushed American political culture along its natural direction of development. British society, of which American society was an off-shoot, had been moving for a long time in the direction of representative democracy. And prior to the War of Independence the Americans were already practicing a significant degree of representative democracy in the colonial assemblies. The political system established by the Constitution was modeled on the British system and on the colonial assemblies. With major alteration, to be sure - there is no doubt that the Founding Fathers took a very important step. But it was a step along the road the English-speaking world was already traveling. The proof is that Britain and all of its colonies that were populated predominantly by people of British descent ended up with systems of representative democracy essentially similar to that of the United States. If the Founding Fathers had lost their nerve and declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, our way of life today would not have been significantly different. Maybe we would have had somewhat closer ties to Britain, and would have had a Parliament and Prime Minister instead of a Congress and President. No big deal. Thus the American Revolution provides not a counterexample to our principles but a good illustration of them.

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美國獨立運動並不是反例。所謂的美國“革命”並不是我們所謂的革命，而是一場獨立戰爭加上一場用力過猛的政治改革。開國元勛們沒有改變美國社會的發展方向，也沒有這麼做的打算。他們僅僅將美國從英國的拘束性統治之下解放了出來。他們的政治改革沒有改變任何基本趨勢，僅僅將美國政治文化在自然發展方向上推了一把。美國社會是從英國社會分生出來的，而英國社會早已在代議制民主的方向上發展很久了。獨立戰爭之前美國已經在各殖民地代表大會內部實行了相當程度的代議制民主。美國憲法確立的政治體系是根據英國政體與殖民地代表大會為模版構建出來的。開國元勛們的確進行了重大修改，他們走出了重要的一步。但是這一步僅僅是踏在了英語國家早已走了很久的道路上。證據就是英國本土以及所有英國人永久居留的殖民地最終都發展出了與美國類似的代議制民主。就算當年開國元勛們一時手軟沒有簽署《獨立宣言》，我們今天的生活方式也不會有顯著差異。我們與英國的聯繫或許會更緊密，或許會有議會與首相而不是國會與總統，但這都不是什麼大事。美國獨立運動並未對我們的原則構成反例，而是對其進行了很好的詮釋。

Still, one has to use common sense in applying the principles. They are expressed in imprecise language that allows latitude for interpretation, and exceptions to them can be found. So we present these principles not as inviolable laws but as rules of thumb, or guides to thinking, that may provide a partial antidote to naive ideas about the future of society. The principles should be borne constantly in mind, and whenever one reaches a conclusion that conflicts with them one should carefully reexamine one's thinking and retain the conclusion only if one has good, solid reasons for doing so.

110
不過人們在應用這些原則時依然需要依靠自己的常識。這些原則的表述語言並不周密，有進行闡釋的空間，也可以找到例外。因此我們提出這些原則並非將其當作牢不可破的定律，而是作為思考指南，希望能為關於未來社會的不成熟想法提供部分解藥。應當牢記這些原則，假如某人得出了與這些原則相衝突的結論，他應當仔細審視自己的思考過程，僅僅在有堅實理由的前提下才維持原有結論。

INDUSTRIAL-TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY CANNOT BE REFORMED
工業技術社會無法得到改良

The foregoing principles help to show how hopelessly difficult it would be to reform the industrial system in such a way as to prevent it from progressively narrowing our sphere of freedom. There has been a consistent tendency, going back at least to the Industrial Revolution for technology to strengthen the system at a high cost in individual freedom and local autonomy. Hence any change designed to protect freedom from technology would be contrary to a fundamental trend in the development of our society. Consequently, such a change either would be a transitory one -- soon swamped by the tide of history -- or, if large enough to be permanent would alter the nature of our whole society. This by the first and second principles. Moreover, since society would be altered in a way that could not be predicted in advance (third principle) there would be great risk. Changes large enough to make a lasting difference in favor of freedom would not be initiated because it would realized that they would gravely disrupt the system. So any attempts at reform would be too timid to be effective. Even if changes large enough to make a lasting difference were initiated, they would be retracted when their disruptive effects became apparent. Thus, permanent changes in favor of freedom could be brought about only by persons prepared to accept radical, dangerous and unpredictable alteration of the entire system. In other words, by revolutionaries, not reformers.

111
上述原則也表現了為什麼很難對工業體系進行改革從而防止其漸進性侵蝕我們的自由。技術至少早在工業革命時就就已經有了以個體自由與地方自主非為代價來加強體系的持續趨勢。因此任何保護自由不受技術損害的改變都與我們社會的基本發展趨勢相悖。這樣的改變要麼是暫時性的——很快就會被歷史的潮水所淹沒——要麼就會因為足夠產生永久性效果而改變我們這個社會的本質。這是根據第一與第二條原則得出的結果。此外，由於社會的變化無法事先得到預知（第三原則），這種變化將會伴隨極大的風險。如果改變足以產生對自由長期有利的變化，那麼就不會被風險嚇倒，因為這些風險將極大地打亂體系。因此任何改革努力都過於軟弱，無法生效。就算改革者們發動了足以帶來持久不同的改革，他們也會在這些改革的破壞性效果表露出來後收手。因此只有那些願意接受極端、危險且無法預測的體系變動的人才能對於自由永久有利的改變，換句話說就是革命者而不是改革者。

People anxious to rescue freedom without sacrificing the supposed benefits of technology will suggest naive schemes for some new form of society that would reconcile freedom with technology. Apart from the fact that people who make suggestions seldom propose any practical means by which the new form of society could be set up in the first place, it follows from the fourth principle that even if the new form of society could be once established, it either would collapse or would give results very different from those expected.

112
有些人急於拯救自由卻不願犧牲技術帶來的所謂好處，他們會提出天真的新式社會構想來調和自由與技術。姑且不論這些人很少提出任何建立此類社會的具體方法這一事實，就算這些社會真能得到建立也得遵循第四條原則，要麼崩潰要麼產生與預期十分不同的結果。

So even on very general grounds it seems highly improbably that any way of changing society could be found that would reconcile freedom with modern technology. In the next few sections we will give more specific reasons for concluding that freedom and technological progress are incompatible.

113
因此即便是泛泛而言，想要通過改革協調自由與現代科技也很不現實。在接下來幾節當中我們將會給出更詳細的理由來總結為什麼自由與技術進步不相容。

RESTRICTION OF FREEDOM IS UNAVOIDABLE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
在工業社會裡對自由的限制是不可避免的

As explained in paragraph 65-67, 70-73, modern man is strapped down by a network of rules and regulations, and his fate depends on the actions of persons remote from him whose decisions he cannot influence. This is not accidental or a result of the arbitrariness of arrogant bureaucrats. It is necessary and inevitable in any technologically advanced society. The system HAS TO regulate human behavior closely in order to function. At work, people have to do what they are told to do, otherwise production would be thrown into chaos. Bureaucracies HAVE TO be run according to rigid rules. To allow any substantial personal discretion to lower-level bureaucrats would disrupt the system and lead to charges of unfairness due to differences in the way individual bureaucrats exercised their discretion. It is true that some restrictions on our freedom could be eliminated, but GENERALLY SPEAKING the regulation of our lives by large organizations is necessary for the functioning of industrial-technological society. The result is a sense of powerlessness on the part of the average person. It may be, however, that formal regulations will tend increasingly to be replaced by psychological tools that make us want to do what the system requires of us. (Propaganda [14], educational techniques, "mental health" programs, etc.)

114
正如在65-67段以及70-73段所解釋的那樣，現代人受到了一整套規則與規章的約束，他的命運取決於他人，這些人離他很遠以致他無法對他們的決策施加影響。這並非偶然發生的事故，也不是傲慢的官僚獨斷專行的結果。在任何一個技術發達的社會這都是不可避免的。體系必須緊密監管人類行為，唯此才能正常運作。在工作當中人們必須遵守命令，否則生產過程就將陷入混亂。官僚體系必須根據硬性規定進行運作。假如允許底層官僚運用任何潛在的個人裁量就將打亂體系，底層官僚運用個人裁量導致的差異也會引發不公平的指控。的確，有一些對於自由的限制的確可以得到消除，但總體而言，答應組織對於我們生活的監管是工業技術社會正常運行所必需的。這將令普通人感到無力。不過正式的監管將會越發由心理工具所取代，使我們想要遵從體系對我們的要求（第14段，教育手段，“心理健康”項目，等等）

The system HAS TO force people to behave in ways that are increasingly remote from the natural pattern of human behavior. For example, the system needs scientists, mathematicians and engineers. It can't function without them. So heavy pressure is put on children to excel in these fields. It isn't natural for an adolescent human being to spend the bulk of his time sitting at a desk absorbed in study. A normal adolescent wants to spend his time in active contact with the real world. Among primitive peoples the things that children are trained to do are in natural harmony with natural human impulses. Among the American Indians, for example, boys were trained in active outdoor pursuits -- just the sort of things that boys like. But in our society children are pushed into studying technical subjects, which most do grudgingly.

115
體系必須強制人們的行為越發遠離人類行為自然模式。例如體系需要科學家、數學家與工程師，否則就無法正常運作。因此兒童們擔負了要在這些領域出類拔萃的巨大壓力。青少年將大量時間花在靜坐學習上是不自然的。正常的青少年希望花時間來能動地接觸真實世界。原始民族訓練兒童所做的事情與自然的人類節律自然和諧。例如美洲印第安人就會訓練男孩到戶外相互追逐——正是男孩子喜歡做的事情。但是在我們的社會兒童被迫學習技術學科，大多數兒童對此都不情不願。

Because of the constant pressure that the system exerts to modify human behavior, there is a gradual increase in the number of people who cannot or will not adjust to society's requirements: welfare leeches, youth-gang members, cultists, anti-government rebels, radical environmentalist saboteurs, dropouts and resisters of various kinds.

116
因為體系持續施壓來矯正人類行為，不能或不願調整自己來適應社會需要的人也越來越多：這其中包括完全拒絕工作的社會救濟領取者、青少年犯罪團夥、邪教信徒、反政府叛逆、激進派環保主義破壞者、輟學者以及其他各種抵制社會體系的人。

In any technologically advanced society the individual's fate MUST depend on decisions that he personally cannot influence to any great extent. A technological society cannot be broken down into small, autonomous communities, because production depends on the cooperation of very large numbers of people and machines. Such a society MUST be highly organized and decisions HAVE TO be made that affect very large numbers of people. When a decision affects, say, a million people, then each of the affected individuals has, on the average, only a one-millionth share in making the decision. What usually happens in practice is that decisions are made by public officials or corporation executives, or by technical specialists, but even when the public votes on a decision the number of voters ordinarily is too large for the vote of any one individual to be significant. [17] Thus most individuals are unable to influence measurably the major decisions that affect their lives. Their is no conceivable way to remedy this in a technologically advanced society. The system tries to "solve" this problem by using propaganda to make people WANT the decisions that have been made for them, but even if this "solution" were completely successful in making people feel better, it would be demeaning.

117
在任何一個技術發達的社會，個體命運都必須依賴於那些他本人不能施加實質性影響的決策。技術社會無法分解成小型自主社區。因為生產有賴於極大數目的人和機器的協作。這祥一個社會必須是高度組織化的，而且不得不做出影響極其大量人口的決策。打個比方，當一個決策影響一百萬人時，每一個被影響的個人對於該項決策平均只有百萬分之一的影響力。實際上，決策往往是由政府公務員、公司主管抑或技術專家做出的，但即使是公眾投票進行決策，一般也會因為投票人數過多而使得任何個人的投票不起什麼實質性作用。因此，大多數個人不可能對於影響他們生活的重大決策產生任何值得注意的影響。在技術發達社會中，這一點是無可救藥的。體系試圖通過使用宣傳手段來誘使人們主動要求那些已為他們作好的決策來“解決”這個問題，即使這種“解決辦法”非常成功地讓人民在感覺上好了一點，它也依然是對人類的一種貶低。

Conservatives and some others advocate more "local autonomy." Local communities once did have autonomy, but such autonomy becomes less and less possible as local communities become more enmeshed with and dependent on large-scale systems like public utilities, computer networks, highway systems, the mass communications media, the modern health care system. Also operating against autonomy is the fact that technology applied in one location often affects people at other locations far away. Thus pesticide or chemical use near a creek may contaminate the water supply hundreds of miles downstream, and the greenhouse effect affects the whole world.

118
保守派和其他一些人主張進一步加強地方社區曾經有過的自主權，但隨著地方社區越來越與公共設施、計算機網絡、高速公路、大眾傳媒以及現代醫保制度等大規模系統糾纏在一起並且必須依賴它們才能存在，這種自主也就越來越不可能了。應用於一個地點的技術往往會影響到距離遙遠的其他地區，這一事實同樣說明了技術社會與自主的不相容。例如，在某條小溪使用殺蟲劑或化學品可能污染下游幾百英里的水供應，而溫室效應則影響了整個世界。

The system does not and cannot exist to satisfy human needs. Instead, it is human behavior that has to be modified to fit the needs of the system. This has nothing to do with the political or social ideology that may pretend to guide the technological system. It is the fault of technology, because the system is guided not by ideology but by technical necessity. [18] Of course the system does satisfy many human needs, but generally speaking it does this only to the extent that it is to the advantage of the system to do it. It is the needs of the system that are paramount, not those of the human being. For example, the system provides people with food because the system couldn't function if everyone starved; it attends to people's psychological needs whenever it can CONVENIENTLY do so, because it couldn't function if too many people became depressed or rebellious. But the system, for good, solid, practical reasons, must exert constant pressure on people to mold their behavior to the needs of the system. Too much waste accumulating? The government, the media, the educational system, environmentalists, everyone inundates us with a mass of propaganda about recycling. Need more technical personnel? A chorus of voices exhorts kids to study science. No one stops to ask whether it is inhumane to force adolescents to spend the bulk of their time studying subjects most of them hate. When skilled workers are put out of a job by technical advances and have to undergo "retraining," no one asks whether it is humiliating for them to be pushed around in this way. It is simply taken for granted that everyone must bow to technical necessity and for good reason: If human needs were put before technical necessity there would be economic problems, unemployment, shortages or worse. The concept of "mental health" in our society is defined largely by the extent to which an individual behaves in accord with the needs of the system and does so without showing signs of stress.

119
體系的存在不是為了滿足人類的需求，僅僅以滿足人類需求為目的的體系也不可能存在。相反，體系會改變人類的行為以適應它自己的需要。這與可能假裝引導技術體系的政治或社會意識形態無關，而是技術本身的問題，因為體系不是由意識形態引導的，而是由技術需求引導的。[18] 當然，體系滿足了人類的許多需求。但一般說來，只有在滿足人的需求對體系有好處時，它才會這樣做。體系本身、而非組成體系的個人的需求才是至高無上的。例如，體系供給人們糧食，因為如果每個人都挨餓體系就不能運轉；在方便的情況下，體系也會照顧人們的心理需求，因為如果太多的人感到壓抑或變得反叛，體系就不能運轉。但是，體系有許多充分且實際的理由要不斷地對人施壓，改變他們的行為以適應體系的需要。比方說，假如垃圾積累過多，那麼政府、媒體、教育系統以及環保主義者就會一擁而上，用鋪天蓋地的垃圾回收利用宣傳來淹沒我們。假如體系需要更多的技術人員，那麼各種聲音就會組成一場大合唱來勸誘兒童學習科學。沒有人停下來問一問：強迫青少年花費大量時間來學習他們之中大多數人都十分討厭的東西是否人道。當技術工人因技術進步失去工作而去接受“重新訓練”時，沒有人問一問：像這樣把他們推過來撥過去對於他們來說是否太屈辱。所有人都理所當然地認為，每一個人都必需向技術的需要低頭，而且理由十分充分：如果人的需求被擺在了優先於技術需要的地位，就會出現經濟問題、失業、短缺甚至更糟。在我們的社會當中，“精神健康”的概念主要被定義為在多大程度一個人能夠根據體系的需要行事並且不會流露出承受精神壓力的跡象。

[18]. (Paragraph 119) "Today, in technologically advanced lands, men live very similar lives in spite of geographical, religious and political differences. The daily lives of a Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo, a Communist bank clerk in Moscow are far more alike than the life any one of them is like that of any single man who lived a thousand years ago. These similarities are the result of a common technology. . ." L. Sprague de Camp, "The Ancient Engineers," Ballentine edition, page 17.
[18]（119段）“今天，在技術發達地區，人們的生活方式十分相像，地理位置、宗教和政治上的不同幾乎沒有任何關係。芝加哥的一個基督教銀行職員，東京的一個佛教銀行職員，莫斯科的一個共產黨銀行職員，他們彼此之間的日常生活十分相像，而他們之中的任何一個人的生活與一千年以前人們的生活卻非常不同。這種相像是普遍技術的結果……”L. Sprague de Camp，The Ancient Engineers，Ballencine版，第17頁。

The lives of the three bank clerks are not IDENTICAL. Ideology does have SOME effect. But all technological societies, in order to survive, must evolve along APPROXIMATELY the same trajectory.
三個銀行職員的生活其實並不完全一樣。意識形態確實會產生某種影響，但所有技術社會必須遵循大致相同的進化路徑，唯此才能存在下去。

Efforts to make room for a sense of purpose and for autonomy within the system are no better than a joke. For example, one company, instead of having each of its employees assemble only one section of a catalogue, had each assemble a whole catalogue, and this was supposed to give them a sense of purpose and achievement. Some companies have tried to give their employees more autonomy in their work, but for practical reasons this usually can be done only to a very limited extent, and in any case employees are never given autonomy as to ultimate goals -- their "autonomous" efforts can never be directed toward goals that they select personally, but only toward their employer's goals, such as the survival and growth of the company. Any company would soon go out of business if it permitted its employees to act otherwise. Similarly, in any enterprise within a socialist system, workers must direct their efforts toward the goals of the enterprise, otherwise the enterprise will not serve its purpose as part of the system. Once again, for purely technical reasons it is not possible for most individuals or small groups to have much autonomy in industrial society. Even the small-business owner commonly has only limited autonomy. Apart from the necessity of government regulation, he is restricted by the fact that he must fit into the economic system and conform to its requirements. For instance, when someone develops a new technology, the small-business person often has to use that technology whether he wants to or not, in order to remain competitive.

120
在體系內為目的感和自主權留出空間的努力只是一個笑話。例如，我們的公司把每個工人只組裝一套機件的一部分改為每個工人都組裝整套機件，聲稱這就是給了他們目的感與成就感。有些公司的確試圖在工作中賦予僱員更多的自主權，但由於實際需要，這種嘗試只能是非常有限的，而且無論如何也不能給予僱員有關最終目標的自主權，他們的“自主”努力決不能指向他們自己選擇的目標，而只能指向僱主的目標。任何公司如果允許其僱員自行其是都會很快關門大吉。同樣，對於任何一家存在於特定社會體系當中的公司來說，其中的僱員都必須將各自的努力指向企業的目標，否則企業就不能實現其作為系統一部分的目的。從純技術角度來說，大多數個人或小團體在工業社會中都不可能享有高度自主權。甚至就連小型企業所有者通常也只有有限的自主權。除了遵從必要的政府規章之外，他還必須適應經濟體系對自己的要求。例如，當有人開發出一種新技術之後，小企業主為了保持競爭力往往必須利用這種技術，無論他本人意願如何。

THE 'BAD' PARTS OF TECHNOLOGY CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'GOOD' PARTS
技術的負面效應不可能與正面效應分割開來

A further reason why industrial society cannot be reformed in favor of freedom is that modern technology is a unified system in which all parts are dependent on one another. You can't get rid of the "bad" parts of technology and retain only the "good" parts. Take modern medicine, for example. Progress in medical science depends on progress in chemistry, physics, biology, computer science and other fields. Advanced medical treatments require expensive, high-tech equipment that can be made available only by a technologically progressive, economically rich society. Clearly you can't have much progress in medicine without the whole technological system and everything that goes with it.

121
工業化社會不能迸行有利於自由的改革的一個更深層原因在於，現代技術是一個統一的系統，其中所有部分都相互依存。你不可能去掉技術當中“壞的”部分，只保留“好的”部分。以現代醫學為例。醫學的進步有賴於化學、物理、生物、計算機科學以及其他領域的進步。先進的醫療需要昂貴的高科技設備。只有技術先進、經濟富裕的社會才能提供。顯然，拋除了整個技術體系及其所有伴生物，你就不可能在醫學領域有任何進步。

Even if medical progress could be maintained without the rest of the technological system, it would by itself bring certain evils. Suppose for example that a cure for diabetes is discovered. People with a genetic tendency to diabetes will then be able to survive and reproduce as well as anyone else. Natural selection against genes for diabetes will cease and such genes will spread throughout the population. (This may be occurring to some extent already, since diabetes, while not curable, can be controlled through the use of insulin.) The same thing will happen with many other diseases susceptibility to which is affected by genetic degradation of the population. The only solution will be some sort of eugenics program or extensive genetic engineering of human beings, so that man in the future will no longer be a creation of nature, or of chance, or of God (depending on your religious or philosophical opinions), but a manufactured product.

122
即使醫學進步可以不依賴技術體系的其他部分，這一進步本身也會帶來特定的弊端。例如，假設我們發現了治療糖尿病的辦法。帶有糖尿病遺傳傾向的人就會生存下來並且與他人一樣繁殖，淘汰糖尿病基因的自然選擇就會中止，而這類基因就會在人口中擴散。（在一定程度上這種現象已經發生了，因為糖尿病雖然仍舊不可治癒，卻可以用胰島素控制）許多其他疾病的易感性也會受到人口遺傳退化的影響。這個問題的解決之道無非是優生學計畫或者大規模人體基因改造工程。換句話說，未來的人類將不再是自然、偶然或者上帝（根據各人哲學觀點而異）的造物，而是人造的產品。

If you think that big government interferes in your life too much NOW, just wait till the government starts regulating the genetic constitution of your children. Such regulation will inevitably follow the introduction of genetic engineering of human beings, because the consequences of unregulated genetic engineering would be disastrous. [19]

123
如果你認為現在的大政府過度地干涉了你的生活，那麼你就等著政府著手管制你的孩子的遺傳構造吧。隨著人類遺傳工程的到來，這種管制將不可避免，因為沒有管制，遺傳工程的後果將是災難性的。

[19] (Paragraph 123) Just think an irresponsible genetic engineer might create a lot of terrorists.
[19]（123段）可以設想一下某無良基因工程師創造出一群恐怖分子的場景。

The usual response to such concerns is to talk about "medical ethics." But a code of ethics would not serve to protect freedom in the face of medical progress; it would only make matters worse. A code of ethics applicable to genetic engineering would be in effect a means of regulating the genetic constitution of human beings. Somebody (probably the upper-middle class, mostly) would decide that such and such applications of genetic engineering were "ethical" and others were not, so that in effect they would be imposing their own values on the genetic constitution of the population at large. Even if a code of ethics were chosen on a completely democratic basis, the majority would be imposing their own values on any minorities who might have a different idea of what constituted an "ethical" use of genetic engineering. The only code of ethics that would truly protect freedom would be one that prohibited ANY genetic engineering of human beings, and you can be sure that no such code will ever be applied in a technological society. No code that reduced genetic engineering to a minor role could stand up for long, because the temptation presented by the immense power of biotechnology would be irresistible, especially since to the majority of people many of its applications will seem obviously and unequivocally good (eliminating physical and mental diseases, giving people the abilities they need to get along in today's world). Inevitably, genetic engineering will be used extensively, but only in ways consistent with the needs of the industrial-technological system. [20]

124
通常對於這類擔憂的反應是談論所謂的“醫學倫理”，但是倫理規範無法在醫學進步面前保護自由，只能使事情變得更糟。能夠應用於遺傳工程的倫理規範事實上將成為管制人類遺傳構造的手段。一部分人（多半是上層階級）將決定如此這般的遺傳工程合乎“道德”，如此這般的做法則不道德，因而他們將在實際上將自己的價值觀強加於整個人口的遺傳構造。即使倫理規範是以完全民主的方式選擇出來的，多數族裔也會將他們自己的價值觀強加於那些很可能對於如何 “道德地”運用遺傳工程另有看法的少數族裔。真正能夠保護自由的倫理規範只能是一條，那就是禁止任何人類遺傳工程。而我們可以十分有把握地說，這一點恰恰不可能在技術社會中得到實現。任何將遺傳工程貶低成配角的規範都不可能維持下去，因為生物技術的巨大力量所產生的誘惑是無法抗拒的。特別是在大多數人看來，大量生物技術的應用顯然且肯定是有益的（可以根除身體與精神疾病，賦予人們當今世界所需要的能力）。基因技術必將不可避免地得到大規模應用，但應用方式只能與工業-技術體系的需求相一致。[20]

[20]. (Paragraph 124) For a further example of undesirable consequences of medical progress, suppose a reliable cure for cancer is discovered. Even if the treatment is too expensive to be available to any but the elite, it will greatly reduce their incentive to stop the escape of carcinogens into the environment.
[20]（124段）再舉一個醫學進步導致負面後果的例子。假設人們發現了治療癌症的可靠方法，哪怕這種療法過於昂貴，只能用於少數精英，依然會極大地削弱人們制止致癌物質逸入環境的意願。

TECHNOLOGY IS A MORE POWERFUL SOCIAL FORCE THAN THE ASPIRATION FOR FREEDOM
與自由的渴望相比，技術是更為強大的社會力量

It is not possible to make a LASTING compromise between technology and freedom, because technology is by far the more powerful social force and continually encroaches on freedom through REPEATED compromises. Imagine the case of two neighbors, each of whom at the outset owns the same amount of land, but one of whom is more powerful than the other. The powerful one demands a piece of the other's land. The weak one refuses. The powerful one says, "OK, let's compromise. Give me half of what I asked." The weak one has little choice but to give in. Some time later the powerful neighbor demands another piece of land, again there is a compromise, and so forth. By forcing a long series of compromises on the weaker man, the powerful one eventually gets all of his land. So it goes in the conflict between technology and freedom.

125
在技術與自由之間不可能實現持久的妥協，因為技術是遠遠更為強大的社會力量，它將通過不斷的強迫妥協來侵蝕自由。請想像兩個鄰居爭地的案例，開始時兩人各有一塊同樣大小的地皮，但其中一個比另一個強有力，強的那一個要佔對方一塊地，弱的那一個拒絕了。強的說“那好吧，讓我們妥協，給我原先要的那塊地的一半就行。”弱的沒辦法，只能讓步。過了一些時候，那個強的鄰居又要另一塊地，然後又妥協，直這樣妥協下去。通過一系列強加於弱者的妥協，強者最後佔了他所有的地。在技術與自由的衝突中，情況也是一樣。

Let us explain why technology is a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom.

126
請允許我們解釋一下為什麼與自由的渴望相比技術是更為強大的社會力量。

A technological advance that appears not to threaten freedom often turns out to threaten it very seriously later on. For example, consider motorized transport. A walking man formerly could go where he pleased, go at his own pace without observing any traffic regulations, and was independent of technological support-systems. When motor vehicles were introduced they appeared to increase man's freedom. They took no freedom away from the walking man, no one had to have an automobile if he didn't want one, and anyone who did choose to buy an automobile could travel much faster than the walking man. But the introduction of motorized transport soon changed society in such a way as to restrict greatly man's freedom of locomotion. When automobiles became numerous, it became necessary to regulate their use extensively. In a car, especially in densely populated areas, one cannot just go where one likes at one's own pace one's movement is governed by the flow of traffic and by various traffic laws. One is tied down by various obligations: license requirements, driver test, renewing registration, insurance, maintenance required for safety, monthly payments on purchase price. Moreover, the use of motorized transport is no longer optional. Since the introduction of motorized transport the arrangement of our cities has changed in such a way that the majority of people no longer live within walking distance of their place of employment, shopping areas and recreational opportunities, so that they HAVE TO depend on the automobile for transportation. Or else they must use public transportation, in which case they have even less control over their own movement than when driving a car. Even the walker's freedom is now greatly restricted. In the city he continually has to stop and wait for traffic lights that are designed mainly to serve auto traffic. In the country, motor traffic makes it dangerous and unpleasant to walk along the highway. (Note the important point we have illustrated with the case of motorized transport: When a new item of technology is introduced as an option that an individual can accept or not as he chooses, it does not necessarily REMAIN optional. In many cases the new technology changes society in such a way that people eventually find themselves FORCED to use it.)

127
一開始看上去並不威脅自由的技術進步往往會在日後極大地威脅自由。以機動車輛交通為例。從前步行者可以去任何他想去的地方，可以按照自己的步調行走，不用遵守任何交通規則，不依靠任何技術支持系統。機動車剛剛出現時好像增加了人的自由的。它們沒有奪去步行的人的自由，任何人只想要不想買汽車就可以不買，而買了汽車的人則可以比步行者走得快得多。但是機械化運輸很快就改變了社會並大大地限制了人的移動自由。當汽車多起來了之後，大規模地管制它們的使用就變為必需了。開上汽車之後，特別是在人口密集的地區，人們不能按照自己的步調去自己想去的地方，人們的移動為車流和各種各樣的交通法規所限。人們將為各種各樣的義務所累：牌照、駕駛員考試、更換註冊、保險、安全維修、每月付車款，等等。尤其是人們不再擁有選擇是否使用機動車輛交通的自由。自從有了機動車輛交通，我們的城市的佈局已有了很大改變：大多數人的居所已不在其工作場所、購物區和娛樂區的步行距離之內，因而他們不得不依賴汽車交通或者必須使用公共交通。這時他們對自己的移動的控制更少於自己開車。甚至步行者的自由也變到了很大限制。在城市裡，他要不斷地停下來等待為汽車交通而設計的紅綠燈。在鄉下，機動車交通也使得沿高速公路行走變得危險而難受。（注意我們在機動車案例中闡述的重要論點：一項新技術剛開始往往是以一種備選的面目出現的，作為個人可以接受也可以不接受，但它不一定停留在備選的位置上。在許多情況下，新技術會改變社會，最後人們會發現他們自己將要被強制去使用它）

While technological progress AS A WHOLE continually narrows our sphere of freedom, each new technical advance CONSIDERED BY ITSELF appears to be desirable. Electricity, indoor plumbing, rapid long-distance communications . . . how could one argue against any of these things, or against any other of the innumerable technical advances that have made modern society? It would have been absurd to resist the introduction of the telephone, for example. It offered many advantages and no disadvantages. Yet as we explained in paragraphs 59-76, all these technical advances taken together have created world in which the average man's fate is no longer in his own hands or in the hands of his neighbors and friends, but in those of politicians, corporation executives and remote, anonymous technicians and bureaucrats whom he as an individual has no power to influence. [21] The same process will continue in the future. Take genetic engineering, for example. Few people will resist the introduction of a genetic technique that eliminates a hereditary disease It does no apparent harm and prevents much suffering. Yet a large number of genetic improvements taken together will make the human being into an engineered product rather than a free creation of chance (or of God, or whatever, depending on your religious beliefs).

128
儘管技術進步作為整體不斷壓縮我們的自由空間，但是每一項新的技術進步單獨考慮都是可取的。電、室內上下水管道、快速遠距離通訊……一個人怎麼能反對這些東西呢？怎麼能反對數不清的技術進步呢？正是這些技術進步造就了現代社會。例如，反對電活實在是荒唐的，因為電話帶來的全是方便而沒有任何不便。然而，正如我們在59-79段中解釋的那樣，所有的技術進步彙總到一起就創造出了這樣一個世界.在這個世界中，普通人的命運不再掌握在他自己或他的鄰居朋友手中，而是掌握在政客，公司主管及遙遠的、不知其名的技術人員和官僚手中，而對這些人他是沒有任何影響力的。[21] 這一過程將在未來繼續下去。以遺傳工程為例。很少人會反對消滅某種遺傳疾病的遺傳技術。它沒有任何明顯的害處，卻能消除大量的痛苦。而大量對於人類的遺傳改進彙總到一起則會把人變成設計製造的產品而不是隨機性（或上帝，或其他什麼，取決於你的信仰）的創造物。

[21]. (Paragraph 128) Since many people may find paradoxical the notion that a large number of good things can add up to a bad thing, we will illustrate with an analogy. Suppose Mr. A is playing chess with Mr. B. Mr. C, a Grand Master, is looking over Mr. A's shoulder. Mr. A of course wants to win his game, so if Mr. C points out a good move for him to make, he is doing Mr. A a favor. But suppose now that Mr. C tells Mr. A how to make ALL of his moves. In each particular instance he does Mr. A a favor by showing him his best move, but by making ALL of his moves for him he spoils the game, since there is not point in Mr. A's playing the game at all if someone else makes all his moves.
The situation of modern man is analogous to that of Mr. A. The system makes an individual's life easier for him in innumerable ways, but in doing so it deprives him of control over his own fate.
[21] 許多人都覺得許多好東西合到起就會變成壞東西是一個有悖常理的想法，因此我們將用一個類比來說明。假設A先生與B先生下棋，而C先生是一位特級大師，站在A先生後面看棋。A先生當然想贏，於是C先生給他支了一步好招，他是在幫A先生。但現在假設C先生告訴A先生這盤棋的全部下法，情況會如何呢？在兩種情況下，C先生都是給A先生支好招來幫他，但如采他替A先生走完這盤棋，他就等於把這盤棋攪了，因為如果有其他人替他走棋，A先生還下個什麼勁呢？現代人的處境十分似於A先生。體系在無數方面都方便了個人的生活，但這樣它就剝奪了個人對於自己命運的控制。

Another reason why technology is such a powerful social force is that, within the context of a given society, technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never be reversed. Once a technical innovation has been introduced, people usually become dependent on it, unless it is replaced by some still more advanced innovation. Not only do people become dependent as individuals on a new item of technology, but, even more, the system as a whole becomes dependent on it. (Imagine what would happen to the system today if computers, for example, were eliminated.) Thus the system can move in only one direction, toward greater technologization. Technology repeatedly forces freedom to take a step back -- short of the overthrow of the whole technological system.

129
技術之所以是如此強有力的社會力量的另一個理由是，在給定社會的條件下技術進步只會不可逆地朝一個方向前進。只要某項技術發明被引進，人們就往往會對其產生依賴，除非它被某種更先進的發明所取代。人們不僅僅作為個人依賴這項新技術。甚至體系作為一個整體都會依賴它。（例如請想像一下，如果沒有了計算機，今天的體系會怎麼樣）因此，體系只能朝向更加技術化的方向移動。在不至於顛覆整個技術體系的前提下，技術將會不斷地逼迫自由後退。

Technology advances with great rapidity and threatens freedom at many different points at the same time (crowding, rules and regulations, increasing dependence of individuals on large organizations, propaganda and other psychological techniques, genetic engineering, invasion of privacy through surveillance devices and computers, etc.) To hold back any ONE of the threats to freedom would require a long different social struggle. Those who want to protect freedom are overwhelmed by the sheer number of new attacks and the rapidity with which they develop, hence they become pathetic and no longer resist. To fight each of the threats separately would be futile. Success can be hoped for only by fighting the technological system as a whole; but that is revolution not reform.

130
技術的進步十分迅速並在許多方面威脅自由（擁擠、規章制度、個人對於大型組織越發嚴重的依賴、宣傳與其他心理學技術、遺傳工程、通過監視設備和計算機侵犯隱私，等等），阻擋任何一項對於自由的威脅都需要一場單獨的社會鬥爭。那些想要保衛自由的人會被無數的新攻勢及其發展速度所壓倒，他們會變得微不足道並停止抵抗。分別反擊這些威脅是無效的。只有把技術體系作為一個整體來反擊才有成功的希望，但這就是革命而不是改革了。

Technicians (we use this term in its broad sense to describe all those who perform a specialized task that requires training) tend to be so involved in their work (their surrogate activity) that when a conflict arises between their technical work and freedom, they almost always decide in favor of their technical work. This is obvious in the case of scientists, but it also appears elsewhere: Educators, humanitarian groups, conservation organizations do not hesitate to use propaganda or other psychological techniques to help them achieve their laudable ends. Corporations and government agencies, when they find it useful, do not hesitate to collect information about individuals without regard to their privacy. Law enforcement agencies are frequently inconvenienced by the constitutional rights of suspects and often of completely innocent persons, and they do whatever they can do legally (or sometimes illegally) to restrict or circumvent those rights. Most of these educators, government officials and law officers believe in freedom, privacy and constitutional rights, but when these conflict with their work, they usually feel that their work is more important.

131
技術人員（我們在此取這個名詞的廣義定義來描述所有那些執行需要培訓的專門任務的人）往往如此投入自己的工作（他們的替代活動），以至於當他們的技術工作和自由之間發生衝突時，他們幾乎總是決定以技術工作為先。對於科學家來說這是顯而易見的，但這種情況也出現在其他地方：教育機構、人道主義團體與環保組織都會毫不猶豫地使用宣傳或其他心理手段以便他們實現其值得稱道的目的。公司和政府機構發現個人信息很有用之後，也會毫不猶豫地進行採集而絲毫不考慮隱私問題。執法機構經常因為犯罪嫌疑人與完全無辜者的憲法權利感到不便，於是他們採取了一切合法（或非法）手段以限制或規避這些權利。大多數教育工作者，政府官員和執法人員相信自由、隱私和憲法權利，但是當這些觀念與他們的工作相衝突時，他們通常會覺得自己的工作更重要。

It is well known that people generally work better and more persistently when striving for a reward than when attempting to avoid a punishment or negative outcome. Scientists and other technicians are motivated mainly by the rewards they get through their work. But those who oppose technilogiccal invasions of freedom are working to avoid a negative outcome, consequently there are a few who work persistently and well at this discouraging task. If reformers ever achieved a signal victory that seemed to set up a solid barrier against further erosion of freedom through technological progress, most would tend to relax and turn their attention to more agreeable pursuits. But the scientists would remain busy in their laboratories, and technology as it progresses would find ways, in spite of any barriers, to exert more and more control over individuals and make them always more dependent on the system.

132
眾所周知，人們在追求報償時比起在避免懲罰或不良後果時工作得更好、更堅持不懈。科學家和其他技術人員主要是為了報償而工作，但那些抵抗技術對於自由的侵犯的人們卻是為了避免不良後果而工作。因此，只有很少的人能夠堅持不懈並且全心投入地從事這項令人洩氣的工作。如果改革者的確獲得了明面上的顯著勝利，設立了防止技術進步進一步侵蝕自由的堅固屏障，那麼大多數人都會鬆懈下來並把注意力轉向更為愜意的追求。但科學家會仍舊留在他們的實驗室裡忙活，而技術隨著自身的進步會找到辦法繞過任何屏障，將越來越多的控制加於個人頭上，使他們越來越依賴於體系。

No social arrangements, whether laws, institutions, customs or ethical codes, can provide permanent protection against technology. History shows that all social arrangements are transitory; they all change or break down eventually. But technological advances are permanent within the context of a given civilization. Suppose for example that it were possible to arrive at some social arrangements that would prevent genetic engineering from being applied to human beings, or prevent it from being applied in such a ways as to threaten freedom and dignity. Still, the technology would remain waiting. Sooner or later the social arrangement would break down. Probably sooner, given that pace of change in our society. Then genetic engineering would begin to invade our sphere of freedom, and this invasion would be irreversible (short of a breakdown of technological civilization itself). Any illusions about achieving anything permanent through social arrangements should be dispelled by what is currently happening with environmental legislation. A few years ago it seemed that there were secure legal barriers preventing at least SOME of the worst forms of environmental degradation. A change in the political wind, and those barriers begin to crumble.

133
無論是法律、機構、習慣還是倫理規範，任何社會安排都不可能提供永久的保護來防止技術的侵害。歷史表明，所有的社會安排都是短暫的，它們最後都會改變或崩壞。但是技術進步在給定的文明的背景下卻是永久的。例如假設我們能夠作出防止遺傳工程應用於人類，或是防止其威脅自由與尊嚴的某種社會安排，技術仍會等在那裡。遲早這種社會安排會崩壞，多半很快就會崩壞，因為我們的社會變化是如此之快。這時，遺傳工程就會開始入侵我們的自由領域，而這種入侵卻是不可逆的（除非技術文明本身崩壞）。任何通過社會安排獲得持久成果的幻想都會被最近在環境立法中發生的事情所打破。幾年以前，我們似乎已經有了一些牢靠的法律屏障，至少可以防止某些最壞的環境退化。但是政壇風向一變，這些屏障也就崩潰了。

For all of the foregoing reasons, technology is a more powerful social force than the aspiration for freedom. But this statement requires an important qualification. It appears that during the next several decades the industrial-technological system will be undergoing severe stresses due to economic and environmental problems, and especially due to problems of human behavior (alienation, rebellion, hostility, a variety of social and psychological difficulties). We hope that the stresses through which the system is likely to pass will cause it to break down, or at least weaken it sufficiently so that a revolution occurs and is successful, then at that particular moment the aspiration for freedom will have proved more powerful than technology.

134
所有前述理由說明，技術是比自由的渴望更強大的社會力量。但需要對這一陳述作一個重要的限定：在未來幾十年中，由於經濟和環境問題，特別是由於人類行為的問題（異化、反叛、敵意，許多社會和心理困難），工業-技術體系很可能會承受嚴重的壓力。我們希望體系多半要經歷的這種壓力會引發其崩潰，或至少起到足夠的削削弱作用，使得革命能夠發生並獲得成功，那時，自由的渴望將證明自己比技術更強大。

In paragraph 125 we used an analogy of a weak neighbor who is left destitute by a strong neighbor who takes all his land by forcing on him a series of compromises. But suppose now that the strong neighbor gets sick, so that he is unable to defend himself. The weak neighbor can force the strong one to give him his land back, or he can kill him. If he lets the strong man survive and only forces him to give his land back, he is a fool, because when the strong man gets well he will again take all the land for himself. The only sensible alternative for the weaker man is to kill the strong one while he has the chance. In the same way, while the industrial system is sick we must destroy it. If we compromise with it and let it recover from its sickness, it will eventually wipe out all of our freedom.

135
在第125段中，我們使用了一個被其強鄰通過一系列強制性妥協搶走了所有土地，最後一無所有的弱鄰的比喻。但是，假設強鄰病了，不能保衛自己了，弱鄰就可以迫使其歸還自己的土地或在有機會時將其殺死。同樣，我們在工業體系患病時將其摧毀。如果我們與其妥協，給它從病中恢復的機會，它將最終剝奪我們所有的自由。

SIMPLER SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE PROVED INTRACTABLE
更簡單的社會問題也無法得到解決

If anyone still imagines that it would be possible to reform the system in such a way as to protect freedom from technology, let him consider how clumsily and for the most part unsuccessfully our society has dealt with other social problems that are far more simple and straightforward. Among other things, the system has failed to stop environmental degradation, political corruption, drug trafficking or domestic abuse.

136
假如還有人以為可以通過改革的方式保護自由不受技術的侵害，那就讓他想想我們的社會在應對遠遠更加簡單直接的其他問題時到底有多麼笨拙且往往不成功好了。體系未能制止的問題有很多，比方說環境惡化、政治腐敗、販毒或家庭暴力等等。

Take our environmental problems, for example. Here the conflict of values is straightforward: economic expedience now versus saving some of our natural resources for our grandchildren [22] But on this subject we get only a lot of blather and obfuscation from the people who have power, and nothing like a clear, consistent line of action, and we keep on piling up environmental problems that our grandchildren will have to live with. Attempts to resolve the environmental issue consist of struggles and compromises between different factions, some of which are ascendant at one moment, others at another moment. The line of struggle changes with the shifting currents of public opinion. This is not a rational process, or is it one that is likely to lead to a timely and successful solution to the problem. Major social problems, if they get "solved" at all, are rarely or never solved through any rational, comprehensive plan. They just work themselves out through a process in which various competing groups pursing their own (usually short-term) self-interest [23] arrive (mainly by luck) at some more or less stable modus vivendi. In fact, the principles we formulated in paragraphs 100-106 make it seem doubtful that rational, long-term social planning can EVER be successful.

137
以環境問題為例。在這裡價值的衝突是直截了當的：是要眼前的經濟利益還是為我們的子孫保留一些自然資源[22]。然而，關於這個問題我們從掌權者那裡得到的只是一些廢話和胡話，而沒有得到任何清楚一貫的行動路線。與此同時我們則繼續為子孫積累環境問題。解決環境問題的嘗試成為不同集團之間的鬥爭與妥協，有時這邊佔上風，有時那邊佔上風。戰線隨著公眾輿論的飄移不定而變化。這不是一個理性的過程，也不能及時且成功地解決問題。大的社會問題，即使能夠“解決”，解決方式也很少是理性、全面的計畫。各個相互競爭的群體在各自追求（往往是短期的）自身利益的過程中 [23] 主要憑運氣達成了某種多多少少還算穩定的臨時解決辦法，這樣問題就算是得到瞭解決。實際上，我們在100-106段系統地闡述的原理已經顯示了理性長期的社會計畫很難成功。

[22]. (Paragraph 137) Here we are considering only the conflict of values within the mainstream. For the sake of simplicity we leave out of the picture "outsider" values like the idea that wild nature is more important than human economic welfare.
[22]（137段）我們這裡僅僅考慮主流之內的價值觀衝突。為了簡化討論，我們姑且忽略了“非主流”理念的價值觀，例如認為野生自然界比人類經濟福祉更重要的看法。

[23]. (Paragraph 137) Self-interest is not necessarily MATERIAL self-interest. It can consist in fulfillment of some psychological need, for example, by promoting one's own ideology or religion.
[23]（137段）自身利益未必一定是物質性的，也可能包含特定心理需求的滿足，例如通過傳播自身信仰的宗教或意識形態來獲得滿足感。

Thus it is clear that the human race has at best a very limited capacity for solving even relatively straightforward social problems. How then is it going to solve the far more difficult and subtle problem of reconciling freedom with technology? Technology presents clear-cut material advantages, whereas freedom is an abstraction that means different things to different people, and its loss is easily obscured by propaganda and fancy talk.

138
因此很顯然，即使只解決相對直截了當的社會問題，人類的能力也是十分有限的。那麼，人類又怎麼能夠解決協調自由與技術關係這樣遠為困難且微妙的問題呢？技術顯示的是明確的物質優勢，而自由是對不同的人有著不同含義的抽象概念，宣傳和花哨的言論很容易掩蓋自由的缺失。

And note this important difference: It is conceivable that our environmental problems (for example) may some day be settled through a rational, comprehensive plan, but if this happens it will be only because it is in the long-term interest of the system to solve these problems. But it is NOT in the interest of the system to preserve freedom or small-group autonomy. On the contrary, it is in the interest of the system to bring human behavior under control to the greatest possible extent. [24] Thus, while practical considerations may eventually force the system to take a rational, prudent approach to environmental problems, equally practical considerations will force the system to regulate human behavior ever more closely (preferably by indirect means that will disguise the encroachment on freedom.) This isn't just our opinion. Eminent social scientists (e.g. James Q. Wilson) have stressed the importance of "socializing" people more effectively.

139
而且請注意這樣一項重要區別：可以想像某一天我們的環境問題（比方說）可以通過一項理性的全面計畫得到解決，但這一切只有在解決環境問題符合體系的長期利益時才可能發生。然而保留自由和小群體的自主權卻不符合體系的利益。正相反，最大程度地控制人類行為才符合體系的利益。因此出於實際利益的考慮有可能最終迫使體系採取理性且深謀遠慮的手段去解決環境問題，但同樣的實際考慮卻會迫使體系更嚴格地管制人類的行為（最好是通過能夠掩蓋其侵蝕自由之舉的間接手段）。這不僅僅是我們的看法。傑出的社會科學家們（例如James Q. Wilson）也曾經強調過更有效地“社會化”人民的重要性。

[24]. (Paragraph 139) A qualification: It is in the interest of the system to permit a certain prescribed degree of freedom in some areas. For example, economic freedom (with suitable limitations and restraints) has proved effective in promoting economic growth. But only planned, circumscribed, limited freedom is in the interest of the system. The individual must always be kept on a leash, even if the leash is sometimes long( see paragraphs 94, 97).
[24]（第139段）一個限制條件：在某些領域允許某些指定程度的自由符合體系的利益。例如經濟自由（輔之以適當的限制和約束）可以有效地促進經濟發展。但只有有計畫、有約束、有限制的自由才符合體系利益。個人必須得被拴上繩子，即使繩子有時放得很長（參看94、97段）

REVOLUTION IS EASIER THAN REFORM
革命比改革更容易

We hope we have convinced the reader that the system cannot be reformed in a such a way as to reconcile freedom with technology. The only way out is to dispense with the industrial-technological system altogether. This implies revolution, not necessarily an armed uprising, but certainly a radical and fundamental change in the nature of society.

140
我們希望我們已經說服了讀者，體系無法通過改革來調和自由與技術。唯一的出路是摒棄整個工業-技術休系。這意味著革命，不一定是武裝起義，但肯定是激烈而根本的社會性質變化

People tend to assume that because a revolution involves a much greater change than reform does, it is more difficult to bring about than reform is. Actually, under certain circumstances revolution is much easier than reform. The reason is that a revolutionary movement can inspire an intensity of commitment that a reform movement cannot inspire. A reform movement merely offers to solve a particular social problem A revolutionary movement offers to solve all problems at one stroke and create a whole new world; it provides the kind of ideal for which people will take great risks and make great sacrifices. For this reasons it would be much easier to overthrow the whole technological system than to put effective, permanent restraints on the development of application of any one segment of technology, such as genetic engineering, but under suitable conditions large numbers of people may devote themselves passionately to a revolution against the industrial-technological system. As we noted in paragraph 132, reformers seeking to limite certain aspects of technology would be working to avoid a negative outcome. But revolutionaries work to gain a powerful reward -- fulfillment of their revolutionary vision -- and therefore work harder and more persistently than reformers do.

141
人們傾向於想當然地認為，由於革命帶來的變化比改革大，所以革命也就比改革更難發動。實際上，在某些條件下革命比改革容易得多。這是因為一場革命運動能夠激發出人們極大的獻身熱情，而一場改革運動卻不能。一場革命運動許諾一下子解決所有問題並創造整個新世界；它提供人民為之甘冒風險、甘作犧牲的理想。由於這些理由，推翻整個技術體系要比對技術的某一部分——如遺傳工程的應用發展——進行有效、持久的限制容易得多。在適當的條件下，許許多多的人會熱情地獻身於推翻工業技術體系的革命。正如我們在132段提到的那樣，尋求限制技術的某些方面的改革者是為了避免不良後果而工作。然而，革命者是為了獲得強力的報償一一實現其革命理想——而工作，因此他們比改革者更努力且更執著。

Reform is always restrainde by the fear of painful consequences if changes go too far. But once a revolutionary fever has taken hold of a society, people are willing to undergo unlimited hardships for the sake of their revolution. This was clearly shown in the French and Russian Revolutions. It may be that in such cases only a minority of the population is really committed to the revolution, but this minority is sufficiently large and active so that it becomes the dominant force in society. We will have more to say about revolution in paragraphs 180-205.

142
改革總是為對於變化過大有可能帶來的痛苦後果的恐懼所阻遏。而一旦革命的狂熱控制了一個社會，人民會為了革命事業而忍受無與倫比的苦難。法國與俄國革命充分顯示了這一點。很可能在這些案例中，只有少數人真正獻身於革命，但這少數人已足夠多且足夠積極，足以成為社會的主導力量。我們將在180-200段更深入地探討革命.

CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
控制人類行為

Since the beginning of civilization, organized societies have had to put pressures on human beings of the sake of the functioning of the social organism. The kinds of pressures vary greatly from one society to another. Some of the pressures are physical (poor diet, excessive labor, environmental pollution), some are psychological (noise, crowding, forcing humans behavior into the mold that society requires). In the past, human nature has been approximately constant, or at any rate has varied only within certain bounds. Consequently, societies have been able to push people only up to certain limits. When the limit of human endurance has been passed, things start going rong: rebellion, or crime, or corruption, or evasion of work, or depression and other mental problems, or an elevated death rate, or a declining birth rate or something else, so that either the society breaks down, or its functioning becomes too inefficient and it is (quickly or gradually, through conquest, attrition or evolution) replaces by some more efficient form of society.?

143
自文明肇始，有組織的社會便對人們施加壓力以保證社會有機體的運行。這類壓力在各個社會中極為不同。某些壓力是生理的（缺乏營養、過度勞累、環境污染），某些是心理的（噪音、擁擠、按社會所要求的模式重塑人類行為）。過去，人性基本上是恆定的，有變化也不會超越某種界限。因此社會也不能將人推過一定界限。當人的耐受極限被突破時，問題就來了：反叛、犯罪、腐敗、逃避工作、抑鬱和其他精神問題、死亡率升高、出生率降低，等等；社會或是崩壞，或是不能有效運行，最終將會（或快或慢地通過征服、內耗或演進）被其他更為有效的社會形式所取代。

[25]. (Paragraph 143) We don't mean to suggest that the efficiency or the potential for survival of a society has always been inversely proportional to the amount of pressure or discomfort to which the society subjects people. That is certainly not the case. There is good reason to believe that many primitive societies subjected people to less pressure than the European society did, but European society proved far more efficient than any primitive society and always won out in conflicts with such societies because of the advantages conferred by technology.
[25]（143段）我們並不是說一個社會生存的效能和潛能總是與該社會加於其人民的壓力或不適成反比。這顯然是不正確的。有充分理由相信許多原始社會加於其人民的壓力比歐洲社會小，但歐洲社會遠比任何原始社會更有效能，而且在與這些社會衝突時總能因為技術優勢而勝出。

Thus human nature has in the past put certain limits on the development of societies. People coud be pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because modern technology is developing way of modifying human beings.

144
因而在過去，人性對於社會的發展設置了某些界限，人們至多被推到此處而不會踰越。然而今天情況已經發生了變化，因為現代技術正在開發改造人類的方法。

Imagine a society that subjects people to conditions that make them terribley unhappy, then gives them the drugs to take away their unhappiness. Science fiction? It is already happening to some extent in our own society. It is well known that the rate of clinical depression had been greatly increasing in recent decades. We believe that this is due to disruption fo the power process, as explained in paragraphs 59-76. But even if we are wrong, the increasing rate of depression is certainly the result of SOME conditions that exist in today's society. Instead of removing the conditions that make people depressed, modern society gives them antidepressant drugs. In effect, antidepressants area a means of modifying an individual's internal state in such a way as to enable him to toelrate social conditions that he would otherwise find intolerable. (Yes, we know that depression is often of purely genetic origin. We are referring here to those cases in which environment plays the predominant role.)

145
設想這樣一個社會，它可以迫使人們處於極度不快的狀況，然後向他們提供藥物以解消他們的不快。這是科學幻想嗎？某種程度上這種事正在我們的社會裡上演。在最近幾十年中，可臨床診斷的抑鬱症發病率迅速上升。我們相信這是由於權力過程遭到打斷而導致的，如59-76段解釋的那樣。但即使我們錯了，抑鬱症發病率的提高也肯定是由於當代社會的某些條件造成的。現代社會不是去改變那些使人們抑鬱的條件，而是給人們抗抑鬱藥。實際上抗抑鬱藥是改變個人的內在狀態以使其能夠忍受其原先不能忍受的社會條件的一種手段（是的，我們知道抑鬱顯時常是純遺傳性的。我們在這裡談的是那些環境起決定作用的病例）

Drugs that affect the mind are only one example of the methods of controlling human behavior that modern society is developing. Let us look at some of the other methods.

146
用於人類頭腦的藥物僅僅是現代社會正在開發的控制人類行為方法的一個例子。讓我們看看其他例子

To start with, there are the techniques of surveillance. Hidden video cameras are now used in most stores and in many other places, computers are used to collect and process vast amounts of information about individuals. Information so obtained greatly increases the effectiveness of physical coercion (i.e., law enforcement).[26] Then there are the methods of propaganda, for which the mass communication media provide effective vehicles. Efficient techniques have been developed for winning elections, selling products, influencing public opinion. The entertainment industry serves as an important psychological tool of the system, possibly even when it is dishing out large amounts of sex and violence. Entertainment provides modern man with an essential means of escape. While absorbed in television, videos, etc., he can forget stress, anxiety, frustration, dissatisfaction. Many primitive peoples, when they don't have work to do, are quite content to sit for hours at a time doing nothing at all, because they are at peace with themselves and their world. But most modern people must be contantly occupied or entertained, otherwise the get "bored," i.e., they get fidgety, uneasy, irritable.

147
讓我們從監視技術開始。隱蔽的錄像攝影機今天在大多數商店和許多其他地方使用，計算機被用來收集和處理大量的個人信息。如此獲取的信息大大加強了生理強制（即執法）的有效性。[26] 然後是宣傳手段，大眾傳播媒介為此提供了有效的載體。有效的技術被開發來，使選舉、銷售產品、影響民意娛樂的產業成為了體系的重要心理工具，即使是在大量播放性與暴力的時候。娛樂業為現代人提供了逃避現實的必要手段。當人們關注於電視、錄像等時，就會忘悼緊張、焦慮、挫折、不滿等情緒。許多原始民族在無需勞作的閒暇時候很樂意一連坐上幾個小時無所事事，因為他們與自身以及外在世界和睦相處。但是多數現代人必須不停地忙碌或不停地娛樂，不然就會“厭倦”，坐立不安、心神不定、煩燥易怒。

[26]. (Paragraph 147) If you think that more effective law enforcement is unequivocally good because it suppresses crime, then remember that crime as defined by the system is not necessarily what YOU would call crime. Today, smoking marijuana is a "crime," and, in some places in the U.S.., so is possession of ANY firearm, registered or not, may be made a crime, and the same thing may happen with disapproved methods of child-rearing, such as spanking. In some countries, expression of dissident political opinions is a crime, and there is no certainty that this will never happen in the U.S., since no constitution or political system lasts forever.
[26] 如果你認為更有效的執法手段打擊了犯罪，因此只有好處沒有壞處，那麼不要忘了，體系定義的犯罪未必就是在你眼中的犯罪行為。吸食大麻在今天美國的某些地區是“犯罪”。持有火器，無論註冊與否，也有可能變成犯罪。同樣，不受認可的育兒方式，例如打屁股，也有可能變成犯罪。在某些國家，表達異見政治觀點是犯罪。誰也不敢說美國永遠也不會發生這種事，因為任何憲制或政體都不可能永遠存在下去。

If a society needs a large, powerful law enforcement establishment, then there is something gravely wrong with that society; it must be subjecting people to severe pressures if so many refuse to follow the rules, or follow them only because forced. Many societies in the past have gotten by with little or no formal law-enforcement.

如果一個社會需要一個龐大且強有力的執法機構，那麼這個社會肯定有些什麼嚴重的毛病：如果有那麼多的人拒絕遵守規則，或者只有在遭受強迫的時候才肯遵守規則，那麼這個社會必須向人們施以強大壓力。過去很多社會並沒有正式執法力量，或者執法力量有限，不過也照樣運行得很好。

Other techniques strike deeper that the foregoing. Education is no longer a simple affair of paddling a kid's behind when he doesn't know his lessons and patting him on the head when he does know them. It is becoming a scientific technique for controlling the child's development. Sylvan Learning Centers, for example, have had great success in motivating children to study, and psychological techniques are also used with more or less success in many conventional schools. "Parenting" techniques that are taught to parents are designed to make children accept fundamental values of the system and behave in ways that the system finds desirable. "Mental health" programs, "intervention" techniques, psychotherapy and so forth are ostensibly designed to benefit individuals, but in practice they usually serve as methods for inducing individuals to think and behave as the system requires. (There is no contradiction here; an individual whose attitudes or behavior bring him into conflict with the system is up against a force that is too powerful for him to conquer or escape from, hence he is likely to suffer from stress, frustration, defeat. His path will be much easier if he thinks and behaves as the system requires. In that sense the system is acting for the benefit of the individual when it brainwashes him into conformity.) Child abuse in its gross and obvious forms is disapproved in most if not all cultures. Tormenting a child for a trivial reason or no reason at all is something that appalls almost everyone. But many psychologists interpret the concept of abuse much more broadly. Is spanking, when used as part of a rational and consistent system of discipline, a form of abuse? The question will ultimately be decided by whether or not spanking tends to produce behavior that makes a person fit in well with the existing system of society. In practice, the word "abuse" tends to be interpreted to include any method of child-rearing that produces behavior inconvenient for the system. Thus, when they go beyond the prevention of obvious, senseless cruelty, programs for preventing "child abuse" are directed toward the control of human behavior of the system.

148
其他技術的影響比上文所述更深遠。教育已經不再是孩子不會功課時打打他的屁股、會了就拍拍他的頭這樣簡單的事了。它成了一門控制兒童發展的科學技術。例如，西爾瓦學習中心（Sylvan Learning Centers）在激勵兒童學習方面取得了很大成功，而心理學技術在許多常規學校中的應用也多多少少取得了成功。教給家長們的“如何做家長”的技術是為了使兒童接受體系的基本價值觀並按照體系的要求行事而設計的。“精神健康”計畫、“參與教學”技術、心理治療等等表面上是為了個人的利益設計的，但實際上它們往往是誘導個人按照體系的要求去想去做的一種方法（這裡確實也沒有什麼矛盾，如果個人的態度和行為與體系發生了衝突，那麼他就是在與一個極為強大的力量作對，他既無法戰勝也無法躲避，因此他就會因緊張、挫折、失敗而痛苦。如果他按照體系的要求去想去做，他的路就會容易得多。在這個意義上，體系對個人進行洗腦，使他順從，確實是為了他好。大多數文化——如果不是全部——都不贊同以粗暴且明顯的方式虐待兒童。為了一點小事或無事便折磨一個兒童，這使幾乎每一個人都感到厭惡。但是許多心理學家把虐待的概念無限擴大。打屁股，作為教育孩子遵守紀律的理性併合諧的體系的一部分，是否算虐待？這個問題的答案最終要由打屁股是否能使一個人良好地適應社會的現存體系而定。實際上，虐待這個詞的解釋幾乎包括了所有會導致不利於體系的行為的撫育兒童方法。因此，當防止“虐待兒童”的計畫超出了防止明顯且無意義的殘酷行為時，其目的就已經在於加強體系對於人類行為的控制了。

Presumably, research will continue to increas the effectiveness of psychological techniques for controlling human behavior. But we think it is unlikely that psychological techniques alone will be sufficient to adjust human beings to the kind of society that technology is creating. Biological methods probably will have to be used. We have already mentiond the use of drugs in this connection. Neurology may provide other avenues of modifying the human mind. Genetic engineering of human beings is already beginning to occur in the form of "gene therapy," and there is no reason to assume the such methods will not eventually be used to modify those aspects of the body that affect mental funtioning.

149
可以推測，研究將繼續增強心理學技術用於控制人類行為的有效性。但是，我們認為。僅憑心理學技術就使人類適應技術正在創造的這種杜會是不可能的。生物學方法多半也會被用上。這方面我們已經提到了藥物的使用。神經病學也許可以提供改造人類頭腦的其他途徑，人類遺傳工程已經以“基因療法”的形式開始冒頭了，沒有理由認為這些辦法最終不會被用來改造能夠影響思維的身體機能。

As we mentioned in paragraph 134, industrial society seems likely to be entering a period of severe stress, due in part to problems of human behavior and in part to economic and environmental problems. And a considerable proportion of the system's economic and environmental problems result from the way human beings behave. Alienation, low self-esteem, depression, hostility, rebellion; children who won't study, youth gangs, illegal drug use, rape, child abuse , other crimes, unsafe sex, teen pregnancy, population growth, political corruption, race hatred, ethnic rivalry, bitter ideological conflict (i.e., pro-choice vs. pro-life), political extremism, terrorism, sabotage, anti-government groups, hate groups. All these threaten the very survival of the system. The system will be FORCED to use every practical means of controlling human behavior.

150
正如我們在134段提到的那樣。工業化社會似乎正在進人一個嚴重緊張的時期，部分是由於人類行為的問題，部分是由於經濟及環境問題。而體系的經濟及環境問題當中很大一部分又是由人類行為引起的。異化、缺乏自尊、抑鬱、敵意、叛逆、厭學兒童、青少年犯罪團夥、毒品、強姦、虐待兒童、其他罪行、濫交、少女懷孕、人口增長、吹治腐敗、種族仇恨、民族對立、意識形態對立（例如支持與反對人工墮胎的問題）、政治極端主義、恐怖主義、破壞、反政府集團、仇恨集團，等等。所有這些都直接威脅著體系的生存，體系將被迫使用所有可行的手段來控制人類行為。

The social disruption that we see today is certainly not the result of mere chance. It can only be a result of the conditions of life that the system imposes on people. (We have argued that the most important of these conditions is disruption of the power process.) If the systems succeeds in imposing sufficient control over human behavior to assure itw own survival, a new watershed in human history will have passed. Whereas formerly the limits of human endurance have imposed limits on the development of societies (as we explained in paragraphs 143, 144), industrial-technological society will be able to pass those limits by modifying human beings, whether by psychological methods or biological methods or both. In the future, social systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of human beings. Instead, human being will be adjusted to suit the needs of the system. [27]

151
我們今天所見的社會動盪肯定不是偶然，只能是體系強加於人們的生存條件所造成結果（我們曾經論證過這些條件中最重要的是權力過程的中斷）。如果體系能夠成功地對人類行為施加足夠的控制以保障其自身的生存，那麼，人類歷史將跨越一條分水嶺。過去，人類耐受力的界限曾經成為社會發展的界限（如我們在143，144段中解釋的那樣），但是工業——技術社會將能夠通過改造人類—無論是依靠心理學方法還是生物學方法，抑或雙管齊下——來踰越這些界限。未來的社會體系將不再作調整以適應人類的需要，而是人類作調整以適應社會的需要。[27]

[27]. (Paragraph 151) To be sure, past societies have had means of influencing behavior, but these have been primitive and of low effectiveness compared with the technological means that are now being developed.
[27]（第151段）的確，過去的社會也擁有影響人類行為的手段，但是與現代技術發展起來的現金手段相比，這些手段十分原始且效果有限。

Generally speaking, technological control over human behavior will probably not be introduced with a totalitarian intention or even through a conscious desire to restrict human freedom. [28] Each new step in the assertion of control over the human mind will be taken as a rational response to a problem that faces society, such as curing alcoholism, reducing the crime rate or inducing young people to study science and engineering. In many cases, there will be humanitarian justification. For example, when a psychiatrist prescribes an anti-depressant for a depressed patient, he is clearly doing that individual a favor. It would be inhumane to withhold the drug from someone who needs it. When parents send their children to Sylvan Learning Centers to have them manipulated into becoming enthusiastic about their studies, they do so from concern for their children's welfare. It may be that some of these parents wish that one didn't have to have specialized training to get a job and that their kid didn't have to be brainwashed into becoming a computer nerd. But what can they do? They can't change society, and their child may be unemployable if he doesn't have certain skills. So they send him to Sylvan.

152
一般來說，對於人類行為的技術控制多半並非出於極權主義意圖，甚至並非出於有意識地限制人類自由的願望。[28] 控制人類思想的每一步都是針對社會所面臨問題的合理反應。例如防治酗酒、降低犯罪率或者引導年輕人學習科學技術。在許多情況下，總能找到正當的人道主義理由。例如，當一個精神病專家給一個抑鬱症患者開抗抑鬱藥物時，他顯然是在幫助那個人。不給一個需要藥物的人吃藥是不人道的。家長們把他們的孩子送到西爾瓦學習中心去接受改造從而使他們熱愛學習的動機自然也是關心自己孩子的幸福。也許其中有些家長並不喜歡不經特殊訓練就找不到工作的社會現實，也不希望看到自已的孩子被迫經過洗腦後變成計算機宅男。但他們有什麼辦法？他們不能改變社會，他們的孩子如果不掌握某些技術就找不到工作，所以他們把孩子送去西爾瓦。

[28]. (Paragraph 152) However, some psychologists have publicly expressed opinions indicating their contempt for human freedom. And the mathematician Claude Shannon was quoted in Omni (August 1987) as saying, "I visualize a time when we will be to robots what dogs are to humans, and I'm rooting for the machines."
[28]（第152段）無論如何，一些心理學家公開表示了他們付於人類自由的蔑視。《Omni》雜誌（1987年8月號）曾引用數學家克勞德.香農的言論：“我想像有一天我們與機器人的關係就像今天的狗與人一樣，而我支持機器人那邊。”

Thus control over human behavior will be introduced not by a calculated decision of the authorities but through a process of social evolution (RAPID evolution, however). The process will be impossible to resist, because each advance, considered by itself, will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance will appear to be beneficial, or at least the evil involved in making the advance will seem to be less than that which would result from not making it (see paragraph 127). Propaganda for example is used for many good purposes, such as discouraging child abuse or race hatred. [14] Sex education is obviously useful, yet the effect of sex education (to the extent that it is successful) is to take the shaping of sexual attitudes away from the family and put it into the hands of the state as represented by the public school system.

153
因此，對於人類行為的控制並非出自當局的蓄意的決策，而是出自社會進化（快速進化）過程。這一過程將是難以抗拒的，因為單獨考慮向前邁出的每一步，則似乎每一步都是有利的，或者至少邁出這一步所產生的危害比不邁這一步所產生的禍害要小（參見127段）。例如，宣傳被用於許多良好的目的，如減少虐待兒童或種族仇恨。性教育顯然是有用的，然而性教育（如果有效的話）的作用是把對於性觀念的引導權從家庭奪走，交到以公立學校體係為代表的國家手中。

Suppose a biological trait is discovered that increases the likelihood that a child will grow up to be a criminal and suppose some sort of gene therapy can remove this trait. [29] Of course most parents whose children possess the trait will have them undergo the therapy. It would be inhumane to do otherwise, since the child would probably have a miserable life if he grew up to be a criminal. But many or most primitive societies have a low crime rate in comparison with that of our society, even though they have neither high-tech methods of child-rearing nor harsh systems of punishment. Since there is no reason to suppose that more modern men than primitive men have innate predatory tendencies, the high crime rate of our society must be due to the pressures that modern conditions put on people, to which many cannot or will not adjust. Thus a treatment designed to remove potential criminal tendencies is at least in part a way of re-engineering people so that they suit the requirements of the system.

154
假設人們發現某種生物學性狀能夠增加某個兒童長大後成為罪犯的概率，並假設某種基因療法可以去除這種性狀 [29]，當然許多家長都會把具有這種性狀的子女送去接受治療。不這麼做是不人道的，因為如果孩子長大後成為罪犯，他的一生多半會很悲慘。但許多或大多數原始社會的犯罪率都比我們的社會低，雖然它們既沒有高科技的撫育兒童方法，也沒有嚴厲的懲罰制度。沒有理由認為現代人比原始人天生就更為掠奪成性。我們社會的高犯罪率必然是現代生活條件強加於人的壓力造成的，對於這些壓力許多人不能或不願適應。因此去除潛在犯罪傾向的療法至少在一定程度上是一種重新設計製造人類以便使他們滿足體系要求的方法。

[29]. (Paragraph 154) This is no science fiction! After writing paragraph 154 we came across an article in Scientific American according to which scientists are actively developing techniques for identifying possible future criminals and for treating them by a combination of biological and psychological means. Some scientists advocate compulsory application of the treatment, which may be available in the near future. (See "Seeking the Criminal Element", by W. Wayt Gibbs, Scientific American, March 1995.) Maybe you think this is OK because the treatment would be applied to those who might become drunk drivers (they endanger human life too), then perhaps to peel who spank their children, then to environmentalists who sabotage logging equipment, eventually to anyone whose behavior is inconvenient for the system.
[29]（第154段）這不是科學幻想！在寫完第154段後。我們碰巧在《科學美國人》當中發現了一篇文章。據這篇文章說，科學家們正在積極開發辯認潛在罪犯並用生物學和心理學的綜合手段為其治療的技術。一些科學家家主張施行義務治療，這種療法可能不久就會出現。（參見《尋找犯罪分子》（Seeking the Criminal Element），作者 W. Wayt Gibbs，《科學美國人》，1995年3月號）。也許你認為這挺好，因為他們治的是那些有可能醉酒駕車的人（這些人也對人類生命構成了威脅），不過此後他們就要修理那些打孩子屁股的人，然後是那些破壞伐木機械的環境主義者，最後是任何為體系找麻煩的人。

Our society tends to regard as a "sickness" any mode of thought or behavior that is inconvenient for the system, and this is plausible because when an individual doesn't fit into the system it causes pain to the individual as well as problems for the system. Thus the manipulation of an individual to adjust him to the system is seen as a "cure" for a "sickness" and therefore as good.

155
我們的社會傾向於將不利於體系的思想或行為模式視為“病態”，這樣做看起來似乎也很有道理，因為如果一個人不適應體系，其後果不僅僅是給體繫帶來麻煩，其個人也會遭受痛苦。因此，揉搓一個人使其適應體系被看作是“治病”，因而是好事。

In paragraph 127 we pointed out that if the use of a new item of technology is INITIALLY optional, it does not necessarily REMAIN optional, because the new technology tends to change society in such a way that it becomes difficult or impossible for an individual to function without using that technology. This applies also to the technology of human behavior. In a world in which most children are put through a program to make them enthusiastic about studying, a parent will almost be forced to put his kid through such a program, because if he does not, then the kid will grow up to be, comparatively speaking, an ignoramus and therefore unemployable. Or suppose a biological treatment is discovered that, without undesirable side-effects, will greatly reduce the psychological stress from which so many people suffer in our society. If large numbers of people choose to undergo the treatment, then the general level of stress in society will be reduced, so that it will be possible for the system to increase the stress-producing pressures. In fact, something like this seems to have happened already with one of our society's most important psychological tools for enabling people to reduce (or at least temporarily escape from) stress, namely, mass entertainment (see paragraph 147). Our use of mass entertainment is "optional": No law requires us to watch television, listen to the radio, read magazines. Yet mass entertainment is a means of escape and stress-reduction on which most of us have become dependent. Everyone complains about the trashiness of television, but almost everyone watches it. A few have kicked the TV habit, but it would be a rare person who could get along today without using ANY form of mass entertainment. (Yet until quite recently in human history most people got along very nicely with no other entertainment than that which each local community created for itself.) Without the entertainment industry the system probably would not have been able to get away with putting as much stress-producing pressure on us as it does.

156
在第127段我們曾指出，即使某一項新技術的使用一開始是非強制性的，它也不一定一直都會是非強制性的，因為新技術將改變社會，以致於個人離開了該項技術就很難或無法生存。這同樣適用於涉及人類行為的技術。在一個大多數兒童都接受使之熱愛學習的訓練計畫的世界裡，家長幾乎是被迫送他的孩子接受這種訓練計畫的。如果他不送，他的孩子長大後和其他人相比就會顯得像個笨蛋，並因此而失業。再假設人們發明了一種生物學療法，可以大大減少困擾我們社會中許多人的緊張症，並且沒有什麼副作用。如果許多人都接受這種治療，社會的總的緊張水平就會降低，而體系也就可以增強製造緊張的壓力。事實上，類似現象已經在我們的社會中出現了，這就是大眾娛樂（參看147段），我們社會使人們能夠減少（或至少暫時逃避）緊張的最重要的心理學工具之一。大眾娛樂的使用是非強制性的：沒有任何法律要求我們一定要看電視、聽收音機、讀雜誌。然而，大眾娛樂已經成為了我們之中大多數人所依賴的逃避或減少緊張情緒的手段。每一個人都抱怨電視節目儘是垃圾，但幾乎每一個人都看電視。有些人可能不看電視，但令天已很少有人拒絕任何形式的大眾娛樂。（然而，直至相當切近的人類歷史時期，大多數人僅僅享用本地社區的娛樂便能夠過得很好）

Assuming that industrial society survives, it is likely that technology will eventually acquire something approaching complete control over human behavior. It has been established beyond any rational doubt that human thought and behavior have a largely biological basis. As experimenters have demonstrated, feelings such as hunger, pleasure, anger and fear can be turned on and off by electrical stimulation of appropriate parts of the brain. Memories can be destroyed by damaging parts of the brain or they can be brought to the surface by electrical stimulation. Hallucinations can be induced or moods changed by drugs. There may or may not be an immaterial human soul, but if there is one it clearly is less powerful that the biological mechanisms of human behavior. For if that were not the case then researchers would not be able so easily to manipulate human feelings and behavior with drugs and electrical currents.

157
假如工業化社會能夠存在下去，技術很可能最終將找到完全控制人類行為的某種方法。人類的思想和行為有著深厚的生物學基礎，這一點已是不容質疑的了。實驗人員告訴我們：通過用電刺激大腦的適當部位。可以挑起或關閉諸如飢餓、愉快、憤怒和恐懼等感覺。可以通過破壞大腦的某些部位來消除記憶，也可以通過電刺激來使記憶浮現。可以用藥誘發幻覺，也可以用藥改變情緒。非物質性的人類靈魂可能有也可能沒有，即使有，它也顯然不如人類行為的生物學機制那麼強大。否則研究人員不可能如此容易地使用藥物和電流來操縱人類的感情和行為。

It presumably would be impractical for all people to have electrodes inserted in their heads so that they could be controlled by the authorities. But the fact that human thoughts and feelings are so open to biological intervention shows that the problem of controlling human behavior is mainly a technical problem; a problem of neurons, hormones and complex molecules; the kind of problem that is accessible to scientific attack. Given the outstanding record of our society in solving technical problems, it is overwhelmingly probable that great advances will be made in the control of human behavior.

158
將所有人的腦袋都插上電極以便當局控制大概是不切實際的。但人類的思想和感覺如此易受生物介入這一事實說明控制人類行為僅僅是一個技術問題，一個涉及神經元、激素和複雜分子的問題，一個可以用科學解決的問題。我們的社會在解決技術問題方面有著非凡的記錄，因此它在控制人類行為方面將取得巨大進步實在是十拿九穩的事。

Will public resistance prevent the introduction of technological control of human behavior? It certainly would if an attempt were made to introduce such control all at once. But since technological control will be introduced through a long sequence of small advances, there will be no rational and effective public resistance. (See paragraphs 127,132, 153.)

159
公眾抵抗能夠防止對人類行為進行技術控制嗎?如果誰要想一下子就進行全面的控制，那麼公眾的抵抗肯定會奏效。但是因為技術控制將是通過一長串連續的微小進展逐漸實現的，也就不會出現理性或有效的公共抵抗。（見第127、132、153段）

To those who think that all this sounds like science fiction, we point out that yesterday's science fiction is today's fact. The Industrial Revolution has radically altered man's environment and way of life, and it is only to be expected that as technology is increasingly applied to the human body and mind, man himself will be altered as radically as his environment and way of life have been.

160
對於那些認為這一切無非是科幻小說的人們，我們想指出，昨天的科學幻想小說在今天已成為了現實。工業革命已經極大地改變了人類的環境和生活方式，完全可以預期，隨著技術不斷地應用於人類的身體和思維，人類自身將發生的變化不會小於其環境和生活方式已經產生的變化。

HUMAN RACE AT A CROSSROADS
十字路口的人類

But we have gotten ahead of our story. It is one thing to develop in the laboratory a series of psychological or biological techniques for manipulating human behavior and quite another to integrate these techniques into a functioning social system. The latter problem is the more difficult of the two. For example, while the techniques of educational psychology doubtless work quite well in the "lab schools" where they are developed, it is not necessarily easy to apply them effectively throughout our educational system. We all know what many of our schools are like. The teachers are too busy taking knives and guns away from the kids to subject them to the latest techniques for making them into computer nerds. Thus, in spite of all its technical advances relating to human behavior the system to date has not been impressively successful in controlling human beings. The people whose behavior is fairly well under the control of the system are those of the type that might be called "bourgeois." But there are growing numbers of people who in one way or another are rebels against the system: welfare leaches, youth gangs cultists, satanists, nazis, radical environmentalists, militiamen, etc..

161
但是，我們的故事或許還是超前了一點。在實驗室裡開發一系列操縱人類行為的心理學或生物學技術是一回事，將這些技術整合進一個運轉的社會體系則是另一回事。後一個問題更困難。例如，教育心理學技術在開發這些技術的“實驗學校”中無疑十分有效，但要在我們的整個教育體系中有效地運用就不見得那麼容易了。我們都知道我們的許多學校是什麼樣的。老師們正忙於收繳孩子們的刀具與槍支，根本沒有時間運用最新技術把他們造就成計算機宅男。因此，雖然擁有這些關乎人類行為的技術進步，體系迄今在控制人類行為方而尚未取得令人印象深刻的成功。其行為受到體系很好控制的人是那些可以被稱為“小資產階級”的類型。但越來越多的人在這方面或那方面成為了體系的叛逆：社會福利的寄生蟲、青年犯罪團夥、邪教崇拜者、惡魔崇拜者、納粹分子、激進環境保護主義者、民間軍事集團，等等。

The system is currently engaged in a desperate struggle to overcome certain problems that threaten its survival, among which the problems of human behavior are the most important. If the system succeeds in acquiring sufficient control over human behavior quickly enough, it will probably survive. Otherwise it will break down. We think the issue will most likely be resolved within the next several decades, say 40 to 100 years.

162
體系目前正在為克服某些威脅到其生存的問題進行著拚死的鬥爭，在這其中最重要的或許就是人類行為問題。如果體系能夠及時地掌握充分控制人類行為的能力，它就多半能夠生存下去。否則它就會崩潰。我們認為這個問題多半在今後幾十年，大約在40至100年間，就能見分曉。

Suppose the system survives the crisis of the next several decades. By that time it will have to have solved, or at least brought under control, the principal problems that confront it, in particular that of "socializing" human beings; that is, making people sufficiently docile so that their behavior no longer threatens the system. That being accomplished, it does not appear that there would be any further obstacle to the development of technology, and it would presumably advance toward its logical conclusion, which is complete control over everything on Earth, including human beings and all other important organisms. The system may become a unitary, monolithic organization, or it may be more or less fragmented and consist of a number of organizations coexisting in a relationship that includes elements of both cooperation and competition, just as today the government, the corporations and other large organizations both cooperate and compete with one another. Human freedom mostly will have vanished, because individuals and small groups will be impotent vis-a-vis large organizations armed with supertechnology and an arsenal of advanced psychological and biological tools for manipulating human beings, besides instruments of surveillance and physical coercion. Only a small number of people will have any real power, and even these probably will have only very limited freedom, because their behavior too will be regulated; just as today our politicians and corporation executives can retain their positions of power only as long as their behavior remains within certain fairly narrow limits.

163
假設體系能夠度過今後幾十年的危機。到那時，它必須已經解決或至少控制住了它面臨的主要問題，特別是“社會化”人類的問題，即將人們改造得足夠馴順，使得他們的行為不再威脅到體系。實現了這一點之後，技術的發展就不再會有任何障礙，它將會走向它的邏輯終點，也就是完全控制地球上的一切，包括人類和所有其它重要的有機體。體系將成為鐵板一塊的整體組織，或者多多少少分成幾塊，由幾十個既合作又競爭的共存組織共同組成，就像今天的政府、公司和其他大型組織既合作又競爭一樣。人類自由基本上將不復存在，因為個人和小群體無法對抗用超級技術以及可以操縱改造人類的先進心理學和生物學工具武裝起來的大型組織，更不用說後者還掌握著監視儀器和物理強制手段了。只有極少數人握有真正的權力，但甚至就連他們的自由也是十分有限的，因為他們的行為也是受到管制的；就像今天的政客和公司主管，他們要保住自己的職權就必須限制自己的行為，不踰越某些十分狹隘的界限。

Don't imagine that the systems will stop developing further techniques for controlling human beings and nature once the crisis of the next few decades is over and increasing control is no longer necessary for the system's survival. On the contrary, once the hard times are over the system will increase its control over people and nature more rapidly, because it will no longer be hampered by difficulties of the kind that it is currently experiencing. Survival is not the principal motive for extending control. As we explained in paragraphs 87-90, technicians and scientists carry on their work largely as a surrogate activity; that is, they satisfy their need for power by solving technical problems. They will continue to do this with unabated enthusiasm, and among the most interesting and challenging problems for them to solve will be those of understanding the human body and mind and intervening in their development. For the "good of humanity," of course.

164
今後幾十年的危機如果能過去，那時體系就不再需要為生存而加強控制了，但不要想像體系會因此而停止進一步發展控制人與自然的技術。正相反，一旦艱難時期過去了，體系將更迅速地加強對於人與自然的控制，因為它將不再為今日所面臨的困難所掣肘。生存並非加強控制的主要動機。我們在第87-90段已經闡述過，技術人員和科學家把他們的工作作為了替代性活動；他們解決技術問題是為了滿足自己的權力慾。他們樂此不疲，而留待他們解決的最令人感興趣、最具挑戰性的問題就是探究人類身體和思想的秘密並干預它們的發展。當然，這是為了“人類福祉”。

But suppose on the other hand that the stresses of the coming decades prove to be too much for the system. If the system breaks down there may be a period of chaos, a "time of troubles" such as those that history has recorded: at various epochs in the past. It is impossible to predict what would emerge from such a time of troubles, but at any rate the human race would be given a new chance. The greatest danger is that industrial society may begin to reconstitute itself within the first few years after the breakdown. Certainly there will be many people (power-hungry types especially) who will be anxious to get the factories running again.

165
但另一方面，請假設今後幾十年的壓力超出了體系的承受能力。如果體系崩潰，可能會有一個混亂時期，“動亂年代”，就像在過去各個對代歷史所記載的那樣。不可能預見動亂年代最後會產生什麼結果。但無論如何人類會被賦予一個新機會。最大的危險是工業化社會很可能在崩潰後不幾年就開始重組其自身，肯定會有許多人（特別是權力飢渴型的人們）急於重新開動工廠。

Therefore two tasks confront those who hate the servitude to which the industrial system is reducing the human race. First, we must work to heighten the social stresses within the system so as to increase the likelihood that it will break down or be weakened sufficiently so that a revolution against it becomes possible. Second, it is necessary to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the industrial society if and when the system becomes sufficiently weakened. And such an ideology will help to assure that, if and when industrial society breaks down, its remnants will be smashed beyond repair, so that the system cannot be reconstituted. The factories should be destroyed, technical books burned, etc.

166
工業體系將人類貶低到了被奴役的狀態，而憎恨這種被奴役狀態的人則面臨兩個任務。第一，我們必須增強體系內的社會緊張態勢，以加快其崩潰或把它弱化到足夠程度，使得反對體系的革命成為可能。第二，當體系充分弱化時，我們必須發展並宣傳一種反對技術和工業社會的意識形態。當工業社會崩潰時，這種意識形態將有助於保證其殘餘被粉碎到無法修復的地步，這樣體系就無法重組。工廠將被搗毀，技術書籍將被燒掉，等等

HUMAN SUFFERING
人類苦難

The industrial system will not break down purely as a result of revolutionary action. It will not be vulnerable to revolutionary attack unless its own internal problems of development lead it into very serious difficulties. So if the system breaks down it will do so either spontaneously, or through a process that is in part spontaneous but helped along by revolutionaries. If the breakdown is sudden, many people will die, since the world's population has become so overblown that it cannot even feed itself any longer without advanced technology. Even if the breakdown is gradual enough so that reduction of the population can occur more through lowering of the birth rate than through elevation of the death rate, the process of de-industrialization probably will be very chaotic and involve much suffering. It is naive to think it likely that technology can be phased out in a smoothly managed orderly way, especially since the technophiles will fight stubbornly at every step. Is it therefore cruel to work for the breakdown of the system? Maybe, but maybe not. In the first place, revolutionaries will not be able to break the system down unless it is already in deep trouble so that there would be a good chance of its eventually breaking down by itself anyway; and the bigger the system grows, the more disastrous the consequences of its breakdown will be; so it may be that revolutionaries, by hastening the onset of the breakdown will be reducing the extent of the disaster.

167
工業體系的崩潰不會純粹是革命行動的結果，它不會那麼難以抵禦革命的攻擊，除非它自身內部的發展問題導致了極為嚴重的困難。因此如果體系崩潰，那麼它或是自發崩潰，或是部分自發、部分由革命者促發的崩潰。如果崩潰是突如其來的，許多人都會死去，因為世界人口已如此過分膨脹，離開了先進技術就無法養活自己。甚至即使崩潰足夠緩慢，人口的減少可以主要通過出生率的降低而不是死亡率的提高而實現，非工業化的過程也多半是極度混亂和極度痛苦的。幻想通過平穩控制的有序方式逐步廢除技術是天真的，特別是要考慮到技術愛好者們的負隅頑抗。那麼，致力於體系的崩潰是否因此就十分殘酷呢？也許是，也許不是。首先，除非體系本來就已經陷入了深重的困難，無論如何都很可能最終自行崩潰，否者單靠革命者是不可能強行使其崩潰的。而且體系發展得規模越大，崩潰的後果就越嚴重。因此加速體系崩潰的革命者或許反倒控制了災難的規模。

In the second place, one has to balance the struggle and death against the loss of freedom and dignity. To many of us, freedom and dignity are more important than a long life or avoidance of physical pain. Besides, we all have to die some time, and it may be better to die fighting for survival, or for a cause, than to live a long but empty and purposeless life.

168
其次，我們必須權衡鬥爭與死亡和喪失自由與尊嚴這兩方面的得失。對於我們之中的許多人來說，自由與尊嚴比長壽和避免肉體痛苦更重要。再者，我們早晚會死，死於為生存或為某一事業而戰，強於活得空虛而無目的。

In the third place, it is not all certain that the survival of the system will lead to less suffering than the breakdown of the system would. The system has already caused, and is continuing to cause , immense suffering all over the world. Ancient cultures, that for hundreds of years gave people a satisfactory relationship with each other and their environment, have been shattered by contact with industrial society, and the result has been a whole catalogue of economic, environmental, social and psychological problems. One of the effects of the intrusion of industrial society has been that over much of the world traditional controls on population have been thrown out of balance. Hence the population explosion, with all that it implies. Then there is the psychological suffering that is widespread throughout the supposedly fortunate countries of the West (see paragraphs 44, 45). No one knows what will happen as a result of ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect and other environmental problems that cannot yet be foreseen. And, as nuclear proliferation has shown, new technology cannot be kept out of the hands of dictators and irresponsible Third World nations. Would you like to speculate abut what Iraq or North Korea will do with genetic engineering?

169
第三，體系的存續所帶來的痛苦並不一定就比體系崩潰所帶來的痛苦更少。在全世界範圍內，體系已經招致、並且正在招致的巨大痛苦曾使人類千百年與他人以及環境和睦相處的古代文化被與其解接觸的工業社會所摧毀。其結果就是全方位的經濟、環境、社會和心理問題。工業杜會的侵擾所產生的影響之一，就是傳統的人口控制在全球範圍內一下子失去了平衡，因而產生了人口爆炸及其所有連帶後果。接著就是心理疾病席捲了整個所謂“幸運”的西方社會（參見44, 45段）。沒有人知道臭氧層耗盡、溫室效應及其他現在還不能預測的環境問題最終會為這個世界帶來怎樣的後果。而且就像核擴散已經顯示的那樣，我們無法防止新技術落入獨裁者和不負責任的第三世界國家手中。願意猜猜伊位克或北朝鮮將用遺傳工程來幹什麼嗎?

"Oh!" say the technophiles, "Science is going to fix all that! We will conquer famine, eliminate psychological suffering, make everybody healthy and happy!" Yeah, sure. That's what they said 200 years ago. The Industrial Revolution was supposed to eliminate poverty, make everybody happy, etc. The actual result has been quite different. The technophiles are hopelessly naive (or self-deceiving) in their understanding of social problems. They are unaware of (or choose to ignore) the fact that when large changes, even seemingly beneficial ones, are introduced into a society, they lead to a long sequence of other changes, most of which are impossible to predict (paragraph 103). The result is disruption of the society. So it is very probable that in their attempt to end poverty and disease, engineer docile, happy personalities and so forth, the technophiles will create social systems that are terribly troubled, even more so that the present one. For example, the scientists boast that they will end famine by creating new, genetically engineered food plants. But this will allow the human population to keep expanding indefinitely, and it is well known that crowding leads to increased stress and aggression. This is merely one example of the PREDICTABLE problems that will arise. We emphasize that, as past experience has shown, technical progress will lead to other new problems for society far more rapidly that it has been solving old ones. Thus it will take a long difficult period of trial and error for the technophiles to work the bugs out of their Brave New World (if they ever do). In the meantime there will be great suffering. So it is not all clear that the survival of industrial society would involve less suffering than the breakdown of that society would. Technology has gotten the human race into a fix from which there is not likely to be any easy escape.

170
“嗨！”技術愛好者們會說，“科學能解決所有這些問題！我們將征服饑荒、消滅心理病痛，讓每一個人都健康而快樂！”是的，是的。他們200年前就是這麼說的。人們曾指望工業社會能夠消滅貧窮，使每一個人都快樂，等等。實際結果卻不是那麼回事。技術愛好者對社會問題的理解簡直是無可救藥地天真（或自欺欺人）。他們沒有意識到（或故意視而不見）這樣一個事實：當巨大的變化，即使是看上去有利的變化，被引入一個社會時，將會引發一長串其他變化，這些變化之中的大都分是不可預見的（103段）其結果則是社會的混亂。因此，技術愛好者們在試圖消滅貧窮和疾病，設計製造馴順、快樂的人格等等時，很可能會創造出比現在還糟糕的社會體系。例如，科學家們吹噓說他們能夠創造出新的、經遺傳工程改造的糧食植物以消滅饑荒。然而，這將會允許人日無限膨脹下去，而眾所周知，擁擠會導致緊張和攻擊性的增強。這僅僅是技術會導致的可預見問題中的一個例子。我們強調指出，歷史經驗告訴我們，技術進步給社會帶來新問題的速度遠比它解決舊問題的速度要快。因此技術愛好者們要經過一個漫長的試錯時期才能夠為他們的美麗新世界排除掉所有的故障（假設他們最終能做到的話）。而與此同時所產生的痛苦將會如此巨大，以至於體系生存下去所帶來的痛苦不見得就比體系崩潰更少。技術己將人類帶入了一條無法輕易逃脫的死胡同。

THE FUTURE
未來

But suppose now that industrial society does survive the next several decade and that the bugs do eventually get worked out of the system, so that it functions smoothly. What kind of system will it be? We will consider several possibilities.

171
然而，假設工業社會經過未來幾十年確實倖存下來並最終排除了故障，因而實現了平穩運轉，它又會是一個什麼樣的體系呢？我們將考慮幾種可能性

First let us postulate that the computer scientists succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do all things better that human beings can do them. In that case presumably all work will be done by vast, highly organized systems of machines and no human effort will be necessary. Either of two cases might occur. The machines might be permitted to make all of their own decisions without human oversight, or else human control over the machines might be retained.

172
首先，讓我們假定計算機科學家成功地開發出了智能機器，這些機器無論做什麼事都比人類強。在這種情況下，大概所有工作都會由巨大的、高度組織化的機器系統去做，而不再需要任何人類的努力。有兩種情況可能發生。一種是允許機器在沒有人類監督的情況下自已做出所有的決策，另一種是人類保留對於機器的控制。

If the machines are permitted to make all their own decisions, we can't make any conjectures as to the results, because it is impossible to guess how such machines might behave. We only point out that the fate of the human race would be at the mercy of the machines. It might be argued that the human race would never be foolish enough to hand over all the power to the machines. But we are suggesting neither that the human race would voluntarily turn power over to the machines nor that the machines would willfully seize power. What we do suggest is that the human race might easily permit itself to drift into a position of such dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of the machines decisions. As society and the problems that face it become more and more complex and machines become more and more intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decision for them, simply because machine-made decisions will bring better result than man-made ones. Eventually a stage may be reached at which the decisions necessary to keep the system running will be so complex that human beings will be incapable of making them intelligently. At that stage the machines will be in effective control. People won't be able to just turn the machines off, because they will be so dependent on them that turning them off would amount to suicide.

173
如果我們允許機器自己做出所有的決策，就無法對其結果進行揣度，因為不可能猜測此類機器的行為。我們只想指出，人類的命運那時就全憑機器發落了。人們也許會反駁，人類決不會愚蠢到把全部權力都交給機器。但我們既不是說人類會有意將權力交給機器，也不是說機器會存心奪權。我們實際上說的是，人類可能會輕易地讓自己滑落到一個完全依賴機器的位置，滑落到不能做出任何實際選擇，只能接受機器的所有決策的地步。隨著社會及其面臨的問題變得越來越複雜，而機器變得越來越聰明，人們會讓機器替他們做更多的決策。僅僅是因為機器做出的決策會比人的決策帶來更好的結果。最後，第二階段將會來臨，在這個階段，維持體系運行所必需的決策已變得如此之複雜。以至於人類已無能力明智地進行決策。在這一階段，機器實質上已處於控制地位。人們已不能把機器關上，因為他們已如此地依賴於機器，關上它們就等於是自殺。

On the other hand it is possible that human control over the machines may be retained. In that case the average man may have control over certain private machines of his own, such as his car of his personal computer, but control over large systems of machines will be in the hands of a tiny elite -- just as it is today, but with two difference. Due to improved techniques the elite will have greater control over the masses; and because human work will no longer be necessary the masses will be superfluous, a useless burden on the system. If the elite is ruthless the may simply decide to exterminate the mass of humanity. If they are humane they may use propaganda or other psychological or biological techniques to reduce the birth rate until the mass of humanity becomes extinct, leaving the world to the elite. Or, if the elite consist of soft-hearted liberals, they may decide to play the role of good shepherds to the rest of the human race. They will see to it that everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are raised under psychologically hygienic conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy, and that anyone who may become dissatisfied undergoes "treatment" to cure his "problem." Of course, life will be so purposeless that people will have to be biologically or psychologically engineered either to remove their need for the power process or to make them "sublimate" their drive for power into some harmless hobby. These engineered human beings may be happy in such a society, but they most certainly will not be free. They will have been reduced to the status of domestic animals.

174
另一方面，也可能人類還能保持對機器的控制。在這種情況下，一般人也許可以控制他自己的私人機器，如他自己的汽車或私人計算機，但對於大型機器系統的控制權將落入一小群精英之手——就像今天一樣，但有兩點不同。由於技術的改進，精英對於大眾的控制能力將會極大提高，因為人不再必需工作，大眾就成為了多餘的人，成為了體系的無用負擔。如果精英集團失去了憐憫心，他們完全可以決定滅絕人類大眾。如果他們有些人情味，他們也可以使用宣傳或其他心理學或生物學技術降低出生率，直至人類大眾自行消亡，讓這個世界由精英們獨佔。或者，如果精英集團是由軟心腸的自由派人士組成的，他們也可以為剩餘的人類種族扮演好牧人的角色。他們將注意保證每個人的生理需求都得到滿足，每一個孩子都在心理十分健康的條件下被撫養成人，每一個人都有一項有益於健康的癖好來打發日子，每一個可能會變得不滿的人都會接受治療以治癒其“疾病”。當然，生活是如此沒有目的，以致於人們都不得不經過生物學的或心理學的重新設計改造，以去除他們對於權力過程的需求，或使他們的權力慾“昇華”為無害的癖好。這些經過改造的人們也許能在這樣一個社會中生活得平和愉快，但他們決不會自由。他們將被貶低到家畜的地位。

But suppose now that the computer scientists do not succeed in developing artificial intelligence, so that human work remains necessary. Even so, machines will take care of more and more of the simpler tasks so that there will be an increasing surplus of human workers at the lower levels of ability. (We see this happening already. There are many people who find it difficult or impossible to get work, because for intellectual or psychological reasons they cannot acquire the level of training necessary to make themselves useful in the present system.) On those who are employed, ever-increasing demands will be placed; They will need more and m ore training, more and more ability, and will have to be ever more reliable, conforming and docile, because they will be more and more like cells of a giant organism. Their tasks will be increasingly specialized so that their work will be, in a sense, out of touch with the real world, being concentrated on one tiny slice of reality. The system will have to use any means that I can, whether psychological or biological, to engineer people to be docile, to have the abilities that the system requires and to "sublimate" their drive for power into some specialized task. But the statement that the people of such a society will have to be docile may require qualification. The society may find competitiveness useful, provided that ways are found of directing competitiveness into channels that serve that needs of the system. We can imagine into channels that serve the needs of the system. We can imagine a future society in which there is endless competition for positions of prestige an power. But no more than a very few people will ever reach the top, where the only real power is (see end of paragraph 163). Very repellent is a society in which a person can satisfy his needs for power only by pushing large numbers of other people out of the way and depriving them of THEIR opportunity for power.

175
再假設計算機科學家們沒有能夠在開發人工智能方面取得成功，因此人的工作還是必要的。即使如此，機器也將承擔越來越多的簡單工作，而低能力的工人將越來越過剩（正如我們所見，這種事已經發生了。許多人很難或根本找不到工作，因為他們由於智力或心理原因而不能達到在現今體系內有用就必須達到的訓練水平）對於那些找到工作的人，要求會越來越高。他們將需要越來越多的訓練，越來越強的能力，他們將不得不越來越可靠、越來越規矩、越來越馴順，因為他們將越來越像巨型有機體的細胞。他們的任務將越來越專門化，囚而他們的工作在某種意義上也將越來越脫離真實世界，僅集中於現實的一塊小碎片。體系將使用一切可以使用的心理學或生物學手段來設計製造人類，使之馴順，使之具有體系要求的能力，使之將權力慾“昇華”為某些專門化的任務。但是這樣一個社會的人民將不得不馴順。這一陳述是有條件的。如果可以找到某種方法，能將競爭性導向服務於體系需求的軌道，那麼社會也許會發現競爭性是有用的。我們可以想像這徉一個未來社會，生活於其間的人沒完沒了地為了聲望和權力而競爭，但是只有少數人能夠爬上獨佔真正權力的頂點（參見163段末尾）。這是一個極其令人反胃的世界，因為在這個世界當中，一個人滿足權力需求的唯一方式就是將眾多他人排擠到一邊並剝奪他們滿足權力需求的機會。

Once can envision scenarios that incorporate aspects of more than one of the possibilities that we have just discussed. For instance, it may be that machines will take over most of the work that is of real, practical importance, but that human beings will be kept busy by being given relatively unimportant work. It has been suggested, for example, that a great development of the service of industries might provide work for human beings. Thus people will would spend their time shinning each others shoes, driving each other around inn taxicab, making handicrafts for one another, waiting on each other's tables, etc. This seems to us a thoroughly contemptible way for the human race to end up, and we doubt that many people would find fulfilling lives in such pointless busy-work. They would seek other, dangerous outlets (drugs, , crime, "cults," hate groups) unless they were biological or psychologically engineered to adapt them to such a way of life.

176
我們還可以想像某種把若干個上述可能性結合起來的場景。例如，機器可能接管大部分具有真正重要性的工作，但人類則仍舊還能在相對不那麼重要的工作上面忙活。例如有人建議，大力發展服務業可以給人類提供工作機會。這樣人們就可以把時間花在互相擦皮鞋上面，可以用出租車帶著彼此到處瞎轉，互相為對方做手工藝品，互相給對方端盤子，等等。人類如果最終以這樣的方式結局，那對於我們來說也實在是太可憐了，而且我們懷疑有多少人會覺得這樣的無意義的忙碌等同於充實的生活。他們會去尋找危險的其他渲洩途徑（毒品、犯罪、邪教、仇恨群體等），除非他們經過生物學或心理學的設計改造後適應了這種生活方式。

Needless to day, the scenarios outlined above do not exhaust all the possibilities. They only indicate the kinds of outcomes that seem to us mots likely. But wee can envision no plausible scenarios that are any more palatable that the ones we've just described. It is overwhelmingly probable that if the industrial-technological system survives the next 40 to 100 years, it will by that time have developed certain general characteristics: Individuals (at least those of the "bourgeois" type, who are integrated into the system and make it run, and who therefore have all the power) will be more dependent than ever on large organizations; they will be more "socialized" that ever and their physical and mental qualities to a significant extent (possibly to a very great extent ) will be those that are engineered into them rather than being the results of chance (or of God's will, or whatever); and whatever may be left of wild nature will be reduced to remnants preserved for scientific study and kept under the supervision and management of scientists (hence it will no longer be truly wild). In the long run (say a few centuries from now) it is it is likely that neither the human race nor any other important organisms will exist as we know them today, because once you start modifying organisms through genetic engineering there is no reason to stop at any particular point, so that the modifications will probably continue until man and other organisms have been utterly transformed.

177
不用說，上述場景尚未窮盡所有可能性。它們只是表明了我們看來似乎最可能的結局。然而，我們無法想像比上述情況更好而又似乎可能的場景。極其可能的情況是，如果工業技術體系能夠度過未來40-100年而倖存下來，那時它將會發展出某些一般特徵：個人（至少是那些“小資產階級”類型的人，他們被整合進體系並維持其運轉，因而也掌握了全部權力）空前地依賴大型組織，空前地“社會化”，他們的身心品質在相當程度上（很可能是極大程度上）是設計改造的結果，而不是機緣（或上帝意志，或其他什麼）的結果；野生自然所能留下的部分只是為了科學研究而保留的一些殘餘，這些殘餘將由科學家監視與管理（因而也算不上真正野生）。從長遠看（比如幾個世紀以後），無論是人類，還是任何其他重要的有機體，都不會像我們今天所知道的那樣存在下去，因為只要你一開始通過遺傳工程改造有機體，就沒有理由在某一個特定點上停下來，因此改造多半會繼下去去，直至人類和其他有機體徹底改觀。

Whatever else may be the case, it is certain that technology is creating for human begins a new physical and social environment radically different from the spectrum of environments to which natural selection has adapted the human race physically and psychological. If man is not adjust to this new environment by being artificially re-engineered, then he will be adapted to it through a long an painful process of natural selection. The former is far more likely that the latter.

178
無論還有另外什麼情況，有一點是肯定的：技術給人類創造了一個新的物質和社會環境。這個環境與人類通過自然選擇而在生理上和心理上適應了的所有各類環境都極為不同。如果人類不能通過人為的重新設計改造而適應這一新環境，那麼就得通過自然選擇的痛苦過程去適應它，前者的可能性要比後者大得多

It would be better to dump the whole stinking system and take the consequences.

179
更好的辦法是把這個腐朽的體系整個扔進垃圾堆，並勇敢地承受其後果。

STRATEGY
策略

The technophiles are taking us all on an utterly reckless ride into the unknown. Many people understand something of what technological progress is doing to us yet take a passive attitude toward it because they think it is inevitable. But we (FC) don't think it is inevitable. We think it can be stopped, and we will give here some indications of how to go about stopping it.

180
技術愛好者們把我們所有的人都綁上了一輛筆直衝向未知世界的戰車。許多人已經開始理解了技術進步給我們帶來的究竟是什麼，但仍然採取消極態度，囚為他們認為這是無法改變的。但是，我們（FC）認為這是可以改變的。我們認為可以制止它，而且在這裡我們將提出如何著手制止它的辦法。

As we stated in paragraph 166, the two main tasks for the present are to promote social stress and instability in industrial society and to develop and propagate an ideology that opposes technology and the industrial system. When the system becomes sufficiently stressed and unstable, a revolution against technology may be possible. The pattern would be similar to that of the French and Russian Revolutions. French society and Russian society, for several decades prior to their respective revolutions, showed increasing signs of stress and weakness. Meanwhile, ideologies were being developed that offered a new world view that was quite different from the old one. In the Russian case, revolutionaries were actively working to undermine the old order. Then, when the old system was put under sufficient additional stress (by financial crisis in France, by military defeat in Russia) it was swept away by revolution. What we propose in something along the same lines.

181
正如我們在第166段宣稱的那樣，現在的兩個主要任務是在工業社會中促進社會緊張與不穩定，以及宣傳一種反對技術和工業體系的意識形態。當體系變得足夠緊張和不穩定時，一場反對技術的革命就有機會發動了。這一模式將十分類似於法國和俄國革命。在兩國各自革命之前的幾十年裡，法國和俄國社會都顯示出了越來越多的緊張與脆弱跡象。同時，提供一個與舊世界完全不同的新世界願景的意識形態發展了起來。以俄國的情況為例，革命者積極從事於破壞舊秩序的工作。然後當舊體系面臨著足夠的額外緊張時（法國是財政危機，俄國是軍事失敗），它就會被革命一掃而光。我們預想的就是這樣的道路。

It will be objected that the French and Russian Revolutions were failures. But most revolutions have two goals. One is to destroy an old form of society and the other is to set up the new form of society envisioned by the revolutionaries. The French and Russian revolutionaries failed (fortunately!) to create the new kind of society of which they dreamed, but they were quite successful in destroying the existing form of society.

182
大多數革命都有兩個,目標，一個目標是摧毀一個舊社會，另一個目標是建立革命者想像的新社會。法國和俄國的革命者沒有能夠成功地建立他們所夢想的新社會（這是十分幸運的事），但她們非常成功地摧毀了既存社會。

But an ideology, in order to gain enthusiastic support, must have a positive ideals well as a negative one; it must be FOR something as well as AGAINST something. The positive ideal that we propose is Nature. That is , WILD nature; those aspects of the functioning of the Earth and its living things that are independent of human management and free of human interference and control. And with wild nature we include human nature, by which we mean those aspects of the functioning of the human individual that are not subject to regulation by organized society but are products of chance, or free will, or God (depending on your religious or philosophical opinions).

183
然而，一種意識形態如想爭取到熱情支持，除了負面理想外必須還有正面理想，決不能只破不立。我們的正面理想是自然，即野生自然，按照其本來面目運行的地球，不依賴於人類管理、擺脫人類干涉和控制的地球生靈。我們的野生自然也包括人類本性，即不受有組織社會管制、自主運行的個人，成為偶然性或自由意志或上帝（由你的宗教或哲學觀念）的產物。

Nature makes a perfect counter-ideal to technology for several reasons. Nature (that which is outside the power of the system) is the opposite of technology (which seeks to expand indefinitely the power of the system). Most people will agree that nature is beautiful; certainly it has tremendous popular appeal. The radical environmentalists ALREADY hold an ideology that exalts nature and opposes technology. [30] It is not necessary for the sake of nature to set up some chimerical utopia or any new kind of social order. Nature takes care of itself: It was a spontaneous creation that existed long before any human society, and for countless centuries many different kinds of human societies coexisted with nature without doing it an excessive amount of damage. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the effect of human society on nature become really devastating. To relieve the pressure on nature it is not necessary to create a special kind of social system, it is only necessary to get rid of industrial society. Granted, this will not solve all problems. Industrial society has already done tremendous damage to nature and it will take a very long time for the scars to heal. Besides, even pre-industrial societies can do significant damage to nature. Nevertheless, getting rid of industrial society will accomplish a great deal. It will relieve the worst of the pressure on nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the capacity of organized society to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature). Whatever kind of society may exist after the demise of the industrial system, it is certain that most people will live close to nature, because in the absence of advanced technology there is not other way that people CAN live. To feed themselves they must be peasants or herdsmen or fishermen or hunter, etc., And, generally speaking, local autonomy should tend to increase, because lack of advanced technology and rapid communications will limit the capacity of governments or other large organizations to control local communities.

184
出於以下原因，自然成為了與技術抗衡的完美理想。自然處於體系權力之外，是技術（它謀求無限地擴張體系權力）的對立面。大多數人都會認為自然是美的，而美確實對公眾有著巨大的感召力。激進的環境主義者們已經秉承了頌揚自然、反對技術的意識形態。[30] 根本不需要為了自然而建立某種空想的烏托邦或任何社會新秩序自然能夠自己照料自己：它是自發的創造物，在有任何人類社會之前很久就存在了，而且許多不同類型的人類社會與自然共存了無數世紀卻沒有對它造成大的損害。只是工業革命之後，人類社會對於自然的影響才真正變得具有破壞性緩解對自然的壓力是不用著創建一個新社會體系的，只要擺脫工業化社會就足夠了。當然這不能解決所有問題。工業化社會已經對自然造成極大的破壞，醫治創傷需要一個漫長的時期。另外，甚至前工業社會也能對自然造成相當的破壞。儘管如此，擺脫工業社會也能大有建樹。它會緩解對自然的最嚴酷的壓力，使創傷能開始癒合。它將剝奪有組織的社會對自然(包括人類自然)的控制能力。工業體系死亡之後，無論出現什麼徉的社會，有一點是肯定的:它的人民將更貼近自然，因為沒有了先進技術，這成了人們唯一能採取的生活方式。為了吃飽，他們必須是農民、牧民、漁民或獵人，等等。而且，一般說來，地方自洽會增加，因為沒有了先進技術和快速通迅，政府或其他大型組織控制地方社區的能力將十分有限

[30]. (Paragraph 184) A further advantage of nature as a counter-ideal to technology is that, in many people, nature inspires the kind of reverence that is associated with religion, so that nature could perhaps be idealized on a religious basis. It is true that in many societies religion has served as a support and justification for the established order, but it is also true that religion has often provided a basis for rebellion. Thus it may be useful to introduce a religious element into the rebellion against technology, the more so because Western society today has no strong religious foundation.
[30]（第184段）將自然作為與技術抗衡的理想的另一個優點是，在許多人心目中自然都會喚起某種和宗教相類似的神聖情感。因此自然多半可以在宗教的基礎上加以理想化。確實，在很多社會中，宗教都支持既存狀序並將其正當化，但宗教同樣也經常提供反叛的基礎。因此，把宗教成份導入反對技術的革命也是有用的，特別是因為今天的西方社會沒有很強的宗教基礎。

Religion, nowadays either is used as cheap and transparent support for narrow, short-sighted selfishness (some conservatives use it this way), or even is cynically exploited to make easy money (by many evangelists), or has degenerated into crude irrationalism (fundamentalist Protestant sects, "cults"), or is simply stagnant (Catholicism, main-line Protestantism). The nearest thing to a strong, widespread, dynamic religion that the West has seen in recent times has been the quasi-religion of leftism, but leftism today is fragmented and has no clear, unified inspiring goal.
今天的宗教，或者被人拿來廉價且顯眼地支持狹隘短視的私利（一些保守派就是這樣利用它的），或者甚至被人百無禁忌的拿來賺錢（許多福音派傳道人就是這麼做的），或者墮落成了粗陋的非理性主義（許多原教旨新教教派以及邪教就是這麼做的），或者乾脆陷入了停滯（天主教與主流新教）。近年來西方世界當中最接近於強大、傳播廣泛且富於活力的宗教的事物就是左派准宗教，但左派今天陷入了分裂，而且沒有清晰統一、鼓舞人心的目標。

Thus there is a religious vaccuum in our society that could perhaps be filled by a religion focused on nature in opposition to technology. But it would be a mistake to try to concoct artificially a religion to fill this role. Such an invented religion would probably be a failure. Take the "Gaia" religion for example. Do its adherents REALLY believe in it or are they just play-acting? If they are just play-acting their religion will be a flop in the end.
因此，在我們的社會中出現了宗教真空，它多半可以由一個注重自然、反對技術的宗教填補。但是試圖人為地拼揍出一門宗教來承擔這一角色將是一個錯誤。人為創造的宗教多半會失敗。比方說“蓋亞”（Gaia）教，它的信徒是真信仰它還是僅僅在裝腔作勢呢？如果他們只是在裝腔作勢，那麼他們的宗教最終會砸鍋。

It is probably best not to try to introduce religion into the conflict of nature vs. technology unless you REALLY believe in that religion yourself and find that it arouses a deep, strong, genuine response in many other people.
最好不要把宗教引入自然與技術的衝突，除非你自己真正相信這門宗教，並發現它能在許多人心中激發出內心深處強烈且真實的共鳴

As for the negative consequences of eliminating industrial society -- well, you can't eat your cake and have it too. To gain one thing you have to sacrifice another.

185
至於把工業社會消滅掉會隨之引發的負效應——怎麼說呢，你不可能一邊吃掉蛋糕一邊還想在手上把著它不放——有得必有失。

Most people hate psychological conflict. For this reason they avoid doing any serious thinking about difficult social issues, and they like to have such issues presented to them in simple, black-and-white terms: THIS is all good and THAT is all bad. The revolutionary ideology should therefore be developed on two levels.

186
大多數人不喜歡心理衝突。由於這個原因，他們避免對困難的社會問題做任何嚴肅思考，他們喜歡看到這些問題以簡單且非黑即白的方式擺在他們面前：這完全是好的而那完全是壞的。革命的意識形態因而必須在兩個層次上展開。

On the more sophisticated level the ideology should address itself to people who are intelligent, thoughtful and rational. The object should be to create a core of people who will be opposed to the industrial system on a rational, thought-out basis, with full appreciation of the problems and ambiguities involved, and of the price that has to be paid for getting rid of the system. It is particularly important to attract people of this type, as they are capable people and will be instrumental in influencing others. These people should be addressed on as rational a level as possible. Facts should never intentionally be distorted and intemperate language should be avoided. This does not mean that no appeal can be made to the emotions, but in making such appeal care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting the truth or doing anything else that would destroy the intellectual respectability of the ideology.

187
在高層次上，意識形態必須針對高智力、有思想且理性的人們。目標是要建立一個核心，由基於理性與縝密考慮的工業體系反對者組成，這些人完全瞭解問題及其兩面性，瞭解擺脫工業社會所必須付出的代價。吸引這種類型的人尤為重要，因為他們能起到影響他人的作用。對於這些人要儘量在理性的層次上做工作。不應故意歪曲事實，也不應使用過激的語言。這並不是說不能訴諸情感，而是說在這樣做時必須注意避免歪曲真相，避免以任何方式毀掉意識形態在理智方面的體面。

On a second level, the ideology should be propagated in a simplified form that will enable the unthinking majority to see the conflict of technology vs. nature in unambiguous terms. But even on this second level the ideology should not be expressed in language that is so cheap, intemperate or irrational that it alienates people of the thoughtful and rational type. Cheap, intemperate propaganda sometimes achieves impressive short-term gains, but it will be more advantageous in the long run to keep the loyalty of a small number of intelligently committed people than to arouse the passions of an unthinking, fickle mob who will change their attitude as soon as someone comes along with a better propaganda gimmick. However, propaganda of the rabble-rousing type may be necessary when the system is nearing the point of collapse and there is a final struggle between rival ideologies to determine which will become dominant when the old world-view goes under.

188
在第二個層次上，應當以簡化的形式宣傳我們的意識形態。這種方式將能夠使不事思考的大多數人以沒有歧義的方式看到技術與自然的衝突。但即使在這個層次上，也不應以廉價過激或非理性的語言表達意識形態，因為這會疏遠那些有思想和理性的人。廉價過激的宣傳有時會獲得令人印象深刻的短期效果，但從長遠看。保持少數出於理智而獻身的人們的忠誠。比激發一群沒有頭腦、變幻無常的烏合之眾的熱情更有價值。後者只要有個什麼人搞出點更好的宣傳花招馬上就會改變態度。然而當體系已瀕臨崩潰之際，當決定哪種意識形態將在舊世界觀破產之後佔據主導地位的最後時刻來臨時，糾台烏合之眾的宣傳也可能是必要的。

Prior to that final struggle, the revolutionaries should not expect to have a majority of people on their side. History is made by active, determined minorities, not by the majority, which seldom has a clear and consistent idea of what it really wants. Until the time comes for the final push toward revolution [31], the task of revolutionaries will be less to win the shallow support of the majority than to build a small core of deeply committed people. As for the majority, it will be enough to make them aware of the existence of the new ideology and remind them of it frequently; though of course it will be desirable to get majority support to the extent that this can be done without weakening the core of seriously committed people.

189
在最後的鬥爭到來之前，革命者不應指望多數人站在他們一邊。歷史是由積極堅定的少數人創造的，而不是由多數人決定的，多數人對他們的真正需要很少能有一個清晰一貫的想法。直到即將發動革命的前夕[31]，革命者的主要任務都不是贏得大多數人的泛泛支持，而是建立一個由甘願獻身的人們組成的小核心。至於多數人，只要讓他們知道新的意識形態的存在並時時提醒他們就夠了。當然，如果能掌握好分寸，既爭取到多數人的支持又不傷害到認真投身的核心層，那自然再好不過。

[31]. (Paragraph 189) Assuming that such a final push occurs. Conceivably the industrial system might be eliminated in a somewhat gradual or piecemeal fashion. (see paragraphs 4, 167 and Note 4).
[31]（第189段）這裡假設確實會有這樣的一個最後時刻。同樣可以想見的是，工業體系也可能以零敲碎打的漸進方式遭到消滅。

Any kind of social conflict helps to destabilize the system, but one should be careful about what kind of conflict one encourages. The line of conflict should be drawn between the mass of the people and the power-holding elite of industrial society (politicians, scientists, upper-level business executives, government officials, etc..). It should NOT be drawn between the revolutionaries and the mass of the people. For example, it would be bad strategy for the revolutionaries to condemn Americans for their habits of consumption. Instead, the average American should be portrayed as a victim of the advertising and marketing industry, which has suckered him into buying a lot of junk that he doesn't need and that is very poor compensation for his lost freedom. Either approach is consistent with the facts. It is merely a matter of attitude whether you blame the advertising industry for manipulating the public or blame the public for allowing itself to be manipulated. As a matter of strategy one should generally avoid blaming the public.

190
任何社會衝突都有助於導致體制不穩定，但我們必須小心謹慎，不能隨便鼓勵什麼衝突。衝突線必須劃在大眾與工業社會的權力精英（政客、科學家、公司上層管理人員、政府官員，等等）之間，而不應劃在革命者與大眾之間。例如對於革命者來說，譴責美國人的消費習慣是很壞的戰略。相反，一般美國人應當被描繪成廣告和營銷業的受害者，是廣告和者銷業欺騙他去購買大堆他並不需要的破爛，而相對於他所付出的自由代價來說，這是極其可憐的報償。兩種方式都符合事實。不同之處只是態度：你是歸咎於廣告業操縱大眾，還是歸咎於大眾允許自已遭到操縱。作為戰略，我們要避免責備大眾。

One should think twice before encouraging any other social conflict than that between the power-holding elite (which wields technology) and the general public (over which technology exerts its power). For one thing, other conflicts tend to distract attention from the important conflicts (between power-elite and ordinary people, between technology and nature); for another thing, other conflicts may actually tend to encourage technologization, because each side in such a conflict wants to use technological power to gain advantages over its adversary. This is clearly seen in rivalries between nations. It also appears in ethnic conflicts within nations. For example, in America many black leaders are anxious to gain power for African Americans by placing back individuals in the technological power-elite. They want there to be many black government officials, scientists, corporation executives and so forth. In this way they are helping to absorb the African American subculture into the technological system. Generally speaking, one should encourage only those social conflicts that can be fitted into the framework of the conflicts of power--elite vs. ordinary people, technology vs nature.

191
除了權力精英（他們掌握技術）與一般大眾（他們是技術施加淫威的對象）之間的衝突之外，革命者在鼓勵任何其他衝突的時候都必須三思而後行。首先，其他衝突會轉移鬥爭大方向（權力精英與普通人民之間的鬥爭，技術與自然之間的鬥爭），其次，其他衝突可能會鼓勵技術化，因為在這種衝突中，雙方都想利用技術壓倒對手。這一點在國家的敵對之中有著清楚的體現，在國內民族衝突中也可以看到。例如在美國，許多黑人領導人急切希望讓黑人擠入技術權力精英層來為非洲裔美國人爭取權利。他們希望能夠出現很多黑人政府官員、黑人科學家、黑人公司主管，等等。照這種方式，他們其實是在幫助技術體系同化吸收非洲裔美國人的亞文化。一般地說，我們應該只支持那些符合權力精英對普通人民、技術對自然這一框架的衝突。

But the way to discourage ethnic conflict is NOT through militant advocacy of minority rights (see paragraphs 21, 29). Instead, the revolutionaries should emphasize that although minorities do suffer more or less disadvantage, this disadvantage is of peripheral significance. Our real enemy is the industrial-technological system, and in the struggle against the system, ethnic distinctions are of no importance.

192
但是阻止民族衝突的方法不是激進地主張少數民族的權利（參見21，29段）。相反，革命者應該強調指出，雖然少數民族確實或多或少地處於不利地位，但這種不利地位是無關緊要的。我們的真正敵人是工業—技術體系，而在反對這一體系的鬥爭中，民族的區別並不重要.

The kind of revolution we have in mind will not necessarily involve an armed uprising against any government. It may or may not involve physical violence, but it will not be a POLITICAL revolution. Its focus will be on technology and economics, not politics. [32]

193
我們想像的這種革命並不一定非要牽涉一場反對任何政府的武裝起義。它可能牽涉也可能不牽涉到暴力，但它將不是一場政治革命。它的焦點是技術和經濟，不是政治。[32]

[32]. (Paragraph 193) It is even conceivable (remotely) that the revolution might consist only of a massive change of attitudes toward technology resulting in a relatively gradual and painless disintegration of the industrial system. But if this happens we'll be very lucky. It's far more probably that the transition to a nontechnological society will be very difficult and full of conflicts and disasters.
[32]（第193段）我們甚至可以（遠期）想像，革命僅僅由對於技術的態度發生的巨大轉變構成，從而導致工業體系相對漸進且無痛苦的解體。但如果真是這樣我們可謂非常幸運。更為可能的情況是向非技術社會的過渡將會十分痛苦，充滿了衝突和災難。

Probably the revolutionaries should even AVOID assuming political power, whether by legal or illegal means, until the industrial system is stressed to the danger point and has proved itself to be a failure in the eyes of most people. Suppose for example that some "green" party should win control of the United States Congress in an election. In order to avoid betraying or watering down their own ideology they would have to take vigorous measures to turn economic growth into economic shrinkage. To the average man the results would appear disastrous: There would be massive unemployment, shortages of commodities, etc. Even if the grosser ill effects could be avoided through superhumanly skillful management, still people would have to begin giving up the luxuries to which they have become addicted. Dissatisfaction would grow, the "green" party would be voted out of of fice and the revolutionaries would have suffered a severe setback. For this reason the revolutionaries should not try to acquire political power until the system has gotten itself into such a mess that any hardships will be seen as resulting from the failures of the industrial system itself and not from the policies of the revolutionaries. The revolution against technology will probably have to be a revolution by outsiders, a revolution from below and not from above.

194
很可能革命者甚至應當迴避承擔政治權力，無論是合法的還是不合法的，直到工業體系被壓迫到了危險點，並在大多數人民眼中證實了自己的失敗。例如，設想某個綠黨在選舉中贏得了對於美國國會的控制。為了避免背叛自己的意識形態或將其打折扣，他們就必須採取強有力措施將經濟增長轉變為經濟縮減。在一般人看來，其結果會是災難性的：大量失業，商品短缺，等等。即使能夠通過超人般的管理而避免更為惡劣的影響，人們還是要放棄他們已經上了癮的奢侈品。不滿會增長，綠黨會在選舉中失敗，而革命者會遭受一次嚴重的挫折。由於這個原因，革命者不應試圖去獲取政治權力，直至體制陷入嚴重的困境，直至人們把任何困難都看作是工業體系自身的失敗而不是革命者政策的結果。反對技術的革命多半會是一場由外人發動的革命，一場自下而上的革命。

The revolution must be international and worldwide. It cannot be carried out on a nation-by-nation basis. Whenever it is suggested that the United States, for example, should cut back on technological progress or economic growth, people get hysterical and start screaming that if we fall behind in technology the Japanese will get ahead of us. Holy robots The world will fly off its orbit if the Japanese ever sell more cars than we do! (Nationalism is a great promoter of technology.) More reasonably, it is argued that if the relatively democratic nations of the world fall behind in technology while nasty, dictatorial nations like China, Vietnam and North Korea continue to progress, eventually the dictators may come to dominate the world. That is why the industrial system should be attacked in all nations simultaneously, to the extent that this may be possible. True, there is no assurance that the industrial system can be destroyed at approximately the same time all over the world, and it is even conceivable that the attempt to overthrow the system could lead instead to the domination of the system by dictators. That is a risk that has to be taken. And it is worth taking, since the difference between a "democratic" industrial system and one controlled by dictators is small compared with the difference between an industrial system and a non-industrial one. [33] It might even be argued that an industrial system controlled by dictators would be preferable, because dictator-controlled systems usually have proved inefficient, hence they are presumably more likely to break down. Look at Cuba.

195
這場革命必須在國際與世界範圍內同步進行，不能一個國家一個國家地進行。無論什麼時候，如果有國家——例如美國——提出要減慢技術進步或經濟增長的速度，人們就會歇斯底里並開始大叫大嚷。如果我們在技術上落到日本後面，日本就會超過我們。機器人在上啊！要是日本賣汽車總是比我們多，這地球就會飛出軌道！（民族主義是技術的強大促進力量）更為理性的反對意見是，如果相對民主的國家在技術上落在了邪惡獨裁的國家如中國、越南和北朝鮮後面，那麼那些獨裁者最終將有可能主宰世界。這就是為什麼要儘可能同時在所有的國家對工業體系發動總攻擊。確實，我們無法確保幾乎同時摧毀世界範圍內的工業體系，甚至可以想像推翻體系的企圖反而會導致獨裁者主宰體系。但我們必須冒這個險。這個險也值得冒：比工業體系與非工業體系之間的差別來，“民主”的工業體系與獨裁的工業體系之間的差別是很小的。[33] 甚至可以認為，獨裁的工業體系更好，因為獨裁的工業體系往往沒有效率，因而也更容易崩潰。看看古巴就好了。

[33]. (Paragraph 195) The economic and technological structure of a society are far more important than its political structure in determining the way the average man lives (see paragraphs 95, 119 and Notes 16, 18).
[33]（第195段）一個社會的經濟與技術結構在決定一般人的生活方式方面遠比政治結構更加重要（見第95、119段以及附註16、18）

Revolutionaries might consider favoring measures that tend to bind the world economy into a unified whole. Free trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT are probably harmful to the environment in the short run, but in the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic interdependence between nations. I will be eaier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide basis if he world economy is so unified that its breakdown in any on major nation will lead to its breakdwon in all industrialized nations. In the long run they may perhaps be advantageous because they foster economic interdependence between nations. It will be easier to destroy the industrial system on a worldwide basis if the world economy is so unified that its breakdown in any one major nation will lead to its breakdown in all industrialized nations.

196
革命者也可以考慮支持促使世界經濟一體化的措施。自由貿易協定，如北美自由貿易區和關貿總協定，從短期看對環境有害，但從長期看也許是有利的。因為它們促進了國與國之間相互的經濟依賴。如果世界經濟一體化到了任何一個主要國家的經濟崩潰會導致所有工業化國家經濟崩潰的程度，那麼在全世界範圍內摧毀工業體系就變得容易了。

Some people take the line that modern man has too much power, too much control over nature; they argue for a more passive attitude on the part of the human race. At best these people are expressing themselves unclearly, because they fail to distinguish between power for LARGE ORGANIZATIONS and power for INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS. It is a mistake to argue for powerlessness and passivity, because people NEED power. Modern man as a collective entity--that is, the industrial system--has immense power over nature, and we (FC) regard this as evil. But modern INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS have far less power than primitive man ever did. Generally speaking, the vast power of "modern man" over nature is exercised not by individuals or small groups but by large organizations. To the extent that the average modern INDIVIDUAL can wield the power of technology, he is permitted to do so only within narrow limits and only under the supervision and control of the system. (You need a license for everything and with the license come rules and regulations). The individual has only those technological powers with which the system chooses to provide him. His PERSONAL power over nature is slight.

197
有些人認為現代人的權力過大，對自然控制過多，他們主張人類應採取更為消極一些的態度。往好裡說這些人並未清楚表明自己的意見，因為他們未能區分大型組織的權力與個人和小群體的權力。主張放權與消極是錯誤的，因為人們需要權力。現代人作為一個集合的實體——即工業體系——具有凌駕自然之上的巨大權力，而我們（FC）將此看作邪惡。但是，現代個人以及個人組成的小群體的權力比原始人小得多。一般說來，“現代人”在自然之上的巨大權力不是由個人或小群體行使的，而是由大組織行使的。即使一般現代個人能夠使用技術的力量，也要受到極大限制並且處在體系的監視和控制之下（幹什麼都得要許可證，而有證就有規章制度）。個人只能擁有體系選擇給他的技術力量。他個人在自然之上的權力是很小的。

Primitive INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS actually had considerable power over nature; or maybe it would be better to say power WITHIN nature. When primitive man needed food he knew how to find and prepare edible roots, how to track game and take it with homemade weapons. He knew how to protect himself from heat, cold, rain, dangerous animals, etc. But primitive man did relatively little damage to nature because the COLLECTIVE power of primitive society was negligible compared to the COLLECTIVE power of industrial society.

198
原始的個人和小群體實際上有著相當大的凌駕於自然之上的權力；或更為準確地說是擁有存在於自然之內的權力。當原始人需要食物時，他知道如何去尋找和調理可食用的根，知道如何跟蹤獵物並用自制的武器獵獲它。他知道如何保護自己不受熱、冷、雨、野獸等的侵害。但是原始人相對來說很少破壞自然，因為原始社會的集體權力與工業化社會的集體權力相比是微不足道的。

Instead of arguing for powerlessness and passivity, one should argue that the power of the INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM should be broken, and that this will greatly INCREASE the power and freedom of INDIVIDUALS and SMALL GROUPS.

199
我們不應主張無力或消極，我們應主張打破工業體系的權力，而這將大大增加個人和小群體的權力和自由。

Until the industrial system has been thoroughly wrecked, the destruction of that system must be the revolutionaries' ONLY goal. Other goals would distract attention and energy from the main goal. More importantly, if the revolutionaries permit themselves to have any other goal than the destruction of technology, they will be tempted to use technology as a tool for reaching that other goal. If they give in to that temptation, they will fall right back into the technological trap, because modern technology is a unified, tightly organized system, so that, in order to retain SOME technology, one finds oneself obliged to retain MOST technology, hence one ends up sacrificing only token amounts of technology.

200
在工業體系被徹底破壞之前，摧毀這一體系必須成為革命者的唯一目標。其他目標將會分散注意力和精力。更重要的的是，如果革命者允許自己既有摧毀技術之外的任何其他目標，他們就會受不住誘惑而把技術用作實現其他目標的工具。如果他們不能抵禦這種誘惑，就會正中下懷地落入技術的陷阱，因為現代技術是統一緊密地組織起來的系統，所以，要保留某些技術，就必須保留絕大部分技術，因而最後也就只能象徵性地犧牲掉一點技術。

Suppose for example that the revolutionaries took "social justice" as a goal. Human nature being what it is, social justice would not come about spontaneously; it would have to be enforced. In order to enforce it the revolutionaries would have to retain central organization and control. For that they would need rapid long-distance transportation and communication, and therefore all the technology needed to support the transportation and communication systems. To feed and clothe poor people they would have to use agricultural and manufacturing technology. And so forth. So that the attempt to insure social justice would force them to retain most parts of the technological system. Not that we have anything against social justice, but it must not be allowed to interfere with the effort to get rid of the technological system.

201
假設革命者將社會正義作為一個目標。人性就是人性。社會正義不會自發實現，必須強制執行。為了強制執行社會正義，革命者就不得不保留中央組織和控制。為此，他們又會需要快速長距離運輸與通訊，因而也需要所有支持運輸和通訊系統的技術。為了讓窮人吃飽穿暖，他就不得不使用農業和製造業技術，等等。因此。保障社會正義的企圖會迫使他們保留絕大部分技術。我們並不反對社會正義，我們只是認為不應允許它干擾我們推翻技術體系的努力。

It would be hopeless for revolutionaries to try to attack the system without using SOME modern technology. If nothing else they must use the communications media to spread their message. But they should use modern technology for only ONE purpose: to attack the technological system.

202
革命者要攻擊體系就必須使用某些技術，否則就沒有成功的希望，他們至少必須使用傳媒來傳播他們的思想。但他們應當只將現代技術用於一個目的，那就是攻擊技術體系

Imagine an alcoholic sitting with a barrel of wine in front of him. Suppose he starts saying to himself, "Wine isn't bad for you if used in moderation. Why, they say small amounts of wine are even good for you! It won't do me any harm if I take just one little drink..." Well you know what is going to happen. Never forget that the human race with technology is just like an alcoholic with a barrel of wine.

203
想像酒鬼坐在一桶酒前面。假設他開始對自己說：“喝酒只要不過量就沒有壞處。嘿，他們說稍喝一點甚至有好處。如果我只喝一小口，這決不會有什麼害處。”你當然知道接下來會發生什麼事。不要忘記人類和技術在一起恰恰就像酒鬼和一桶酒在一起

Revolutionaries should have as many children as they can. There is strong scientific evidence that social attitudes are to a significant extent inherited. No one suggests that a social attitude is a direct outcome of a person's genetic constitution, but it appears that personality traits tend, within the context of our society, to make a person more likely to hold this or that social attitude. Objections to these findings have been raised, but objections are feeble and seem to be ideologically motivated. In any event, no one denies that children tend on the average to hold social attitudes similar to those of their parents. From our point of view it doesn't matter all that much whether the attitudes are passed on genetically or through childhood training. In either case the ARE passed on.

204
革命者應儘量多生孩子。有相當切實可信的科學證據表明，對於社會的觀點在很大程度上會遺傳。這並不是說某種社會觀點是一個人的遺傳構造的直接結果，但在我們的社會背景下，似乎是人格特性決定了一個人更可能持有這種或那種社會觀點。對於這些發現的反對意見很多，但這些反對意見往往站不住腳，而且多半是出於意識形態的動機。不管怎樣，沒有人能夠否認，一般說來孩子持有的社會觀點與其父母類似。從我們的觀點看，究竟觀點是通過遺傳還是通過幼時訓練傳承關係其實並不大。反正它們是傳承的。

The trouble is that many of the people who are inclined to rebel against the industrial system are also concerned about the population problems, hence they are apt to have few or no children. In this way they may be handing the world over to the sort of people who support or at least accept the industrial system. To insure the strength of the next generation of revolutionaries the present generation must reproduce itself abundantly. In doing so they will be worsening the population problem only slightly. And the most important problem is to get rid of the industrial system, because once the industrial system is gone the world's population necessarily will decrease (see paragraph 167); whereas, if the industrial system survives, it will continue developing new techniques of food production that may enable the world's population to keep increasing almost indefinitely.

205
問題在於許多贊同反叛工業體系的人們也十分擔憂人口問題，因此他們往往只要數量很少的孩子或不要孩子。這樣他們就把世界拱手讓給了那些支持或至少是接受工業體系的人們。為了確保下一代革命者的力量，這一代革命者必須大量繁殖後代。他們這樣做也許會稍稍加重人口問題。然而最重要的是推翻工業體系，因為一旦工業體系沒有了，世界人口必然會減少（參見167段）。而如果工業體系倖存下來，它就會繼續發展糧食生產技術，使世界人口幾乎是無限地增長下去

With regard to revolutionary strategy, the only points on which we absolutely insist are that the single overriding goal must be the elimination of modern technology, and that no other goal can be allowed to compete with this one. For the rest, revolutionaries should take an empirical approach. If experience indicates that some of the recommendations made in the foregoing paragraphs are not going to give good results, then those recommendations should be discarded.

206
關於革命的戰略，我們絕對堅持一點：壓倒一切的首要目標是消滅現代技術，任何其他目標都不允許與這個目標競爭。至於其他方面，革命者可以依據經驗決定採取具體方法。如果經驗表明，某些我們在前面段落推薦的方法效果不佳，那麼這些方法就應被棄置一旁。

TWO KINDS OF TECHNOLOGY
兩種技術

An argument likely to be raised against our proposed revolution is that it is bound to fail, because (it is claimed) throughout history technology has always progressed, never regressed, hence technological regression is impossible. But this claim is false.

207
有一個反對我們所設想的革命的理由是它必定會失敗，因為（據稱）貫穿整個歷史，技術都是進步的，從未退步過，因此技術退步是不可能的。但這並非事實。

We distinguish between two kinds of technology, which we will call small-scale technology and organization-dependent technology. Small-scale technology is technology that can be used by small-scale communities without outside assistance. Organization-dependent technology is technology that depends on large-scale social organization. We are aware of no significant cases of regression in small-scale technology. But organization-dependent technology DOES regress when the social organization on which it depends breaks down. Example: When the Roman Empire fell apart the Romans' small-scale technology survived because any clever village craftsman could build, for instance, a water wheel, any skilled smith could make steel by Roman methods, and so forth. But the Romans' organization-dependent technology DID regress. Their aqueducts fell into disrepair and were never rebuilt. Their techniques of road construction were lost. The Roman system of urban sanitation was forgotten, so that until rather recent times did the sanitation of European cities that of Ancient Rome.

208
應該區別兩種技術，一種我們稱為小規模技術，另一種我們稱為組織依賴型技術。小規模技術是小社團無需外援就能運用的技術。組織依賴型技術是必須依賴大規模社會組織的技術。我們知道，就小規模技術而言，確實不存在明顯退步的事例。但是，組織依賴型技術當其所依賴的社會組織崩潰時確實會退步。例如，當羅馬帝國崩潰時，羅馬的小規模技術倖存了下來，因為任何一個心靈手巧的鄉村手藝人都能製造諸如水車之類的東西，任何一個技術熟練的鐵匠都能用羅馬的方法煉鋼，等等。但羅馬的組織依賴型技術確實退步了。他們的高架引水渠年久失修且再未重修過。他們的築路技術失傳了。羅馬的城市公共衛生系統被遺忘了，以至於直至相當近代，歐洲城市的公共衛生系統才達到了古代羅馬的水平。

The reason why technology has seemed always to progress is that, until perhaps a century or two before the Industrial Revolution, most technology was small-scale technology. But most of the technology developed since the Industrial Revolution is organization-dependent technology. Take the refrigerator for example. Without factory-made parts or the facilities of a post-industrial machine shop it would be virtually impossible for a handful of local craftsmen to build a refrigerator. If by some miracle they did succeed in building one it would be useless to them without a reliable source of electric power. So they would have to dam a stream and build a generator. Generators require large amounts of copper wire. Imagine trying to make that wire without modern machinery. And where would they get a gas suitable for refrigeration? It would be much easier to build an icehouse or preserve food by drying or picking, as was done before the invention of the refrigerator.

209
技術之所以看上去總在不斷進步是因為直至工業革命前一兩個世紀，大部分技術是小規模技術。但自工業革命以來發展的大部分技術卻是組織依賴型技術。以電冰箱為例。離開了工廠製造的零件和後工業時代機器車間的設備，單靠幾個本地手藝人是絕對不可能造出電冰箱的。即使奇蹟發生，他們真造出一個來，沒有可靠的電力供應，這個電冰箱對他們也沒什麼用。於是他們就得在河上築壩，並造一個發電機。發電機需要大量的銅線。能夠想像不用現代機械造出這些銅線嗎？而且他們到哪去找冷卻用氣體呢？建個冰窖要容易得多，也可以用乾燥或醃潰的方法來保存食物，電冰箱發明前，人們就是用這些方法。

So it is clear that if the industrial system were once thoroughly broken down, refrigeration technology would quickly be lost. The same is true of other organization-dependent technology. And once this technology had been lost for a generation or so it would take centuries to rebuild it, just as it took centuries to build it the first time around. Surviving technical books would be few and scattered. An industrial society, if built from scratch without outside help, can only be built in a series of stages: You need tools to make tools to make tools to make tools ... . A long process of economic development and progress in social organization is required. And, even in the absence of an ideology opposed to technology, there is no reason to believe that anyone would be interested in rebuilding industrial society. The enthusiasm for "progress" is a phenomenon particular to the modern form of society, and it seems not to have existed prior to the 17th century or thereabouts.

210
可見，假如工業體系徹底崩潰，冰箱技術就會很快失傳。其他組織依賴型技術也一樣。而只要這種技術失傳一代人，重新開發它就需要幾個世紀，就像第一次開發時需要幾個世紀一樣。殘留下來的技術書籍將稀少而四散。一個工業社會，如果要在沒有外力幫助的情況下從零開始建設，就必須經過許多個階段：你需要工具以製造工具以製造工具以製造工具…… 一個很長的經濟發展和社會組織進步的過程是不可少的，而且，即使沒有反對技術的意識形態，也沒有理由相信任何人會對重建工業化社會感興趣。對於“進步”的熱情是現代社會形態的特殊現象，在大約十七世紀之前並不存在。

In the late Middle Ages there were four main civilizations that were about equally "advanced": Europe, the Islamic world, India, and the Far East (China, Japan, Korea). Three of those civilizations remained more or less stable, and only Europe became dynamic. No one knows why Europe became dynamic at that time; historians have their theories but these are only speculation. At any rate, it is clear that rapid development toward a technological form of society occurs only under special conditions. So there is no reason to assume that long-lasting technological regression cannot be brought about.

211
在中世紀，有四大文明幾乎同樣“先進”：歐洲、伊斯蘭世界、印度和遠東（中國、日本、朝鮮）。其中三個多多少少保持了穩定，只有歐洲始終處於動態。沒有人知道為什麼歐洲處於動態，歷史學家們有他們的理論，但那僅僅是猜測。無論如何，走向技術社會形態的快速發展是特殊情況下才出現的現象。這一點是很明顯的。因此沒有理由相信持久的技術退步不會發生。

Would society EVENTUALLY develop again toward an industrial-technological form? Maybe, but there is no use in worrying about it, since we can't predict or control events 500 or 1,000 years in the future. Those problems must be dealt with by the people who will live at that time.

212
社會最終會不會再向工業-技術形態發展？也許，但擔心這一點毫無意義，因為我們無法預見也無法控制500或1000年後的事情。那些問題應由那個時代的人們去處理。

THE DANGER OF LEFTISM
左派的危險

Because of their need for rebellion and for membership in a movement, leftists or persons of similar psychological type are often unattracted to a rebellious or activist movement whose goals and membership are not initially leftist. The resulting influx of leftish types can easily turn a non-leftist movement into a leftist one, so that leftist goals replace or distort the original goals of the movement.

213
因為左派需要反叛與參加運動，他們以及類似心理類型的人往往為反叛或行動主義的運動所吸引，即使這些運動原本的目標和成員都不是左派。由此而產生的左派大量湧入會很容易就把一個非左派運動變成左派運動，因而左派的目標將會替代或歪曲該運動原來的目標

To avoid this, a movement that exalts nature and opposes technology must take a resolutely anti-leftist stance and must avoid all collaboration with leftists. Leftism is in the long run inconsistent with wild nature, with human freedom and with the elimination of modern technology. Leftism is collectivist; it seeks to bind together the entire world (both nature and the human race) into a unified whole. But this implies management of nature and of human life by organized society, and it requires advanced technology. You can't have a united world without rapid transportation and communication, you can't make all people love one another without sophisticated psychological techniques, you can't have a "planned society" without the necessary technological base. Above all, leftism is driven by the need for power, and the leftist seeks power on a collective basis, through identification with a mass movement or an organization. Leftism is unlikely ever to give up technology, because technology is too valuable a source of collective power.

214
為了避免這種事情，一個弘揚自然並反對技術的運動必須採取堅決的反對左派立場並避免與左派進行任何合作。左派從長遠看與野生自然、人類自由和消滅現代技術都是相悖的。左派是集體主義者，他們尋求將整個世界（包括自然和人類兩者）捆綁到一起，成為一個統一的整體。但這就意味著要由有組織的社會來管理自然和人的生活，而這就需要技術。離開了快速運輸和通迅，就不可能有統一的世界，離開了先進的心理學技術，就不可能讓所有的人都相親相愛；離開了必要的技術基礎，就不可能有“計畫的社會”。尤其是左派受權力慾所驅使，並且通過認同於一個群眾運動或一個組織以集體為基礎謀求權力，左派極不可能放棄技術，因為技術對於集體權力來說太寶貴了。

The anarchist [34] too seeks power, but he seeks it on an individual or small-group basis; he wants individuals and small groups to be able to control the circumstances of their own lives. He opposes technology because it makes small groups dependent on large organizations.

215
無政府主義者 [34] 也謀求權力，但那是以個人或小群體為基礎的；他要讓個人或小群體有能力控制他們自己的生活環境。他反對技術，因為技術使小群體依賴於大組織

[34]. (Paragraph 215) This statement refers to our particular brand of anarchism. A wide variety of social attitudes have been called "anarchist," and it may be that many who consider themselves anarchists would not accept our statement of paragraph 215. It should be noted, by the way, that there is a nonviolent anarchist movement whose members probably would not accept FC as anarchist and certainly would not approve of FC's violent methods.
[34]（第215段）這一陳述所指的是我們這種特殊品牌的無政府主義。許多不同的社會態度都被叫作“無政府主義”，而且許多自認為是無政府主義者的人可能不接受我們第215段的陳述。需要順便說明，如今有一場非暴力無政府主義運動，其成員多半不會接受FC為無政府主義者，也肯定不會贊同FC的暴力手段。

Some leftists may seem to oppose technology, but they will oppose it only so long as they are outsiders and the technological system is controlled by non-leftists. If leftism ever becomes dominant in society, so that the technological system becomes a tool in the hands of leftists, they will enthusiastically use it and promote its growth. In doing this they will be repeating a pattern that leftism has shown again and again in the past. When the Bolsheviks in Russia were outsiders, they vigorously opposed censorship and the secret police, they advocated self-determination for ethnic minorities, and so forth; but as soon as they came into power themselves, they imposed a tighter censorship and created a more ruthless secret police than any that had existed under the tsars, and they oppressed ethnic minorities at least as much as the tsars had done. In the United States, a couple of decades ago when leftists were a minority in our universities, leftist professors were vigorous proponents of academic freedom, but today, in those universities where leftists have become dominant, they have shown themselves ready to take away from everyone else's academic freedom. (This is "political correctness.") The same will happen with leftists and technology: They will use it to oppress everyone else if they ever get it under their own control.

216
一些左派看上去似乎反對技術，但那只不過是因為他們是體系外的人，而技術體系是由非左派控制的。如果左派成為了社會的主導力量，從而技術體系變成了左派手中的工具，他們就會熱情地使用它，促進它的成長。這樣，他們就會重複左派在過去一再顯現的模式。當俄羅斯的布爾什維克位於體系外的時候，他們起勁地反對新聞檢查和秘密警察，他們支待少數民族自決權，等等；但是一旦他們自己掌握了政權，他們卻實施了比任何沙皇都更嚴厲的新聞檢查，創建了比任何沙皇都更殘酷的秘密警察，而且他們壓迫少數民族也不遜於任何沙皇。在美國，當幾十年前左派在大學裡還是少數時，左派教授們起勁地鼓吹學術自由，而今天，在大多數大學裡左派已佔據了主導地位，他們卻表明隨時準備剝奪他人的學術自由（這就是所謂的“政治正確性”）左派與技術的關係也是一樣；只要他們控制了技術，他們就會利用它去壓迫別人。

In earlier revolutions, leftists of the most power-hungry type, repeatedly, have first cooperated with non-leftist revolutionaries, as well as with leftists of a more libertarian inclination, and later have double-crossed them to seize power for themselves. Robespierre did this in the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks did it in the Russian Revolution, the communists did it in Spain in 1938 and Castro and his followers did it in Cuba. Given the past history of leftism, it would be utterly foolish for non-leftist revolutionaries today to collaborate with leftists.

217
在過去的革命中，最為權力飢渴的左派反覆先與非左派革命者和比較有自由派傾向的左派合作，然後再欺騙他們，以便自己攫取權力。在法國革命中，羅伯斯庇爾是這樣做的，在俄國革命中，布爾什維克是這樣做的，1938年的西班牙共產黨人是這徉做的，卡斯特羅及其追隨者也是這樣做的。回顧左派過去的歷史，非左派革命者與左派合作乃是最愚蠢不過的事。

Various thinkers have pointed out that leftism is a kind of religion. Leftism is not a religion in the strict sense because leftist doctrine does not postulate the existence of any supernatural being. But for the leftist, leftism plays a psychological role much like that which religion plays for some people. The leftist NEEDS to believe in leftism; it plays a vital role in his psychological economy. His beliefs are not easily modified by logic or facts. He has a deep conviction that leftism is morally Right with a capital R, and that he has not only a right but a duty to impose leftist morality on everyone. (However, many of the people we are referring to as "leftists" do not think of themselves as leftists and would not describe their system of beliefs as leftism. We use the term "leftism" because we don't know of any better words to designate the spectrum of related creeds that includes the feminist, gay rights, political correctness, etc., movements, and because these movements have a strong affinity with the old left. See paragraphs 227-230.)

218
各種各樣的思想家曾指出，左派思想是一種宗教。左派思想並非嚴格意義上的宗教，因為左派的學說不假定任何超自然事物的存在。但對於左派人士來說，左派思想所起的心理學作用和宗教對於某些人所起的作用十分相像。左派人士需要信仰左派思想；這在他的心理經濟學中起著生死攸關的作用。他的信仰不會輕易被邏輯或事實改變。他深深地相信左派在道德上真正正確，而他不僅有權力而且有責任將左派的道德強加於每一個人。（無論如何，許多我們指稱為“左派”的人並不認為自己是左派，也不把他們的信仰系統描述成左派思想。我們使用“左派”這個術語是因為我們不知道有更好的詞彙來標識包括女權主義、同性戀權利、政治正確性等運動的一整套相關的信條，也是因為這些運動與老左派有著親緣關係。參見第227-230段）

Leftism is totalitarian force. Wherever leftism is in a position of power it tends to invade every private corner and force every thought into a leftist mold. In part this is because of the quasi-religious character of leftism; everything contrary to leftists beliefs represents Sin. More importantly, leftism is a totalitarian force because of the leftists' drive for power. The leftist seeks to satisfy his need for power through identification with a social movement and he tries to go through the power process by helping to pursue and attain the goals of the movement (see paragraph 83). But no matter how far the movement has gone in attaining its goals the leftist is never satisfied, because his activism is a surrogate activity (see paragraph 41). That is, the leftist's real motive is not to attain the ostensible goals of leftism; in reality he is motivated by the sense of power he gets from struggling for and then reaching a social goal.[35]

219
左派是極權主義力量。無論左派在什麼地方掌握了權力，它都往往會侵入每一個私人領域並強行把每一個人的思想都改造成為左派。這部分地是由於左派的准宗教性質。任何與左派信仰相悖的東西都代表罪孽。左派成為一股極權主義力量的更重要原因是左派的權力慾。左派尋求通過認同於一個社會運動來滿足白己的權力慾，並且試圖通過參與追求和實現該運動的目標來體驗權力過程（參見第83段）。但是，無論該運動在實現其目標方面獲得了多大的成功，左派都不會滿足，因為他的行動主義是一種替代性活動（參見41段）。這是指左派的真實動機並非是實現左派表面上追求的目標，而是他可以通過追求實現某個社會目標而獲得權力感 [35]。

[35]. (Paragraph 219) Many leftists are motivated also by hostility, but the hostility probably results in part from a frustrated need for power.
[35]（第219段）許多左派的動機是敵意，但敵意多半是權力慾受挫所導致的。

Consequently the leftist is never satisfied with the goals he has already attained; his need for the power process leads him always to pursue some new goal. The leftist wants equal opportunities for minorities. When that is attained he insists on statistical equality of achievement by minorities. And as long as anyone harbors in some corner of his mind a negative attitude toward some minority, the leftist has to re-educated him. And ethnic minorities are not enough; no one can be allowed to have a negative attitude toward homosexuals, disabled people, fat people, old people, ugly people, and on and on and on. It's not enough that the public should be informed about the hazards of smoking; a warning has to be stamped on every package of cigarettes. Then cigarette advertising has to be restricted if not banned. The activists will never be satisfied until tobacco is outlawed, and after that it will be alco hot then junk food, etc. Activists have fought gross child abuse, which is reasonable. But now they want to stop all spanking. When they have done that they will want to ban something else they consider unwholesome, then another thing and then another. They will never be satisfied until they have complete control over all child rearing practices. And then they will move on to another cause.
因此，左派決不會滿足於他已實現的目標。他對於權力過程的追求將永遠引導他撲向某些新的目標。左派要求少數民族的平等機會。當這已實現了之後，他又要求少數民族的成就在統計上的平等。只要任何人在其思想深處還藏有對於某個少數民族的負面看法，左派就要對他實行再教育。而且少數民族還不夠，任何人也不允許對同性戀、殘疾人，胖子、老人、醜人等等等等持有負面看法。告訴公眾吸菸的危害還不夠；還必須把警告印在每一盒香菸上。然後香菸廣告即使未被禁止也受到了限制。香菸一天不禁止，行動主義者們就一天不滿意，而在此之後會是酒，然後又是不良食品，等等。行動主義者們反對兒童虐待，這是合理的，但現在他們要完全禁止打屁股。當他們實現這一點之後，他們又要禁止其它他們認為有害於身心健康的東西，一件又一件。在完全控制兒童的養育習俗之前，他們是不會滿足的。而後他們又將向另一個問題下手。

Suppose you asked leftists to make a list of ALL the things that were wrong with society, and then suppose you instituted EVERY social change that they demanded. It is safe to say that within a couple of years the majority of leftists would find something new to complain about, some new social "evil" to correct because, once again, the leftist is motivated less by distress at society's ills than by the need to satisfy his drive for power by imposing his solutions on society.

220
假定你叫左派列一張表，寫上所有社會上不正確的東西，然後假定你實行了他們要求的每一個社會變化。可以十分有把握地說，不出幾年，大多數左派又會發現某些新的東西要抱怨，某些新的社會“邪惡”要糾正。因為，我們再說一遍，左派的動機不是對於社會弊病的憂患，而是把他的解決辦法強加給社會以滿足權力慾的需要.

Because of the restrictions placed on their thoughts and behavior by their high level of socialization, many leftists of the over-socialized type cannot pursue power in the ways that other people do. For them the drive for power has only one morally acceptable outlet, and that is in the struggle to impose their morality on everyone.

221
由於其高度社會化水平對其思想和行為的限制，許多過度社會化類型的左派不能以其他人的方式追求權力。對於他們來說，權力慾在道德上只有一個可接受的宣洩口，就是把他們的道德強加於每一個人的鬥爭。

Leftists, especially those of the oversocialized type, are True Believers in the sense of Eric Hoffer's book, "The True Believer." But not all True Believers are of the same psychological type as leftists. Presumably a truebelieving nazi, for instance is very different psychologically from a truebelieving leftist. Because of their capacity for single-minded devotion to a cause, True Believers are a useful, perhaps a necessary, ingredient of any revolutionary movement. This presents a problem with which we must admit we don't know how to deal. We aren't sure how to harness the energies of the True Believer to a revolution against technology. At present all we can say is that no True Believer will make a safe recruit to the revolution unless his commitment is exclusively to the destruction of technology. If he is committed also to another ideal, he may want to use technology as a tool for pursuing that other ideal (see paragraphs 220, 221).

222
左派，特別是過度社會化的左派，是Eric Hoffer所著《真正的信仰者》（The True Believer）一書當中所謂的真正的信仰者。但不是所有真正有信仰的人都與左派是同一個心理類型。例如.納粹的真正信徒多半在心理上與左派的真正信徒是十分不同的。由於能夠一心一意地獻身於某種事業，真正的信徒對於任何革命運動都是有用且多半必不可少的成分。這就給我們帶來了一個我們必須承認不知道怎麼處理的間題。我們不知道如何將真正信徒的能量用於一場反對技術的革命。我們現在只能說，除非一個真正的信徒執著一念地獻身於摧毀技術，否則革命運動吸收他將是不安全的。如果他還獻身於其他理想。他就很可能要利用技術去實現那個理想（參看220, 221段）

Some readers may say, "This stuff about leftism is a lot of crap. I know John and Jane who are leftish types and they don't have all these totalitarian tendencies." It's quite true that many leftists, possibly even a numerical majority, are decent people who sincerely believe in tolerating others' values (up to a point) and wouldn't want to use high-handed methods to reach their social goals. Our remarks about leftism are not meant to apply to every individual leftist but to describe the general character of leftism as a movement. And the general character of a movement is not necessarily determined by the numerical proportions of the various kinds of people involved in the movement.

223
有些讀者會說“這些關於左派的話都是一派胡言。我認識約翰和珍妮，他們都是左派，而他們沒有任何極權主義傾向。”確買許多左派——單純從數字上看多半還是大多數——是正派人，他們真誠地相信應該寬容其他人的價值觀（某種程度上），而且不想用高壓手段來實現他們的社會目標。我們對於左派的評論並不意味著適用於每一個左派個人，而是描述左派作為一個運動的一般特性。而一個運動的一般特性並不一定由捲入這個運動的各式各樣的人們的數量比例所決定。

The people who rise to positions of power in leftist movements tend to be leftists of the most power-hungry type because power-hungry people are those who strive hardest to get into positions of power. Once the power-hungry types have captured control of the movement, there are many leftists of a gentler breed who inwardly disapprove of many of the actions of the leaders, but cannot bring themselves to oppose them. They NEED their faith in the movement, and because they cannot give up this faith they go along with the leaders. True, SOME leftists do have the guts to oppose the totalitarian tendencies that emerge, but they generally lose, because the power-hungry types are better organized, are more ruthless and Machiavellian and have taken care to build themselves a strong power base.

224
那些在左派運動中上升到掌權位置的人多半是最權力飢渴型的左派，因為權力飢渴型的人才是最努力奮鬥以求躋身權力層的人。一旦權力飢渴型的人攫取了運動的控制權，雖然有許多更溫和厚道的左派在內心中會不贊同領導人的行動，但他們也不會起來反對這些領導人。他們需要信仰他們的運動，而因為他們不能放棄這個信仰，所以他們只能跟著他們的領導入走。確實，某些左派有膽量反對出現的極權主義傾向，但他們一般會失敗，因為權力飢渴類型的人組織得更好，更殘酷無情，更馬基雅維利，並己經為自己建立了強大的權力基礎。

These phenomena appeared clearly in Russia and other countries that were taken over by leftists. Similarly, before the breakdown of communism in the USSR, leftish types in the West would seldom criticize that country. If prodded they would admit that the USSR did many wrong things, but then they would try to find excuses for the communists and begin talking about the faults of the West. They always opposed Western military resistance to communist aggression. Leftish types all over the world vigorously protested the U.S. military action in Vietnam, but when the USSR invaded Afghanistan they did nothing. Not that they approved of the Soviet actions; but because of their leftist faith, they just couldn't bear to put themselves in opposition to communism. Today, in those of our universities where "political correctness" has become dominant, there are probably many leftish types who privately disapprove of the suppression of academic freedom, but they go along with it anyway.

225
這些現象在俄國和其他被左派奪取了政權的國家曾十分明顯地出現過十分類似，在蘇聯的共產主義崩潰之前，西方的左派很少批評那個國家。如果盯住他們問，他們會承認蘇聯做了許多錯事，但然後他們就會替共產黨找藉口並開始談論西方的毛病。他們總是反對西方對共產黨的侵略進行軍事抵杭。全世界的左派都起勁地抗議美國在越南的軍事行動，但當蘇聯入侵阿富汗時，他們就都不說話了。他們並不是贊同蘇聯的行動，而是由於他們的左派信仰，使他們實在沒法讓自己反對共產主義，今天，在我們的那些“政治正確性”佔了主導地位的大學裡，多半也有許多左派私下裡並不贊同壓制學術自由，但他們無論如何都跟著走。

Thus the fact that many individual leftists are personally mild and fairly tolerant people by no means prevents leftism as a whole form having a totalitarian tendency.

226
因此，儘管許多左派個人確實性情溫和且頗為寬容，絕不意味著整體上的左派運動能夠免於集權主義傾向。

Our discussion of leftism has a serious weakness. It is still far from clear what we mean by the word "leftist." There doesn't seem to be much we can do about this. Today leftism is fragmented into a whole spectrum of activist movements. Yet not all activist movements are leftist, and some activist movements (e.g.., radical environmentalism) seem to include both personalities of the leftist type and personalities of thoroughly un-leftist types who ought to know better than to collaborate with leftists. Varieties of leftists fade out gradually into varieties of non-leftists and we ourselves would often be hard-pressed to decide whether a given individual is or is not a leftist. To the extent that it is defined at all, our conception of leftism is defined by the discussion of it that we have given in this article, and we can only advise the reader to use his own judgment in deciding who is a leftist.

227
我們對於左派主義的討論有一個嚴重的缺陷。我們對於“左派主義者”的定義依舊遠未明晰。對此我們似乎無能為力。今天的左派主義已經分裂成了一系列的運動。然而並非所有的運動者都是左派主義者。而且有一些運動（例如極端環保主義）當中似乎既包含了左派主義者，也包含了徹底的非左派主義者，而後者原本應當更為明智一些，而不是與左派主義者合作。左派主義者的種類逐漸隱入了非左派主義者的分類當中，我們在確定某人是不是左派主義者時也經常犯難。如果說左派主義者還有個定義的話，我們對這個詞的概念就是由本文當中的討論來定義的，我們僅能建議讀者運用自己的判斷來確定誰才是左派主義者。

But it will be helpful to list some criteria for diagnosing leftism. These criteria cannot be applied in a cut and dried manner. Some individuals may meet some of the criteria without being leftists, some leftists may not meet any of the criteria. Again, you just have to use your judgment.

228
但是為了診斷左派主義而列舉一批標準將會很有好處。這些標準不能機械地加以應用。有些不是左派主義者的個人或許也會符合某幾條標準，還有些左派主義者或許一條標準也不符合。讀者必須運用自己的判斷力。

The leftist is oriented toward largescale collectivism. He emphasizes the duty of the individual to serve society and the duty of society to take care of the individual. He has a negative attitude toward individualism. He often takes a moralistic tone. He tends to be for gun control, for sex education and other psychologically "enlightened" educational methods, for planning, for affirmative action, for multiculturalism. He tends to identify with victims. He tends to be against competition and against violence, but he often finds excuses for those leftists who do commit violence. He is fond of using the common catch-phrases of the left like "racism, " "sexism, " "homophobia, " "capitalism," "imperialism," "neocolonialism " "genocide," "social change," "social justice," "social responsibility." Maybe the best diagnostic trait of the leftist is his tendency to sympathize with the following movements: feminism, gay rights, ethnic rights, disability rights, animal rights political correctness. Anyone who strongly sympathizes with ALL of these movements is almost certainly a leftist. [36]

229
左派主義者的追求地大規模集體主義。他強調個人服務社會的義務與社會照料個人的義務。他對個人主義持負面看法。他經常採取說教的口吻。他傾向於支持槍支管制、性教育與其他心理“啟蒙”教育方式、國家計畫、平權運動以及文化多元主義。他傾向於認同被害者。他傾向於反對競爭與暴力，但他也經常為使用暴力的左派主義者進行開脫。他慣於使用左派的常用語，例如“種族主義”、“性歧視主義”、“恐同”、“資本主義”、“帝國主義”、“新殖民主義”、“種族滅絕”、“社會變革”、“社會正義”以及“社會責任”。或許一位左派主義者的最明顯診斷特徵就是他傾向於同情下列運動：女權運動、同性戀權益、少數族裔權益、殘疾人權益、動物權益以及政治正確。任何強烈同情上述所有運動的個人幾乎可以肯定是一位左派主義者。[36]

[36]. (Paragraph 229) It is important to understand that we mean someone who sympathizes with these MOVEMENTS as they exist today in our society. One who believes that women, homosexuals, etc., should have equal rights is not necessarily a leftist. The feminist, gay rights, etc., movements that exist in our society have the particular ideological tone that characterizes leftism, and if one believes, for example, that women should have equal rights it does not necessarily follow that one must sympathize with the feminist movement as it exists today.
[36]（第229段）必須懂得我們所指的是那些同情我們今天社會中這些運動的人。一個相信婦女、同性戀等等應有平等權力的人不一定就是左派。我們今天社會的婦女解放、同性戀權利等等運動有著一種特殊的意識形態調門。這種調門是左派的特性；而且如果一個人相信例如婦女應當有平等權力，井不一定就等於他必須同情現今的女權運動。

The more dangerous leftists, that is, those who are most power-hungry, are often characterized by arrogance or by a dogmatic approach to ideology. However, the most dangerous leftists of all may be certain oversocialized types who avoid irritating displays of aggressiveness and refrain from advertising their leftism, but work quietly and unobtrusively to promote collectivist values, "enlightened" psychological techniques for socializing children, dependence of the individual on the system, and so forth. These crypto-leftists (as we may call them) approximate certain bourgeois types as far as practical action is concerned, but differ from them in psychology, ideology and motivation. The ordinary bourgeois tries to bring people under control of the system in order to protect his way of life, or he does so simply because his attitudes are conventional. The crypto-leftist tries to bring people under control of the system because he is a True Believer in a collectivistic ideology. The crypto-leftist is differentiated from the average leftist of the oversocialized type by the fact that his rebellious impulse is weaker and he is more securely socialized. He is differentiated from the ordinary well-socialized bourgeois by the fact that there is some deep lack within him that makes it necessary for him to devote himself to a cause and immerse himself in a collectivity. And maybe his (well-sublimated) drive for power is stronger than that of the average bourgeois.

230
人們經常將傲慢或者教條化的意識形態當做更為危險的左派主義者的特徵，即最為渴望權力的那部分人。但是最為危險的左派主義者往往都是過度社會化的人，他們從不咄咄逼人令人氣惱，也從不公開宣揚左派主義，而是安靜且不動聲色地推動集體主義價值觀、將兒童社會化的“啟蒙”心理技巧、個人對於體系的依賴以及其他種種。這些隱蔽左派主義者（姑且這麼稱呼他們一下）在實際作為方面與某些小資產階級份子很接近，但是在心理、意識形態與動機方面都不相同。一般的小資產階級份子試圖將民眾置於體系控制之下，從而維護自己的生活方式，或者僅僅是因為他的態度很傳統。隱蔽左派主義者試圖將民眾置於體系控制之下，因為他當真相信集體主義價值觀。隱蔽左派主義者與一般過度社會化左派主義者的區別在於他的叛逆衝動較弱且社會化程度更鞏固。他與一般社會化程度相當的小資產階級的卻別在於他內心存在著深刻的缺失，使他必須投身於某項事業並融入某個集體。或許他的（高度昇華的）權欲比一般小資產階級要高。

FINAL NOTE
最後的話

Throughout this article we've made imprecise statements and statements that ought to have had all sorts of qualifications and reservations attached to them; and some of our statements may be flatly false. Lack of sufficient information and the need for brevity made it impossible for us to fomulate our assertions more precisely or add all the necessary qualifications. And of course in a discussion of this kind one must rely heavily on intuitive judgment, and that can sometimes be wrong. So we don't claim that this article expresses more than a crude approximation to the truth.

231
在通篇文章中，我們進行了不精確的陳述，以及應該附帶各種限定條件與保留的陳述，其中有些可能是錯誤的。信息的不充分和簡明的需要使得我們不可能更準確地系統闡述我們的斷言或者列出所有必要的限制。而且這類討論當然是要依靠直覺判斷的。所以我們承認這篇文章表達的只是極為粗陋的近似真理。

All the same we are reasonably confident that the general outlines of the picture we have painted here are roughly correct. We have portrayed leftism in its modern form as a phenomenon peculiar to our time and as a symptom of the disruption of the power process. But we might possibly be wrong about this. Oversocialized types who try to satisfy their drive for power by imposing their morality on everyone have certainly been around for a long time. But we THINK that the decisive role played by feelings of inferiority, low self-esteem, powerlessness, identification with victims by people who are not themselves victims, is a peculiarity of modern leftism. Identification with victims by people not themselves victims can be seen to some extent in 19th century leftism and early Christianity but as far as we can make out, symptoms of low self-esteem, etc., were not nearly so evident in these movements, or in any other movements, as they are in modern leftism. But we are not in a position to assert confidently that no such movements have existed prior to modern leftism. This is a significant question to which historians ought to give their attention.

232
儘管如此，我們有理由相信我們在此勾畫的輪廓大致正確。我們把現代形態的左派描述成為了我們所屬時代的特殊現象，一種因權力過程受到打斷而產生的症狀。但我們在這一點上也很可能錯了。試圖將自己的道德強加於每一個人而滿足其權力慾的過度社會化類型肯定很早就存在了。但是我們認為自卑感、缺乏自尊、無力感、自己不是受害者卻認同受害者等症狀起到決定性作用是現代左派獨有的特點。自己不是受害者卻認同於受害者這一現象在某種程度上可以在十九世紀的左派和早期基督教中看到，但據我們所知，缺乏自尊等症狀在上述運動以及任何其他運動中，都不像在現代左派中那麼明顯。但我們並不能自信地斷言，在現代左派之前就從來沒有存在過這樣的運動。這是一個應該引起歷史學家注意的重要問題。

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